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[tor-commits] [tor/master] Split code for entry guards and bridges into a new module.
commit 9e9edf71f7d3093b4ac1fe61ccc6dad2976e0a1e
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon Oct 15 14:28:23 2012 -0400
Split code for entry guards and bridges into a new module.
---
changes/split_circuitbuild | 2 +
src/or/entrynodes.c | 1945 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/or/entrynodes.h | 101 +++
3 files changed, 2048 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/split_circuitbuild b/changes/split_circuitbuild
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..17fbd69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/split_circuitbuild
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+ o Code simplification and refactoring:
+ - Move the entry node code from circuitbuild.c to its own file.
diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a9651d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1945 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2012, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file entrynodes.c
+ * \brief Code to manage our fixed first nodes for various functions.
+ *
+ * Entry nodes can be guards (for general use) or bridges (for censorship
+ * circumvention).
+ **/
+
+#include "or.h"
+#include "circuitbuild.c"
+#include "config.h"
+#include "connection.h"
+#include "connection_or.h"
+#include "control.h"
+#include "directory.h"
+#include "entrynodes.h"
+#include "nodelist.h"
+#include "policies.h"
+#include "router.h"
+#include "routerlist.h"
+#include "routerparse.h"
+#include "routerset.h"
+#include "transports.h"
+#include "statefile.h"
+
+/** Information about a configured bridge. Currently this just matches the
+ * ones in the torrc file, but one day we may be able to learn about new
+ * bridges on our own, and remember them in the state file. */
+typedef struct {
+ /** Address of the bridge. */
+ tor_addr_t addr;
+ /** TLS port for the bridge. */
+ uint16_t port;
+ /** Boolean: We are re-parsing our bridge list, and we are going to remove
+ * this one if we don't find it in the list of configured bridges. */
+ unsigned marked_for_removal : 1;
+ /** Expected identity digest, or all zero bytes if we don't know what the
+ * digest should be. */
+ char identity[DIGEST_LEN];
+
+ /** Name of pluggable transport protocol taken from its config line. */
+ char *transport_name;
+
+ /** When should we next try to fetch a descriptor for this bridge? */
+ download_status_t fetch_status;
+} bridge_info_t;
+
+/** A list of our chosen entry guards. */
+static smartlist_t *entry_guards = NULL;
+/** A value of 1 means that the entry_guards list has changed
+ * and those changes need to be flushed to disk. */
+static int entry_guards_dirty = 0;
+
+static void bridge_free(bridge_info_t *bridge);
+
+/** Return the list of entry guards, creating it if necessary. */
+const smartlist_t *
+get_entry_guards(void)
+{
+ if (! entry_guards)
+ entry_guards = smartlist_new();
+ return entry_guards;
+}
+
+/** Check whether the entry guard <b>e</b> is usable, given the directory
+ * authorities' opinion about the router (stored in <b>ri</b>) and the user's
+ * configuration (in <b>options</b>). Set <b>e</b>->bad_since
+ * accordingly. Return true iff the entry guard's status changes.
+ *
+ * If it's not usable, set *<b>reason</b> to a static string explaining why.
+ */
+static int
+entry_guard_set_status(entry_guard_t *e, const node_t *node,
+ time_t now, const or_options_t *options,
+ const char **reason)
+{
+ char buf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
+ int changed = 0;
+
+ *reason = NULL;
+
+ /* Do we want to mark this guard as bad? */
+ if (!node)
+ *reason = "unlisted";
+ else if (!node->is_running)
+ *reason = "down";
+ else if (options->UseBridges && (!node->ri ||
+ node->ri->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE))
+ *reason = "not a bridge";
+ else if (options->UseBridges && !node_is_a_configured_bridge(node))
+ *reason = "not a configured bridge";
+ else if (!options->UseBridges && !node->is_possible_guard &&
+ !routerset_contains_node(options->EntryNodes,node))
+ *reason = "not recommended as a guard";
+ else if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeNodes, node))
+ *reason = "excluded";
+ else if (e->path_bias_disabled)
+ *reason = "path-biased";
+
+ if (*reason && ! e->bad_since) {
+ /* Router is newly bad. */
+ base16_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard %s (%s) is %s: marking as unusable.",
+ e->nickname, buf, *reason);
+
+ e->bad_since = now;
+ control_event_guard(e->nickname, e->identity, "BAD");
+ changed = 1;
+ } else if (!*reason && e->bad_since) {
+ /* There's nothing wrong with the router any more. */
+ base16_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard %s (%s) is no longer unusable: "
+ "marking as ok.", e->nickname, buf);
+
+ e->bad_since = 0;
+ control_event_guard(e->nickname, e->identity, "GOOD");
+ changed = 1;
+ }
+ return changed;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff enough time has passed since we last tried to connect
+ * to the unreachable guard <b>e</b> that we're willing to try again. */
+static int
+entry_is_time_to_retry(entry_guard_t *e, time_t now)
+{
+ long diff;
+ if (e->last_attempted < e->unreachable_since)
+ return 1;
+ diff = now - e->unreachable_since;
+ if (diff < 6*60*60)
+ return now > (e->last_attempted + 60*60);
+ else if (diff < 3*24*60*60)
+ return now > (e->last_attempted + 4*60*60);
+ else if (diff < 7*24*60*60)
+ return now > (e->last_attempted + 18*60*60);
+ else
+ return now > (e->last_attempted + 36*60*60);
+}
+
+/** Return the node corresponding to <b>e</b>, if <b>e</b> is
+ * working well enough that we are willing to use it as an entry
+ * right now. (Else return NULL.) In particular, it must be
+ * - Listed as either up or never yet contacted;
+ * - Present in the routerlist;
+ * - Listed as 'stable' or 'fast' by the current dirserver consensus,
+ * if demanded by <b>need_uptime</b> or <b>need_capacity</b>
+ * (unless it's a configured EntryNode);
+ * - Allowed by our current ReachableORAddresses config option; and
+ * - Currently thought to be reachable by us (unless <b>assume_reachable</b>
+ * is true).
+ *
+ * If the answer is no, set *<b>msg</b> to an explanation of why.
+ */
+static INLINE const node_t *
+entry_is_live(entry_guard_t *e, int need_uptime, int need_capacity,
+ int assume_reachable, const char **msg)
+{
+ const node_t *node;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ tor_assert(msg);
+
+ if (e->path_bias_disabled) {
+ *msg = "path-biased";
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (e->bad_since) {
+ *msg = "bad";
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* no good if it's unreachable, unless assume_unreachable or can_retry. */
+ if (!assume_reachable && !e->can_retry &&
+ e->unreachable_since && !entry_is_time_to_retry(e, time(NULL))) {
+ *msg = "unreachable";
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ node = node_get_by_id(e->identity);
+ if (!node || !node_has_descriptor(node)) {
+ *msg = "no descriptor";
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (get_options()->UseBridges) {
+ if (node_get_purpose(node) != ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE) {
+ *msg = "not a bridge";
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!node_is_a_configured_bridge(node)) {
+ *msg = "not a configured bridge";
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else { /* !get_options()->UseBridges */
+ if (node_get_purpose(node) != ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL) {
+ *msg = "not general-purpose";
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (routerset_contains_node(options->EntryNodes, node)) {
+ /* they asked for it, they get it */
+ need_uptime = need_capacity = 0;
+ }
+ if (node_is_unreliable(node, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0)) {
+ *msg = "not fast/stable";
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!fascist_firewall_allows_node(node)) {
+ *msg = "unreachable by config";
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return node;
+}
+
+/** Return the number of entry guards that we think are usable. */
+static int
+num_live_entry_guards(void)
+{
+ int n = 0;
+ const char *msg;
+ if (! entry_guards)
+ return 0;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
+ {
+ if (entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0, &msg))
+ ++n;
+ });
+ return n;
+}
+
+/** If <b>digest</b> matches the identity of any node in the
+ * entry_guards list, return that node. Else return NULL. */
+entry_guard_t *
+entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(const char *digest)
+{
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
+ if (tor_memeq(digest, entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN))
+ return entry;
+ );
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/** Dump a description of our list of entry guards to the log at level
+ * <b>severity</b>. */
+static void
+log_entry_guards(int severity)
+{
+ smartlist_t *elements = smartlist_new();
+ char *s;
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e)
+ {
+ const char *msg = NULL;
+ if (entry_is_live(e, 0, 1, 0, &msg))
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(elements, "%s [%s] (up %s)",
+ e->nickname,
+ hex_str(e->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
+ e->made_contact ? "made-contact" : "never-contacted");
+ else
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(elements, "%s [%s] (%s, %s)",
+ e->nickname,
+ hex_str(e->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
+ msg,
+ e->made_contact ? "made-contact" : "never-contacted");
+ }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
+
+ s = smartlist_join_strings(elements, ",", 0, NULL);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(elements, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(elements);
+ log_fn(severity,LD_CIRC,"%s",s);
+ tor_free(s);
+}
+
+/** Called when one or more guards that we would previously have used for some
+ * purpose are no longer in use because a higher-priority guard has become
+ * usable again. */
+static void
+control_event_guard_deferred(void)
+{
+ /* XXXX We don't actually have a good way to figure out _how many_ entries
+ * are live for some purpose. We need an entry_is_even_slightly_live()
+ * function for this to work right. NumEntryGuards isn't reliable: if we
+ * need guards with weird properties, we can have more than that number
+ * live.
