[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
[tor-commits] [tor/maint-0.4.2] Prevent UB on signed overflow.
commit 0d4a689d3ae8f7e05b3baf8ad71d983a767ef55b
Author: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon Jun 24 22:08:49 2019 +0200
Prevent UB on signed overflow.
Overflowing a signed integer in C is an undefined behaviour.
It is possible to trigger this undefined behaviour in tor_asprintf on
Windows or systems lacking vasprintf.
On these systems, eiter _vscprintf or vsnprintf is called to retrieve
the required amount of bytes to hold the string. These functions can
return INT_MAX. The easiest way to recreate this is the use of a
specially crafted configuration file, e.g. containing the line:
FirewallPorts AAAAA<in total 2147483610 As>
This line triggers the needed tor_asprintf call which eventually
leads to an INT_MAX return value from _vscprintf or vsnprintf.
The needed byte for \0 is added to the result, triggering the
overflow and therefore the undefined behaviour.
Casting the value to size_t before addition fixes the behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
src/common/compat.c | 9 ++++-----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c
index 975875112..6f7ac7bd7 100644
--- a/src/common/compat.c
+++ b/src/common/compat.c
@@ -540,8 +540,8 @@ tor_vasprintf(char **strp, const char *fmt, va_list args)
*strp = NULL;
return -1;
}
- strp_tmp = tor_malloc(len + 1);
- r = _vsnprintf(strp_tmp, len+1, fmt, args);
+ strp_tmp = tor_malloc((size_t)len + 1);
+ r = _vsnprintf(strp_tmp, (size_t)len+1, fmt, args);
if (r != len) {
tor_free(strp_tmp);
*strp = NULL;
@@ -566,9 +566,9 @@ tor_vasprintf(char **strp, const char *fmt, va_list args)
*strp = tor_strdup(buf);
return len;
}
- strp_tmp = tor_malloc(len+1);
+ strp_tmp = tor_malloc((size_t)len+1);
/* use of tor_vsnprintf() will ensure string is null terminated */
- r = tor_vsnprintf(strp_tmp, len+1, fmt, args);
+ r = tor_vsnprintf(strp_tmp, (size_t)len+1, fmt, args);
if (r != len) {
tor_free(strp_tmp);
*strp = NULL;
@@ -3543,4 +3543,3 @@ tor_get_avail_disk_space(const char *path)
return -1;
#endif
}
-
_______________________________________________
tor-commits mailing list
tor-commits@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-commits