[tor-commits] [tor/release-0.2.4] clients now send correct address for rendezvous point

[arma@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

commit 0c3b3650aa831183c76b044466e89eaee36d5684
Author: Roger Dingledine <arma@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Sat Sep 13 21:49:37 2014 -0400

    clients now send correct address for rendezvous point
    
    Clients now send the correct address for their chosen rendezvous point
    when trying to access a hidden service. They used to send the wrong
    address, which would still work some of the time because they also
    sent the identity digest of the rendezvous point, and if the hidden
    service happened to try connecting to the rendezvous point from a relay
    that already had a connection open to it, the relay would reuse that
    connection. Now connections to hidden services should be more robust
    and faster. Also, this bug meant that clients were leaking to the hidden
    service whether they were on a little-endian (common) or big-endian (rare)
    system, which for some users might have reduced their anonymity.
    
    Fixes bug 13151; bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha.
---
 changes/bug13151-client |   13 +++++++++++++
 src/or/rendclient.c     |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/changes/bug13151-client b/changes/bug13151-client
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1218dfd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug13151-client
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+  o Major bugfixes:
+    - Clients now send the correct address for their chosen rendezvous
+      point when trying to access a hidden service. They used to send
+      the wrong address, which would still work some of the time because
+      they also sent the identity digest of the rendezvous point, and if
+      the hidden service happened to try connecting to the rendezvous
+      point from a relay that already had a connection open to it,
+      the relay would reuse that connection. Now connections to hidden
+      services should be more robust and faster. Also, this bug meant
+      that clients were leaking to the hidden service whether they were
+      on a little-endian (common) or big-endian (rare) system, which for
+      some users might have reduced their anonymity. Fixes bug 13151;
+      bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha.
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c
index bb4bd9b..7abbfd6 100644
--- a/src/or/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.c
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
     extend_info_t *extend_info = rendcirc->build_state->chosen_exit;
     int klen;
     /* nul pads */
-    set_uint32(tmp+v3_shift+1, tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&extend_info->addr));
+    set_uint32(tmp+v3_shift+1, tor_addr_to_ipv4n(&extend_info->addr));
     set_uint16(tmp+v3_shift+5, htons(extend_info->port));
     memcpy(tmp+v3_shift+7, extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
     klen = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(extend_info->onion_key,



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