+ **/
+#if 0
+ int n = 0;
+ const char *msg;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ if (!entry_guards)
+ return;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
+ {
+ if (entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0, &msg)) {
+ if (n++ == options->NumEntryGuards) {
+ control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DEFERRED");
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ });
+#endif
+}
+
+/** Add a new (preferably stable and fast) router to our
+ * entry_guards list. Return a pointer to the router if we succeed,
+ * or NULL if we can't find any more suitable entries.
+ *
+ * If <b>chosen</b> is defined, use that one, and if it's not
+ * already in our entry_guards list, put it at the *beginning*.
+ * Else, put the one we pick at the end of the list. */
+static const node_t *
+add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status, int prepend)
+{
+ const node_t *node;
+ entry_guard_t *entry;
+
+ if (chosen) {
+ node = chosen;
+ entry = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(node->identity);
+ if (entry) {
+ if (reset_status) {
+ entry->bad_since = 0;
+ entry->can_retry = 1;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ node = choose_good_entry_server(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, NULL);
+ if (!node)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ entry = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_t));
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Chose %s as new entry guard.",
+ node_describe(node));
+ strlcpy(entry->nickname, node_get_nickname(node), sizeof(entry->nickname));
+ memcpy(entry->identity, node->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ /* Choose expiry time smudged over the past month. The goal here
+ * is to a) spread out when Tor clients rotate their guards, so they
+ * don't all select them on the same day, and b) avoid leaving a
+ * precise timestamp in the state file about when we first picked
+ * this guard. For details, see the Jan 2010 or-dev thread. */
+ entry->chosen_on_date = time(NULL) - crypto_rand_int(3600*24*30);
+ entry->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(VERSION);
+ if (prepend)
+ smartlist_insert(entry_guards, 0, entry);
+ else
+ smartlist_add(entry_guards, entry);
+ control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "NEW");
+ control_event_guard_deferred();
+ log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
+ return node;
+}
+
+/** If the use of entry guards is configured, choose more entry guards
+ * until we have enough in the list. */
+static void
+pick_entry_guards(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ int changed = 0;
+
+ tor_assert(entry_guards);
+
+ while (num_live_entry_guards() < options->NumEntryGuards) {
+ if (!add_an_entry_guard(NULL, 0, 0))
+ break;
+ changed = 1;
+ }
+ if (changed)
+ entry_guards_changed();
+}
+
+/** How long (in seconds) do we allow an entry guard to be nonfunctional,
+ * unlisted, excluded, or otherwise nonusable before we give up on it? */
+#define ENTRY_GUARD_REMOVE_AFTER (30*24*60*60)
+
+/** Release all storage held by <b>e</b>. */
+static void
+entry_guard_free(entry_guard_t *e)
+{
+ if (!e)
+ return;
+ tor_free(e->chosen_by_version);
+ tor_free(e);
+}
+
+/** Remove any entry guard which was selected by an unknown version of Tor,
+ * or which was selected by a version of Tor that's known to select
+ * entry guards badly, or which was selected more 2 months ago. */
+/* XXXX The "obsolete guards" and "chosen long ago guards" things should
+ * probably be different functions. */
+static int
+remove_obsolete_entry_guards(time_t now)
+{
+ int changed = 0, i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(entry_guards); ++i) {
+ entry_guard_t *entry = smartlist_get(entry_guards, i);
+ const char *ver = entry->chosen_by_version;
+ const char *msg = NULL;
+ tor_version_t v;
+ int version_is_bad = 0, date_is_bad = 0;
+ if (!ver) {
+ msg = "does not say what version of Tor it was selected by";
+ version_is_bad = 1;
+ } else if (tor_version_parse(ver, &v)) {
+ msg = "does not seem to be from any recognized version of Tor";
+ version_is_bad = 1;
+ } else {
+ char *tor_ver = NULL;
+ tor_asprintf(&tor_ver, "Tor %s", ver);
+ if ((tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.1.0.10-alpha") &&
+ !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.1.2.16-dev")) ||
+ (tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.0.0-alpha") &&
+ !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.0.6-alpha")) ||
+ /* above are bug 440; below are bug 1217 */
+ (tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.1.3-alpha") &&
+ !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.1.23")) ||
+ (tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.2.0-alpha") &&
+ !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.2.7-alpha"))) {
+ msg = "was selected without regard for guard bandwidth";
+ version_is_bad = 1;
+ }
+ tor_free(tor_ver);
+ }
+ if (!version_is_bad && entry->chosen_on_date + 3600*24*60 < now) {
+ /* It's been 2 months since the date listed in our state file. */
+ msg = "was selected several months ago";
+ date_is_bad = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (version_is_bad || date_is_bad) { /* we need to drop it */
+ char dbuf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
+ tor_assert(msg);
+ base16_encode(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ log_fn(version_is_bad ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_INFO, LD_CIRC,
+ "Entry guard '%s' (%s) %s. (Version=%s.) Replacing it.",
+ entry->nickname, dbuf, msg, ver?escaped(ver):"none");
+ control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DROPPED");
+ entry_guard_free(entry);
+ smartlist_del_keeporder(entry_guards, i--);
+ log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
+ changed = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return changed ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/** Remove all entry guards that have been down or unlisted for so
+ * long that we don't think they'll come up again. Return 1 if we
+ * removed any, or 0 if we did nothing. */
+static int
+remove_dead_entry_guards(time_t now)
+{
+ char dbuf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
+ char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ int i;
+ int changed = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(entry_guards); ) {
+ entry_guard_t *entry = smartlist_get(entry_guards, i);
+ if (entry->bad_since &&
+ ! entry->path_bias_disabled &&
+ entry->bad_since + ENTRY_GUARD_REMOVE_AFTER < now) {
+
+ base16_encode(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ format_local_iso_time(tbuf, entry->bad_since);
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard '%s' (%s) has been down or unlisted "
+ "since %s local time; removing.",
+ entry->nickname, dbuf, tbuf);
+ control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DROPPED");
+ entry_guard_free(entry);
+ smartlist_del_keeporder(entry_guards, i);
+ log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
+ changed = 1;
+ } else
+ ++i;
+ }
+ return changed ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/** A new directory or router-status has arrived; update the down/listed
+ * status of the entry guards.
+ *
+ * An entry is 'down' if the directory lists it as nonrunning.
+ * An entry is 'unlisted' if the directory doesn't include it.
+ *
+ * Don't call this on startup; only on a fresh download. Otherwise we'll
+ * think that things are unlisted.
