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[tor-commits] [tor/master] Actually check for missing protocols and exit as appropriate.
commit 7f718c46f355e194fb6ae8c8aabb72d2492c4d3f
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri Aug 19 17:45:08 2016 -0400
Actually check for missing protocols and exit as appropriate.
---
src/or/networkstatus.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 40 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/or/networkstatus.c b/src/or/networkstatus.c
index 2eb3cd8..6c92773 100644
--- a/src/or/networkstatus.c
+++ b/src/or/networkstatus.c
@@ -1552,6 +1552,31 @@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus_from_ns(networkstatus_t *c,
}
#endif //TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+/** Called when we have received a networkstatus <b>c</b>. If there are
+ * any _required_ protocols we are missing, log an error and exit
+ * immediately. If there are any _recommended_ protocols we are missing,
+ * warn. */
+static void
+handle_missing_protocol_warning(const networkstatus_t *c,
+ const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ char *protocol_warning = NULL;
+ int should_exit = networkstatus_check_required_protocols(c,
+ !server_mode(options),
+ &protocol_warning);
+ if (protocol_warning) {
+ tor_log(should_exit ? LOG_ERR : LOG_WARN,
+ LD_GENERAL,
+ "%s", protocol_warning);
+ }
+ if (should_exit) {
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(protocol_warning);
+ }
+ tor_free(protocol_warning);
+ if (should_exit)
+ exit(1);
+}
+
/** Try to replace the current cached v3 networkstatus with the one in
* <b>consensus</b>. If we don't have enough certificates to validate it,
* store it in consensus_waiting_for_certs and launch a certificate fetch.
@@ -1595,6 +1620,7 @@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus(const char *consensus,
time_t current_valid_after = 0;
int free_consensus = 1; /* Free 'c' at the end of the function */
int old_ewma_enabled;
+ int checked_protocols_already = 0;
if (flav < 0) {
/* XXXX we don't handle unrecognized flavors yet. */
@@ -1610,6 +1636,16 @@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus(const char *consensus,
goto done;
}
+ if (from_cache && !was_waiting_for_certs) {
+ /* We previously stored this; check _now_ to make sure that version-kills
+ * really work. This happens even before we check signatures: we did so
+ * before when we stored this to disk. This does mean an attacker who can
+ * write to the datadir can make us not start: such an attacker could
+ * already harm us by replacing our guards, which would be worse. */
+ checked_protocols_already = 1;
+ handle_missing_protocol_warning(c, options);
+ }
+
if ((int)c->flavor != flav) {
/* This wasn't the flavor we thought we were getting. */
if (require_flavor) {
@@ -1735,6 +1771,10 @@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus(const char *consensus,
if (!from_cache && flav == usable_consensus_flavor())
control_event_client_status(LOG_NOTICE, "CONSENSUS_ARRIVED");
+ if (!checked_protocols_already) {
+ handle_missing_protocol_warning(c, options);
+ }
+
/* Are we missing any certificates at all? */
if (r != 1 && dl_certs)
authority_certs_fetch_missing(c, now, source_dir);
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