+ */
+void
+entry_guards_compute_status(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
+{
+ int changed = 0;
+ digestmap_t *reasons;
+
+ if (! entry_guards)
+ return;
+
+ if (options->EntryNodes) /* reshuffle the entry guard list if needed */
+ entry_nodes_should_be_added();
+
+ reasons = digestmap_new();
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry)
+ {
+ const node_t *r = node_get_by_id(entry->identity);
+ const char *reason = NULL;
+ if (entry_guard_set_status(entry, r, now, options, &reason))
+ changed = 1;
+
+ if (entry->bad_since)
+ tor_assert(reason);
+ if (reason)
+ digestmap_set(reasons, entry->identity, (char*)reason);
+ }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry);
+
+ if (remove_dead_entry_guards(now))
+ changed = 1;
+ if (remove_obsolete_entry_guards(now))
+ changed = 1;
+
+ if (changed) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry) {
+ const char *reason = digestmap_get(reasons, entry->identity);
+ const char *live_msg = "";
+ const node_t *r = entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0, &live_msg);
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Summary: Entry %s [%s] is %s, %s%s%s, and %s%s.",
+ entry->nickname,
+ hex_str(entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
+ entry->unreachable_since ? "unreachable" : "reachable",
+ entry->bad_since ? "unusable" : "usable",
+ reason ? ", ": "",
+ reason ? reason : "",
+ r ? "live" : "not live / ",
+ r ? "" : live_msg);
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry);
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, " (%d/%d entry guards are usable/new)",
+ num_live_entry_guards(), smartlist_len(entry_guards));
+ log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
+ entry_guards_changed();
+ }
+
+ digestmap_free(reasons, NULL);
+}
+
+/** Called when a connection to an OR with the identity digest <b>digest</b>
+ * is established (<b>succeeded</b>==1) or has failed (<b>succeeded</b>==0).
+ * If the OR is an entry, change that entry's up/down status.
+ * Return 0 normally, or -1 if we want to tear down the new connection.
+ *
+ * If <b>mark_relay_status</b>, also call router_set_status() on this
+ * relay.
+ *
+ * XXX024 change succeeded and mark_relay_status into 'int flags'.
+ */
+int
+entry_guard_register_connect_status(const char *digest, int succeeded,
+ int mark_relay_status, time_t now)
+{
+ int changed = 0;
+ int refuse_conn = 0;
+ int first_contact = 0;
+ entry_guard_t *entry = NULL;
+ int idx = -1;
+ char buf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
+
+ if (! entry_guards)
+ return 0;
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) {
+ tor_assert(e);
+ if (tor_memeq(e->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ entry = e;
+ idx = e_sl_idx;
+ break;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
+
+ if (!entry)
+ return 0;
+
+ base16_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ if (succeeded) {
+ if (entry->unreachable_since) {
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard '%s' (%s) is now reachable again. Good.",
+ entry->nickname, buf);
+ entry->can_retry = 0;
+ entry->unreachable_since = 0;
+ entry->last_attempted = now;
+ control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "UP");
+ changed = 1;
+ }
+ if (!entry->made_contact) {
+ entry->made_contact = 1;
+ first_contact = changed = 1;
+ }
+ } else { /* ! succeeded */
+ if (!entry->made_contact) {
+ /* We've never connected to this one. */
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Connection to never-contacted entry guard '%s' (%s) failed. "
+ "Removing from the list. %d/%d entry guards usable/new.",
+ entry->nickname, buf,
+ num_live_entry_guards()-1, smartlist_len(entry_guards)-1);
+ control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DROPPED");
+ entry_guard_free(entry);
+ smartlist_del_keeporder(entry_guards, idx);
+ log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
+ changed = 1;
+ } else if (!entry->unreachable_since) {
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Unable to connect to entry guard '%s' (%s). "
+ "Marking as unreachable.", entry->nickname, buf);
+ entry->unreachable_since = entry->last_attempted = now;
+ control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DOWN");
+ changed = 1;
+ entry->can_retry = 0; /* We gave it an early chance; no good. */
+ } else {
+ char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ format_iso_time(tbuf, entry->unreachable_since);
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Failed to connect to unreachable entry guard "
+ "'%s' (%s). It has been unreachable since %s.",
+ entry->nickname, buf, tbuf);
+ entry->last_attempted = now;
+ entry->can_retry = 0; /* We gave it an early chance; no good. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* if the caller asked us to, also update the is_running flags for this
+ * relay */
+ if (mark_relay_status)
+ router_set_status(digest, succeeded);
+
+ if (first_contact) {
+ /* We've just added a new long-term entry guard. Perhaps the network just
+ * came back? We should give our earlier entries another try too,
+ * and close this connection so we don't use it before we've given
+ * the others a shot. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) {
+ if (e == entry)
+ break;
+ if (e->made_contact) {
+ const char *msg;
+ const node_t *r = entry_is_live(e, 0, 1, 1, &msg);
+ if (r && e->unreachable_since) {
+ refuse_conn = 1;
+ e->can_retry = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
+ if (refuse_conn) {
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Connected to new entry guard '%s' (%s). Marking earlier "
+ "entry guards up. %d/%d entry guards usable/new.",
+ entry->nickname, buf,
+ num_live_entry_guards(), smartlist_len(entry_guards));
+ log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
+ changed = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (changed)
+ entry_guards_changed();
+ return refuse_conn ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+/** When we try to choose an entry guard, should we parse and add
+ * config's EntryNodes first? */
+static int should_add_entry_nodes = 0;
+
+/** Called when the value of EntryNodes changes in our configuration. */
+void
+entry_nodes_should_be_added(void)
+{
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "EntryNodes config option set. Putting configured "
+ "relays at the front of the entry guard list.");
+ should_add_entry_nodes = 1;
+}
+
+/** Adjust the entry guards list so that it only contains entries from
+ * EntryNodes, adding new entries from EntryNodes to the list as needed. */
+static void
+entry_guards_set_from_config(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ smartlist_t *entry_nodes, *worse_entry_nodes, *entry_fps;
+ smartlist_t *old_entry_guards_on_list, *old_entry_guards_not_on_list;
+ tor_assert(entry_guards);
+
+ should_add_entry_nodes = 0;
+
+ if (!options->EntryNodes) {
+ /* It's possible that a controller set EntryNodes, thus making
+ * should_add_entry_nodes set, then cleared it again, all before the
+ * call to choose_random_entry() that triggered us. If so, just return.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ {
+ char *string = routerset_to_string(options->EntryNodes);
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,"Adding configured EntryNodes '%s'.", string);
+ tor_free(string);
+ }
+
+ entry_nodes = smartlist_new();
+ worse_entry_nodes = smartlist_new();
+ entry_fps = smartlist_new();
+ old_entry_guards_on_list = smartlist_new();
+ old_entry_guards_not_on_list = smartlist_new();
+
+ /* Split entry guards into those on the list and those not. */
+
+ routerset_get_all_nodes(entry_nodes, options->EntryNodes,
+ options->ExcludeNodes, 0);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_nodes, const node_t *,node,
+ smartlist_add(entry_fps, (void*)node->identity));
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, {
+ if (smartlist_digest_isin(entry_fps, e->identity))
+ smartlist_add(old_entry_guards_on_list, e);
+ else
+ smartlist_add(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, e);
+ });
+
+ /* Remove all currently configured guard nodes, excluded nodes, unreachable
+ * nodes, or non-Guard nodes from entry_nodes. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node) {
+ if (entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(node->identity)) {
+ SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
+ continue;
+ } else if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeNodes, node)) {
+ SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
+ continue;
+ } else if (!fascist_firewall_allows_node(node)) {
+ SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
+ continue;
+ } else if (! node->is_possible_guard) {
+ smartlist_add(worse_entry_nodes, (node_t*)node);
+ SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
+
+ /* Now build the new entry_guards list. */
+ smartlist_clear(entry_guards);
+ /* First, the previously configured guards that are in EntryNodes. */
+ smartlist_add_all(entry_guards, old_entry_guards_on_list);
+ /* Next, scramble the rest of EntryNodes, putting the guards first. */
+ smartlist_shuffle(entry_nodes);
+ smartlist_shuffle(worse_entry_nodes);
+ smartlist_add_all(entry_nodes, worse_entry_nodes);
+
+ /* Next, the rest of EntryNodes */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node) {
+ add_an_entry_guard(node, 0, 0);
+ if (smartlist_len(entry_guards) > options->NumEntryGuards * 10)
+ break;
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
+ log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "%d entries in guards", smartlist_len(entry_guards));
+ /* Finally, free the remaining previously configured guards that are not in
+ * EntryNodes. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, entry_guard_t *, e,
+ entry_guard_free(e));
+
+ smartlist_free(entry_nodes);
+ smartlist_free(worse_entry_nodes);
+ smartlist_free(entry_fps);
+ smartlist_free(old_entry_guards_on_list);
+ smartlist_free(old_entry_guards_not_on_list);
+ entry_guards_changed();
+}
+
+/** Return 0 if we're fine adding arbitrary routers out of the
+ * directory to our entry guard list, or return 1 if we have a
+ * list already and we must stick to it.
+ */
+int
+entry_list_is_constrained(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ if (options->EntryNodes)
+ return 1;
+ if (options->UseBridges)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Pick a live (up and listed) entry guard from entry_guards. If
+ * <b>state</b> is non-NULL, this is for a specific circuit --
+ * make sure not to pick this circuit's exit or any node in the
+ * exit's family. If <b>state</b> is NULL, we're looking for a random
+ * guard (likely a bridge). */
+const node_t *
+choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ smartlist_t *live_entry_guards = smartlist_new();
+ smartlist_t *exit_family = smartlist_new();
+ const node_t *chosen_exit =
+ state?build_state_get_exit_node(state) : NULL;
+ const node_t *node = NULL;
+ int need_uptime = state ? state->need_uptime : 0;
+ int need_capacity = state ? state->need_capacity : 0;
+ int preferred_min, consider_exit_family = 0;
+
+ if (chosen_exit) {
+ nodelist_add_node_and_family(exit_family, chosen_exit);
+ consider_exit_family = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!entry_guards)
+ entry_guards = smartlist_new();
+
+ if (should_add_entry_nodes)
+ entry_guards_set_from_config(options);
+
+ if (!entry_list_is_constrained(options) &&
+ smartlist_len(entry_guards) < options->NumEntryGuards)
+ pick_entry_guards(options);
+
+ retry:
+ smartlist_clear(live_entry_guards);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry) {
+ const char *msg;
+ node = entry_is_live(entry, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0, &msg);
+ if (!node)
+ continue; /* down, no point */
+ if (node == chosen_exit)
+ continue; /* don't pick the same node for entry and exit */
+ if (consider_exit_family && smartlist_isin(exit_family, node))
+ continue; /* avoid relays that are family members of our exit */
+#if 0 /* since EntryNodes is always strict now, this clause is moot */
+ if (options->EntryNodes &&
+ !routerset_contains_node(options->EntryNodes, node)) {
+ /* We've come to the end of our preferred entry nodes. */
+ if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards))
+ goto choose_and_finish; /* only choose from the ones we like */
+ if (options->StrictNodes) {
+ /* in theory this case should never happen, since
+ * entry_guards_set_from_config() drops unwanted relays */
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "No relays from EntryNodes available. Using others.");
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ smartlist_add(live_entry_guards, (void*)node);
+ if (!entry->made_contact) {
+ /* Always start with the first not-yet-contacted entry
+ * guard. Otherwise we might add several new ones, pick
+ * the second new one, and now we've expanded our entry
+ * guard list without needing to. */
+ goto choose_and_finish;
+ }
+ if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) >= options->NumEntryGuards)
+ goto choose_and_finish; /* we have enough */
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry);
+
+ if (entry_list_is_constrained(options)) {
+ /* If we prefer the entry nodes we've got, and we have at least
+ * one choice, that's great. Use it. */
+ preferred_min = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* Try to have at least 2 choices available. This way we don't
+ * get stuck with a single live-but-crummy entry and just keep
+ * using him.
+ * (We might get 2 live-but-crummy entry guards, but so be it.) */
+ preferred_min = 2;
+ }
+
+ if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) < preferred_min) {
+ if (!entry_list_is_constrained(options)) {
+ /* still no? try adding a new entry then */
+ /* XXX if guard doesn't imply fast and stable, then we need
+ * to tell add_an_entry_guard below what we want, or it might
+ * be a long time til we get it. -RD */
+ node = add_an_entry_guard(NULL, 0, 0);
+ if (node) {
+ entry_guards_changed();
+ /* XXX we start over here in case the new node we added shares
+ * a family with our exit node. There's a chance that we'll just
+ * load up on entry guards here, if the network we're using is
+ * one big family. Perhaps we should teach add_an_entry_guard()
+ * to understand nodes-to-avoid-if-possible? -RD */
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!node && need_uptime) {
+ need_uptime = 0; /* try without that requirement */
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (!node && need_capacity) {
+ /* still no? last attempt, try without requiring capacity */
+ need_capacity = 0;
+ goto retry;
+ }
+#if 0
+ /* Removing this retry logic: if we only allow one exit, and it is in the
+ same family as all our entries, then we are just plain not going to win
+ here. */
+ if (!node && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) {
+ /* still no? if we're using bridges or have strictentrynodes
+ * set, and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our
+ * bridges/entry guards, then be flexible about families. */
+ consider_exit_family = 0;
+ goto retry;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* live_entry_guards may be empty below. Oh well, we tried. */
+ }
+
+ choose_and_finish:
+ if (entry_list_is_constrained(options)) {
+ /* We need to weight by bandwidth, because our bridges or entryguards
+ * were not already selected proportional to their bandwidth. */
+ node = node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(live_entry_guards, WEIGHT_FOR_GUARD);
+ } else {
+ /* We choose uniformly at random here, because choose_good_entry_server()
+ * already weights its choices by bandwidth, so we don't want to
+ * *double*-weight our guard selection. */
+ node = smartlist_choose(live_entry_guards);
+ }
+ smartlist_free(live_entry_guards);
+ smartlist_free(exit_family);
+ return node;
+}
+
+/** Parse <b>state</b> and learn about the entry guards it describes.
+ * If <b>set</b> is true, and there are no errors, replace the global
+ * entry_list with what we find.
+ * On success, return 0. On failure, alloc into *<b>msg</b> a string
+ * describing the error, and return -1.
+ */
+int
+entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg)
+{
+ entry_guard_t *node = NULL;
+ smartlist_t *new_entry_guards = smartlist_new();
+ config_line_t *line;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ const char *state_version = state->TorVersion;
+ digestmap_t *added_by = digestmap_new();
+
+ *msg = NULL;
+ for (line = state->EntryGuards; line; line = line->next) {
+ if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuard")) {
+ smartlist_t *args = smartlist_new();
+ node = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_t));
+ /* all entry guards on disk have been contacted */
+ node->made_contact = 1;
+ smartlist_add(new_entry_guards, node);
+ smartlist_split_string(args, line->value, " ",
+ SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
+ if (smartlist_len(args)<2) {
+ *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
+ "Too few arguments to EntryGuard");
+ } else if (!is_legal_nickname(smartlist_get(args,0))) {
+ *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
+ "Bad nickname for EntryGuard");
+ } else {
+ strlcpy(node->nickname, smartlist_get(args,0), MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
+ if (base16_decode(node->identity, DIGEST_LEN, smartlist_get(args,1),
+ strlen(smartlist_get(args,1)))<0) {
+ *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
+ "Bad hex digest for EntryGuard");
+ }
+ }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(args);
+ if (*msg)
+ break;
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardDownSince") ||
+ !strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardUnlistedSince")) {
+ time_t when;
+ time_t last_try = 0;
+ if (!node) {
+ *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
+ "EntryGuardDownSince/UnlistedSince without EntryGuard");
+ break;
+ }
+ if (parse_iso_time(line->value, &when)<0) {
+ *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
+ "Bad time in EntryGuardDownSince/UnlistedSince");
+ break;
+ }
+ if (when > now) {
+ /* It's a bad idea to believe info in the future: you can wind
+ * up with timeouts that aren't allowed to happen for years. */
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (strlen(line->value) >= ISO_TIME_LEN+ISO_TIME_LEN+1) {
+ /* ignore failure */
+ (void) parse_iso_time(line->value+ISO_TIME_LEN+1, &last_try);
+ }
+ if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardDownSince")) {
+ node->unreachable_since = when;
+ node->last_attempted = last_try;
+ } else {
+ node->bad_since = when;
+ }
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardAddedBy")) {
+ char d[DIGEST_LEN];
+ /* format is digest version date */
+ if (strlen(line->value) < HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1+1+1+ISO_TIME_LEN) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "EntryGuardAddedBy line is not long enough.");
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (base16_decode(d, sizeof(d), line->value, HEX_DIGEST_LEN)<0 ||
+ line->value[HEX_DIGEST_LEN] != ' ') {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "EntryGuardAddedBy line %s does not begin with "
+ "hex digest", escaped(line->value));
+ continue;
+ }
+ digestmap_set(added_by, d, tor_strdup(line->value+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1));
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardPathBias")) {
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ unsigned hop_cnt, success_cnt;
+
+ if (!node) {
+ *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
+ "EntryGuardPathBias without EntryGuard");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (tor_sscanf(line->value, "%u %u", &success_cnt, &hop_cnt) != 2) {
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Unable to parse guard path bias info: "
+ "Misformated EntryGuardPathBias %s", escaped(line->value));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ node->first_hops = hop_cnt;
+ node->circuit_successes = success_cnt;
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Read %u/%u path bias for node %s",
+ node->circuit_successes, node->first_hops, node->nickname);
+ /* Note: We rely on the < comparison here to allow us to set a 0
+ * rate and disable the feature entirely. If refactoring, don't
+ * change to <= */
+ if (node->circuit_successes/((double)node->first_hops)
+ < pathbias_get_disable_rate(options)) {
+ node->path_bias_disabled = 1;
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL,
+ "Path bias is too high (%u/%u); disabling node %s",
+ node->circuit_successes, node->first_hops, node->nickname);
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unexpected key %s", line->key);
+ }
+ }
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(new_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) {
+ char *sp;
+ char *val = digestmap_get(added_by, e->identity);
+ if (val && (sp = strchr(val, ' '))) {
+ time_t when;
+ *sp++ = '\0';
+ if (parse_iso_time(sp, &when)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Can't read time %s in EntryGuardAddedBy", sp);
+ } else {
+ e->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(val);
+ e->chosen_on_date = when;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (state_version) {
+ e->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(state_version);
+ e->chosen_on_date = time(NULL) - crypto_rand_int(3600*24*30);
+ }
+ }
+ if (e->path_bias_disabled && !e->bad_since)
+ e->bad_since = time(NULL);
+ }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
+
+ if (*msg || !set) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(new_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
+ entry_guard_free(e));
+ smartlist_free(new_entry_guards);
+ } else { /* !err && set */
+ if (entry_guards) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
+ entry_guard_free(e));
+ smartlist_free(entry_guards);
+ }
+ entry_guards = new_entry_guards;
+ entry_guards_dirty = 0;
+ /* XXX024 hand new_entry_guards to this func, and move it up a
+ * few lines, so we don't have to re-dirty it */
+ if (remove_obsolete_entry_guards(now))
+ entry_guards_dirty = 1;
+ }
+ digestmap_free(added_by, tor_free_);
+ return *msg ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+/** Our list of entry guards has changed, or some element of one
+ * of our entry guards has changed. Write the changes to disk within
+ * the next few minutes.
+ */
+void
+entry_guards_changed(void)
+{
+ time_t when;
+ entry_guards_dirty = 1;
+
+ /* or_state_save() will call entry_guards_update_state(). */
+ when = get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites ? time(NULL) + 3600 : time(NULL)+600;
+ or_state_mark_dirty(get_or_state(), when);
+}
+
+/** If the entry guard info has not changed, do nothing and return.
+ * Otherwise, free the EntryGuards piece of <b>state</b> and create
+ * a new one out of the global entry_guards list, and then mark
+ * <b>state</b> dirty so it will get saved to disk.
+ */
+void
+entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state)
+{
+ config_line_t **next, *line;
+ if (! entry_guards_dirty)
+ return;
+
+ config_free_lines(state->EntryGuards);
+ next = &state->EntryGuards;
+ *next = NULL;
+ if (!entry_guards)
+ entry_guards = smartlist_new();
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) {
+ char dbuf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
+ if (!e->made_contact)
+ continue; /* don't write this one to disk */
+ *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
+ line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuard");
+ base16_encode(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ tor_asprintf(&line->value, "%s %s", e->nickname, dbuf);
+ next = &(line->next);
+ if (e->unreachable_since) {
+ *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
+ line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardDownSince");
+ line->value = tor_malloc(ISO_TIME_LEN+1+ISO_TIME_LEN+1);
+ format_iso_time(line->value, e->unreachable_since);
+ if (e->last_attempted) {
+ line->value[ISO_TIME_LEN] = ' ';
+ format_iso_time(line->value+ISO_TIME_LEN+1, e->last_attempted);
+ }
+ next = &(line->next);
+ }
+ if (e->bad_since) {
+ *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
+ line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardUnlistedSince");
+ line->value = tor_malloc(ISO_TIME_LEN+1);
+ format_iso_time(line->value, e->bad_since);
+ next = &(line->next);
+ }
+ if (e->chosen_on_date && e->chosen_by_version &&
+ !strchr(e->chosen_by_version, ' ')) {
+ char d[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
+ char t[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
+ line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardAddedBy");
+ base16_encode(d, sizeof(d), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ format_iso_time(t, e->chosen_on_date);
+ tor_asprintf(&line->value, "%s %s %s",
+ d, e->chosen_by_version, t);
+ next = &(line->next);
+ }
+ if (e->first_hops) {
+ *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
+ line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardPathBias");
+ tor_asprintf(&line->value, "%u %u",
+ e->circuit_successes, e->first_hops);
+ next = &(line->next);
+ }
+
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
+ if (!get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites)
+ or_state_mark_dirty(get_or_state(), 0);
+ entry_guards_dirty = 0;
+}
+
+/** If <b>question</b> is the string "entry-guards", then dump
+ * to *<b>answer</b> a newly allocated string describing all of
+ * the nodes in the global entry_guards list. See control-spec.txt
+ * for details.
+ * For backward compatibility, we also handle the string "helper-nodes".
+ * */
+int
+getinfo_helper_entry_guards(control_connection_t *conn,
+ const char *question, char **answer,
+ const char **errmsg)
+{
+ (void) conn;
+ (void) errmsg;
+
+ if (!strcmp(question,"entry-guards") ||
+ !strcmp(question,"helper-nodes")) {
+ smartlist_t *sl = smartlist_new();
+ char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ char nbuf[MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
+ if (!entry_guards)
+ entry_guards = smartlist_new();
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) {
+ const char *status = NULL;
+ time_t when = 0;
+ const node_t *node;
+
+ if (!e->made_contact) {
+ status = "never-connected";
+ } else if (e->bad_since) {
+ when = e->bad_since;
+ status = "unusable";
+ } else {
+ status = "up";
+ }
+
+ node = node_get_by_id(e->identity);
+ if (node) {
+ node_get_verbose_nickname(node, nbuf);
+ } else {
+ nbuf[0] = '$';
+ base16_encode(nbuf+1, sizeof(nbuf)-1, e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ /* e->nickname field is not very reliable if we don't know about
+ * this router any longer; don't include it. */
+ }
+
+ if (when) {
+ format_iso_time(tbuf, when);
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(sl, "%s %s %s\n", nbuf, status, tbuf);
+ } else {
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(sl, "%s %s\n", nbuf, status);
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
+ *answer = smartlist_join_strings(sl, "", 0, NULL);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, c, tor_free(c));
+ smartlist_free(sl);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** A list of configured bridges. Whenever we actually get a descriptor
+ * for one, we add it as an entry guard. Note that the order of bridges
+ * in this list does not necessarily correspond to the order of bridges
+ * in the torrc. */
+static smartlist_t *bridge_list = NULL;
+
+/** Mark every entry of the bridge list to be removed on our next call to
+ * sweep_bridge_list unless it has first been un-marked. */
+void
+mark_bridge_list(void)
+{
+ if (!bridge_list)
+ bridge_list = smartlist_new();
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, b,
+ b->marked_for_removal = 1);
+}
+
+/** Remove every entry of the bridge list that was marked with
+ * mark_bridge_list if it has not subsequently been un-marked. */
+void
+sweep_bridge_list(void)
+{
+ if (!bridge_list)
+ bridge_list = smartlist_new();
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, b) {
+ if (b->marked_for_removal) {
+ SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(bridge_list, b);
+ bridge_free(b);
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(b);
+}
+
+/** Initialize the bridge list to empty, creating it if needed. */
+static void
+clear_bridge_list(void)
+{
+ if (!bridge_list)
+ bridge_list = smartlist_new();
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, b, bridge_free(b));
+ smartlist_clear(bridge_list);
+}
+
+/** Free the bridge <b>bridge</b>. */
+static void
+bridge_free(bridge_info_t *bridge)
+{
+ if (!bridge)
+ return;
+
+ tor_free(bridge->transport_name);
+ tor_free(bridge);
+}
+
+/** If we have a bridge configured whose digest matches <b>digest</b>, or a
+ * bridge with no known digest whose address matches any of the
+ * tor_addr_port_t's in <b>orports</b>, return that bridge. Else return
+ * NULL. */
+static bridge_info_t *
+get_configured_bridge_by_orports_digest(const char *digest,
+ const smartlist_t *orports)
+{
+ if (!bridge_list)
+ return NULL;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge)
+ {
+ if (tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity)) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(orports, tor_addr_port_t *, ap)
+ {
+ if (tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, &ap->addr, CMP_EXACT) == 0 &&
+ bridge->port == ap->port)
+ return bridge;
+ }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ap);
+ }
+ if (digest && tor_memeq(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN))
+ return bridge;
+ }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/** If we have a bridge configured whose digest matches <b>digest</b>, or a
+ * bridge with no known digest whose address matches <b>addr</b>:<b>/port</b>,
+ * return that bridge. Else return NULL. */
+static bridge_info_t *
+get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(const tor_addr_t *addr,
+ uint16_t port,
+ const char *digest)
+{
+ if (!bridge_list)
+ return NULL;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge)
+ {
+ if (tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity) &&
+ !tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, addr, CMP_EXACT) &&
+ bridge->port == port)
+ return bridge;
+ if (digest && tor_memeq(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN))
+ return bridge;
+ }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/** Wrapper around get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest() to look
+ * it up via router descriptor <b>ri</b>. */
+static bridge_info_t *
+get_configured_bridge_by_routerinfo(const routerinfo_t *ri)
+{
+ bridge_info_t *bi = NULL;
+ smartlist_t *orports = router_get_all_orports(ri);
+ bi = get_configured_bridge_by_orports_digest(ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
+ orports);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(orports, tor_addr_port_t *, p, tor_free(p));
+ smartlist_free(orports);
+ return bi;
+}
+
+/** Return 1 if <b>ri</b> is one of our known bridges, else 0. */
+int
+routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(const routerinfo_t *ri)
+{
+ return get_configured_bridge_by_routerinfo(ri) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/** Return 1 if <b>node</b> is one of our configured bridges, else 0. */
+int
+node_is_a_configured_bridge(const node_t *node)
+{
+ int retval = 0;
+ smartlist_t *orports = node_get_all_orports(node);
+ retval = get_configured_bridge_by_orports_digest(node->identity,
+ orports) != NULL;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(orports, tor_addr_port_t *, p, tor_free(p));
+ smartlist_free(orports);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/** We made a connection to a router at <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b>
+ * without knowing its digest. Its digest turned out to be <b>digest</b>.
+ * If it was a bridge, and we still don't know its digest, record it.
+ */
+void
+learned_router_identity(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
+ const char *digest)
+{
+ bridge_info_t *bridge =
+ get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(addr, port, digest);
+ if (bridge && tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity)) {
+ memcpy(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ log_notice(LD_DIR, "Learned fingerprint %s for bridge %s",
+ hex_str(digest, DIGEST_LEN), fmt_addrport(addr, port));
+ }
+}
+
+/** Return true if <b>bridge</b> has the same identity digest as
+ * <b>digest</b>. If <b>digest</b> is NULL, it matches
+ * bridges with unspecified identity digests. */
+static int
+bridge_has_digest(const bridge_info_t *bridge, const char *digest)
+{
+ if (digest)
+ return tor_memeq(digest, bridge->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ else
+ return tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity);
+}
+
+/** We are about to add a new bridge at <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b>, with optional
+ * <b>digest</b> and <b>transport_name</b>. Mark for removal any previously
+ * existing bridge with the same address and port, and warn the user as
+ * appropriate.
+ */
+static void
+bridge_resolve_conflicts(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
+ const char *digest, const char *transport_name)
+{
+ /* Iterate the already-registered bridge list:
+
+ If you find a bridge with the same adress and port, mark it for
+ removal. It doesn't make sense to have two active bridges with
+ the same IP:PORT. If the bridge in question has a different
+ digest or transport than <b>digest</b>/<b>transport_name</b>,
+ it's probably a misconfiguration and we should warn the user.
+ */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge) {
+ if (bridge->marked_for_removal)
+ continue;
+
+ if (tor_addr_eq(&bridge->addr, addr) && (bridge->port == port)) {
+
+ bridge->marked_for_removal = 1;
+
+ if (!bridge_has_digest(bridge, digest) ||
+ strcmp_opt(bridge->transport_name, transport_name)) {
+ /* warn the user */
+ char *bridge_description_new, *bridge_description_old;
+ tor_asprintf(&bridge_description_new, "%s:%s:%s",
+ fmt_addrport(addr, port),
+ digest ? hex_str(digest, DIGEST_LEN) : "",
+ transport_name ? transport_name : "");
+ tor_asprintf(&bridge_description_old, "%s:%s:%s",
+ fmt_addrport(&bridge->addr, bridge->port),
+ tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity) ?
+ "" : hex_str(bridge->identity,DIGEST_LEN),
+ bridge->transport_name ? bridge->transport_name : "");
+
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Tried to add bridge '%s', but we found a conflict"
+ " with the already registered bridge '%s'. We will discard"
+ " the old bridge and keep '%s'. If this is not what you"
+ " wanted, please change your configuration file accordingly.",
+ bridge_description_new, bridge_description_old,
+ bridge_description_new);
+
+ tor_free(bridge_description_new);
+ tor_free(bridge_description_old);
+ }
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge);
+}
+
+/** Remember a new bridge at <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b>. If <b>digest</b>
+ * is set, it tells us the identity key too. If we already had the
+ * bridge in our list, unmark it, and don't actually add anything new.
+ * If <b>transport_name</b> is non-NULL - the bridge is associated with a
+ * pluggable transport - we assign the transport to the bridge. */
+void
+bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
+ const char *digest, const char *transport_name)
+{
+ bridge_info_t *b;
+
+ bridge_resolve_conflicts(addr, port, digest, transport_name);
+
+ b = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(bridge_info_t));
+ tor_addr_copy(&b->addr, addr);
+ b->port = port;
+ if (digest)
+ memcpy(b->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ if (transport_name)
+ b->transport_name = tor_strdup(transport_name);
+ b->fetch_status.schedule = DL_SCHED_BRIDGE;
+ if (!bridge_list)
+ bridge_list = smartlist_new();
+
+ smartlist_add(bridge_list, b);
+}
+
+/** Return true iff <b>routerset</b> contains the bridge <b>bridge</b>. */
+static int
+routerset_contains_bridge(const routerset_t *routerset,
+ const bridge_info_t *bridge)
+{
+ int result;
+ extend_info_t *extinfo;
+ tor_assert(bridge);
+ if (!routerset)
+ return 0;
+
+ extinfo = extend_info_new(
+ NULL, bridge->identity, NULL, &bridge->addr, bridge->port);
+ result = routerset_contains_extendinfo(routerset, extinfo);
+ extend_info_free(extinfo);
+ return result;
+}
+
+/** If <b>digest</b> is one of our known bridges, return it. */
+static bridge_info_t *
+find_bridge_by_digest(const char *digest)
+{
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge,
+ {
+ if (tor_memeq(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN))
+ return bridge;
+ });
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* DOCDOC find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport */
+const char *
+find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port)
+{
+ if (!bridge_list)
+ return NULL;
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, const bridge_info_t *, bridge) {
+ if (tor_addr_eq(&bridge->addr, addr) &&
+ (bridge->port == port))
+ return bridge->transport_name;
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/** If <b>addr</b> and <b>port</b> match the address and port of a
+ * bridge of ours that uses pluggable transports, place its transport
+ * in <b>transport</b>.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success (found a transport, or found a bridge with no
+ * transport, or found no bridge); return -1 if we should be using a
+ * transport, but the transport could not be found.
+ */
+int
+find_transport_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
+ const transport_t **transport)
+{
+ *transport = NULL;
+ if (!bridge_list)
+ return 0;
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, const bridge_info_t *, bridge) {
+ if (tor_addr_eq(&bridge->addr, addr) &&
+ (bridge->port == port)) { /* bridge matched */
+ if (bridge->transport_name) { /* it also uses pluggable transports */
+ *transport = transport_get_by_name(bridge->transport_name);
+ if (*transport == NULL) { /* it uses pluggable transports, but
+ the transport could not be found! */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ } else { /* bridge matched, but it doesn't use transports. */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge);
+
+ *transport = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** We need to ask <b>bridge</b> for its server descriptor. */
+static void
+launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge_info_t *bridge)
+{
+ char *address;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ if (connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose(
+ CONN_TYPE_DIR, &bridge->addr, bridge->port,
+ DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC))
+ return; /* it's already on the way */
+
+ if (routerset_contains_bridge(options->ExcludeNodes, bridge)) {
+ download_status_mark_impossible(&bridge->fetch_status);
+ log_warn(LD_APP, "Not using bridge at %s: it is in ExcludeNodes.",
+ safe_str_client(fmt_and_decorate_addr(&bridge->addr)));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ address = tor_dup_addr(&bridge->addr);
+
+ directory_initiate_command(address, &bridge->addr,
+ bridge->port, 0/*no dirport*/,
+ bridge->identity,
+ DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC,
+ ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE,
+ DIRIND_ONEHOP, "authority.z", NULL, 0, 0);
+ tor_free(address);
+}
+
+/** Fetching the bridge descriptor from the bridge authority returned a
+ * "not found". Fall back to trying a direct fetch. */
+void
+retry_bridge_descriptor_fetch_directly(const char *digest)
+{
+ bridge_info_t *bridge = find_bridge_by_digest(digest);
+ if (!bridge)
+ return; /* not found? oh well. */
+
+ launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge);
+}
+
+/** For each bridge in our list for which we don't currently have a
+ * descriptor, fetch a new copy of its descriptor -- either directly
+ * from the bridge or via a bridge authority. */
+void
+fetch_bridge_descriptors(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
+{
+ int num_bridge_auths = get_n_authorities(BRIDGE_DIRINFO);
+ int ask_bridge_directly;
+ int can_use_bridge_authority;
+
+ if (!bridge_list)
+ return;
+
+ /* If we still have unconfigured managed proxies, don't go and
+ connect to a bridge. */
+ if (pt_proxies_configuration_pending())
+ return;
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge)
+ {
+ if (!download_status_is_ready(&bridge->fetch_status, now,
+ IMPOSSIBLE_TO_DOWNLOAD))
+ continue; /* don't bother, no need to retry yet */
+ if (routerset_contains_bridge(options->ExcludeNodes, bridge)) {
+ download_status_mark_impossible(&bridge->fetch_status);
+ log_warn(LD_APP, "Not using bridge at %s: it is in ExcludeNodes.",
+ safe_str_client(fmt_and_decorate_addr(&bridge->addr)));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* schedule another fetch as if this one will fail, in case it does */
+ download_status_failed(&bridge->fetch_status, 0);
+
+ can_use_bridge_authority = !tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity) &&
+ num_bridge_auths;
+ ask_bridge_directly = !can_use_bridge_authority ||
+ !options->UpdateBridgesFromAuthority;
+ log_debug(LD_DIR, "ask_bridge_directly=%d (%d, %d, %d)",
+ ask_bridge_directly, tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity),
+ !options->UpdateBridgesFromAuthority, !num_bridge_auths);
+
+ if (ask_bridge_directly &&
+ !fascist_firewall_allows_address_or(&bridge->addr, bridge->port)) {
+ log_notice(LD_DIR, "Bridge at '%s' isn't reachable by our "
+ "firewall policy. %s.",
+ fmt_addrport(&bridge->addr, bridge->port),
+ can_use_bridge_authority ?
+ "Asking bridge authority instead" : "Skipping");
+ if (can_use_bridge_authority)
+ ask_bridge_directly = 0;
+ else
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (ask_bridge_directly) {
+ /* we need to ask the bridge itself for its descriptor. */
+ launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge);
+ } else {
+ /* We have a digest and we want to ask an authority. We could
+ * combine all the requests into one, but that may give more
+ * hints to the bridge authority than we want to give. */
+ char resource[10 + HEX_DIGEST_LEN];
+ memcpy(resource, "fp/", 3);
+ base16_encode(resource+3, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
+ bridge->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ memcpy(resource+3+HEX_DIGEST_LEN, ".z", 3);
+ log_info(LD_DIR, "Fetching bridge info '%s' from bridge authority.",
+ resource);
+ directory_get_from_dirserver(DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC,
+ ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE, resource, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge);
+}
+
+/** If our <b>bridge</b> is configured to be a different address than
+ * the bridge gives in <b>node</b>, rewrite the routerinfo
+ * we received to use the address we meant to use. Now we handle
+ * multihomed bridges better.
+ */
+static void
+rewrite_node_address_for_bridge(const bridge_info_t *bridge, node_t *node)
+{
+ /* XXXX move this function. */
+ /* XXXX overridden addresses should really live in the node_t, so that the
+ * routerinfo_t and the microdesc_t can be immutable. But we can only
+ * do that safely if we know that no function that connects to an OR
+ * does so through an address from any source other than node_get_addr().
+ */
+ tor_addr_t addr;
+
+ if (node->ri) {
+ routerinfo_t *ri = node->ri;
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, ri->addr);
+
+ if ((!tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, &addr, CMP_EXACT) &&
+ bridge->port == ri->or_port) ||
+ (!tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, &ri->ipv6_addr, CMP_EXACT) &&
+ bridge->port == ri->ipv6_orport)) {
+ /* they match, so no need to do anything */
+ } else {
+ if (tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr) == AF_INET) {
+ ri->addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&bridge->addr);
+ tor_free(ri->address);
+ ri->address = tor_dup_ip(ri->addr);
+ ri->or_port = bridge->port;
+ log_info(LD_DIR,
+ "Adjusted bridge routerinfo for '%s' to match configured "
+ "address %s:%d.",
+ ri->nickname, ri->address, ri->or_port);
+ } else if (tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr) == AF_INET6) {
+ tor_addr_copy(&ri->ipv6_addr, &bridge->addr);
+ ri->ipv6_orport = bridge->port;
+ log_info(LD_DIR,
+ "Adjusted bridge routerinfo for '%s' to match configured "
+ "address %s.",
+ ri->nickname, fmt_addrport(&ri->ipv6_addr, ri->ipv6_orport));
+ } else {
+ log_err(LD_BUG, "Address family not supported: %d.",
+ tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr));
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Mark which address to use based on which bridge_t we got. */
+ node->ipv6_preferred = (tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr) == AF_INET6 &&
+ !tor_addr_is_null(&node->ri->ipv6_addr));
+
+ /* XXXipv6 we lack support for falling back to another address for
+ the same relay, warn the user */
+ if (!tor_addr_is_null(&ri->ipv6_addr)) {
+ tor_addr_port_t ap;
+ node_get_pref_orport(node, &ap);
+ log_notice(LD_CONFIG,
+ "Bridge '%s' has both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address. "
+ "Will prefer using its %s address (%s).",
+ ri->nickname,
+ tor_addr_family(&ap.addr) == AF_INET6 ? "IPv6" : "IPv4",
+ fmt_addrport(&ap.addr, ap.port));
+ }
+ }
+ if (node->rs) {
+ routerstatus_t *rs = node->rs;
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, rs->addr);
+
+ if (!tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, &addr, CMP_EXACT) &&
+ bridge->port == rs->or_port) {
+ /* they match, so no need to do anything */
+ } else {
+ rs->addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&bridge->addr);
+ rs->or_port = bridge->port;
+ log_info(LD_DIR,
+ "Adjusted bridge routerstatus for '%s' to match "
+ "configured address %s.",
+ rs->nickname, fmt_addrport(&bridge->addr, rs->or_port));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/** We just learned a descriptor for a bridge. See if that
+ * digest is in our entry guard list, and add it if not. */
+void
+learned_bridge_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, int from_cache)
+{
+ tor_assert(ri);
+ tor_assert(ri->purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE);
+ if (get_options()->UseBridges) {
+ int first = !any_bridge_descriptors_known();
+ bridge_info_t *bridge = get_configured_bridge_by_routerinfo(ri);
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ router_set_status(ri->cache_info.identity_digest, 1);
+
+ if (bridge) { /* if we actually want to use this one */
+ node_t *node;
+ /* it's here; schedule its re-fetch for a long time from now. */
+ if (!from_cache)
+ download_status_reset(&bridge->fetch_status);
+
+ node = node_get_mutable_by_id(ri->cache_info.identity_digest);
+ tor_assert(node);
+ rewrite_node_address_for_bridge(bridge, node);
+ add_an_entry_guard(node, 1, 1);
+
+ log_notice(LD_DIR, "new bridge descriptor '%s' (%s): %s", ri->nickname,
+ from_cache ? "cached" : "fresh", router_describe(ri));
+ /* set entry->made_contact so if it goes down we don't drop it from
+ * our entry node list */
+ entry_guard_register_connect_status(ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
+ 1, 0, now);
+ if (first)
+ routerlist_retry_directory_downloads(now);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/** Return 1 if any of our entry guards have descriptors that
+ * are marked with purpose 'bridge' and are running. Else return 0.
+ *
+ * We use this function to decide if we're ready to start building
+ * circuits through our bridges, or if we need to wait until the
+ * directory "server/authority" requests finish. */
+int
+any_bridge_descriptors_known(void)
+{
+ tor_assert(get_options()->UseBridges);
+ return choose_random_entry(NULL)!=NULL ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/** Return 1 if there are any directory conns fetching bridge descriptors
+ * that aren't marked for close. We use this to guess if we should tell
+ * the controller that we have a problem. */
+int
+any_pending_bridge_descriptor_fetches(void)
+{
+ smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
+ if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR &&
+ conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC &&
+ TO_DIR_CONN(conn)->router_purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE &&
+ !conn->marked_for_close &&
+ conn->linked &&
+ conn->linked_conn && !conn->linked_conn->marked_for_close) {
+ log_debug(LD_DIR, "found one: %s", conn->address);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Return 1 if we have at least one descriptor for an entry guard
+ * (bridge or member of EntryNodes) and all descriptors we know are
+ * down. Else return 0. If <b>act</b> is 1, then mark the down guards
+ * up; else just observe and report. */
+static int
+entries_retry_helper(const or_options_t *options, int act)
+{
+ const node_t *node;
+ int any_known = 0;
+ int any_running = 0;
+ int need_bridges = options->UseBridges != 0;
+ if (!entry_guards)
+ entry_guards = smartlist_new();
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) {
+ node = node_get_by_id(e->identity);
+ if (node && node_has_descriptor(node) &&
+ node_is_bridge(node) == need_bridges) {
+ any_known = 1;
+ if (node->is_running)
+ any_running = 1; /* some entry is both known and running */
+ else if (act) {
+ /* Mark all current connections to this OR as unhealthy, since
+ * otherwise there could be one that started 30 seconds
+ * ago, and in 30 seconds it will time out, causing us to mark
+ * the node down and undermine the retry attempt. We mark even
+ * the established conns, since if the network just came back
+ * we'll want to attach circuits to fresh conns. */
+ connection_or_set_bad_connections(node->identity, 1);
+
+ /* mark this entry node for retry */
+ router_set_status(node->identity, 1);
+ e->can_retry = 1;
+ e->bad_since = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
+ log_debug(LD_DIR, "%d: any_known %d, any_running %d",
+ act, any_known, any_running);
+ return any_known && !any_running;
+}
+
+/** Do we know any descriptors for our bridges / entrynodes, and are
+ * all the ones we have descriptors for down? */
+int
+entries_known_but_down(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ tor_assert(entry_list_is_constrained(options));
+ return entries_retry_helper(options, 0);
+}
+
+/** Mark all down known bridges / entrynodes up. */
+void
+entries_retry_all(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ tor_assert(entry_list_is_constrained(options));
+ entries_retry_helper(options, 1);
+}
+
+/** Return true if we've ever had a bridge running a Tor version that can't
+ * provide microdescriptors to us. In that case fall back to asking for
+ * full descriptors. Eventually all bridges will support microdescriptors
+ * and we can take this check out; see bug 4013. */
+int
+any_bridges_dont_support_microdescriptors(void)
+{
+ const node_t *node;
+ static int ever_answered_yes = 0;
+ if (!get_options()->UseBridges || !entry_guards)
+ return 0;
+ if (ever_answered_yes)
+ return 1; /* if we ever answer 'yes', always answer 'yes' */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) {
+ node = node_get_by_id(e->identity);
+ if (node && node->ri &&
+ node_is_bridge(node) && node_is_a_configured_bridge(node) &&
+ !tor_version_supports_microdescriptors(node->ri->platform)) {
+ /* This is one of our current bridges, and we know enough about
+ * it to know that it won't be able to answer our microdescriptor
+ * questions. */
+ ever_answered_yes = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Release all storage held by the list of entry guards and related
+ * memory structs. */
+void
+entry_guards_free_all(void)
+{
+ if (entry_guards) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
+ entry_guard_free(e));
+ smartlist_free(entry_guards);
+ entry_guards = NULL;
+ }
+ clear_bridge_list();
+ smartlist_free(bridge_list);
+ bridge_list = NULL;
+ circuit_build_times_free_timeouts(&circ_times);
+}
+
diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.h b/src/or/entrynodes.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a12cf4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2012, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file guardnodes.h
+ * \brief Header file for circuitbuild.c.
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_ENTRYNODES_H
+#define TOR_ENTRYNODES_H
+
+#if 1
+/* XXXX NM I would prefer that all of this stuff be private to
+ * entrynodes.c. */
+
+/** An entry_guard_t represents our information about a chosen long-term
+ * first hop, known as a "helper" node in the literature. We can't just
+ * use a node_t, since we want to remember these even when we
+ * don't have any directory info. */
+typedef struct entry_guard_t {
+ char nickname[MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
+ char identity[DIGEST_LEN];
+ time_t chosen_on_date; /**< Approximately when was this guard added?
+ * "0" if we don't know. */
+ char *chosen_by_version; /**< What tor version added this guard? NULL
+ * if we don't know. */
+ unsigned int made_contact : 1; /**< 0 if we have never connected to this
+ * router, 1 if we have. */
+ unsigned int can_retry : 1; /**< Should we retry connecting to this entry,
+ * in spite of having it marked as unreachable?*/
+ unsigned int path_bias_notice : 1; /**< Did we alert the user about path bias
+ * for this node already? */
+ unsigned int path_bias_disabled : 1; /**< Have we disabled this node because
+ * of path bias issues? */
+ time_t bad_since; /**< 0 if this guard is currently usable, or the time at
+ * which it was observed to become (according to the
+ * directory or the user configuration) unusable. */
+ time_t unreachable_since; /**< 0 if we can connect to this guard, or the
+ * time at which we first noticed we couldn't
+ * connect to it. */
+ time_t last_attempted; /**< 0 if we can connect to this guard, or the time
+ * at which we last failed to connect to it. */
+
+ unsigned first_hops; /**< Number of first hops this guard has completed */
+ unsigned circuit_successes; /**< Number of successfully built circuits using
+ * this guard as first hop. */
+} entry_guard_t;
+
+entry_guard_t *entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(const char *digest);
+void entry_guards_changed(void);
+const smartlist_t *get_entry_guards(void);
+
+#endif
+
+void entry_guards_compute_status(const or_options_t *options, time_t now);
+int entry_guard_register_connect_status(const char *digest, int succeeded,
+ int mark_relay_status, time_t now);
+void entry_nodes_should_be_added(void);
+int entry_list_is_constrained(const or_options_t *options);
+const node_t *choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state);
+int entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg);
+void entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state);
+int getinfo_helper_entry_guards(control_connection_t *conn,
+ const char *question, char **answer,
+ const char **errmsg);
+
+void mark_bridge_list(void);
+void sweep_bridge_list(void);
+
+int routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(const routerinfo_t *ri);
+int node_is_a_configured_bridge(const node_t *node);
+void learned_router_identity(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
+ const char *digest);
+void bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
+ const char *digest,
+ const char *transport_name);
+void retry_bridge_descriptor_fetch_directly(const char *digest);
+void fetch_bridge_descriptors(const or_options_t *options, time_t now);
+void learned_bridge_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, int from_cache);
+int any_bridge_descriptors_known(void);
+int any_pending_bridge_descriptor_fetches(void);
+int entries_known_but_down(const or_options_t *options);
+void entries_retry_all(const or_options_t *options);
+
+int any_bridges_dont_support_microdescriptors(void);
+
+void entry_guards_free_all(void);
+
+const char *find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr,
+ uint16_t port);
+struct transport_t;
+int find_transport_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
+ const struct transport_t **transport);
+
+int validate_pluggable_transports_config(void);
+
+#endif
+
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