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[tor-commits] [torspec/master] Add Proposal 306: A Tor Implementation of IPv6 Happy Eyeballs
commit a4c0cd1a4f1921823b896026858e683191597496
Author: Neel Chauhan <neel@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue Jun 25 21:10:19 2019 -0400
Add Proposal 306: A Tor Implementation of IPv6 Happy Eyeballs
---
proposals/306-ipv6-happy-eyeballs.txt | 300 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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diff --git a/proposals/306-ipv6-happy-eyeballs.txt b/proposals/306-ipv6-happy-eyeballs.txt
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+Filename: 306-ipv6-happy-eyeballs.txt
+Title: A Tor Implementation of IPv6 Happy Eyeballs
+Author: Neel Chauhan
+Created: 25-Jun-2019
+Supercedes: 299
+Status: Open
+Ticket: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29801
+
+1. Introduction
+
+ As IPv4 address space becomes scarce, ISPs and organizations will deploy
+ IPv6 in their networks. Right now, Tor clients connect to guards using
+ IPv4 connectivity by default.
+
+ When networks first transition to IPv6, both IPv4 and IPv6 will be enabled
+ on most networks in a so-called "dual-stack" configuration. This is to not
+ break existing IPv4-only applications while enabling IPv6 connectivity.
+ However, IPv6 connectivity may be unreliable and clients should be able
+ to connect to the guard using the most reliable technology, whether IPv4
+ or IPv6.
+
+ In ticket #27490, we introduced the option ClientAutoIPv6ORPort which
+ lets a client randomly choose between IPv4 or IPv6. However, this
+ random decision does not take into account unreliable connectivity
+ or falling back to the competing IP version should one be unreliable
+ or unavailable.
+
+ One way to select between IPv4 and IPv6 on a dual-stack network is a
+ so-called "Happy Eyeballs" algorithm as per RFC 8305. In one, a client
+ attempts the preferred IP family, whether IPv4 or IPv6. Should it work,
+ the client sticks with the preferred IP family. Otherwise, the client
+ attempts the alternate version. This means if a dual-stack client has
+ both IPv4 and IPv6, and IPv6 is unreliable, preferred or not, the
+ client uses IPv4, and vice versa. However, if IPv4 and IPv6 are both
+ equally reliable, and IPv6 is preferred, we use IPv6.
+
+ In Proposal 299, we have attempted a IP fallback mechanism using failure
+ counters and preferring IPv4 and IPv6 based on the state of the counters.
+ However, Prop299 was not standard Happy Eyeballs and an alternative,
+ standards-compliant proposal was requested in [P299-TRAC] to avoid issues
+ from complexity caused by randomness.
+
+ This proposal describes a Tor implementation of Happy Eyeballs and is
+ intended as a successor to Proposal 299.
+
+2. Address/Relay Selection
+
+ This section describes the necessary changes for address selection to
+ implement Prop306.
+
+2.1. Extend Info Structure Changes
+
+ To be able to handle Happy Eyeballs in Tor, we will need to modify the
+ data structures used for connections to guards, namely the extend info
+ structure.
+
+ The extend info structure should contain both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address.
+ This will allow us to try IPv4 and the IPv6 addresses should both be
+ available on a relay and the client is dual-stack.
+
+ When parsing relay descriptors and filling in the extend info data
+ structure, we need to fill in both the IPv4 and IPv6 address if they both
+ are available. If only one family is available for a relay (IPv4 or IPv6),
+ we should fill in the address for preferred family and leave the alternate
+ family null.
+
+2.2. Relay Selection Changes
+
+ In Proposal 283, we have allowed microdescriptor consensus documents to
+ contain IPv6 addresses. As clients download microdescriptors, Prop283
+ makes it possible to implement Prop306.
+
+ When we select candidates for the entry guard, we should select at least
+ one relay with an IPv6 address. This makes it possible for an IPv6-only
+ client to bootstrap. Otherwise we would have failures if all the selected
+ guard candidates only have IPv4 addresses.
+
+3. Relay Connections
+
+ If there is an existing authenticated connection, we should use it
+ similar to how we used it pre-Prop306.
+
+ If there is no existing authenticated connection for an extend info,
+ we should attempt to connect using the first available, allowed, and
+ preferred address.
+
+ We should also allow falling back to the alternate address. For this,
+ three alternate designs will be given.
+
+3.1. Proposed Designs
+
+ This subsection will have three proposed designs for connecting to relays
+ via IPv4 and IPv6 in a Tor implementation of Happy Eyeballs.
+
+ These proposed designs will have some tradeoffs, including:
+
+ * Launching multiple TCP connections places up to 2x extra socket load on
+ dual-stack relays and authorities, because both connections may succeed.
+
+ * Launching multiple TLS connections places up to 2x the CPU load on
+ dual-stack relays and authorities, because both connections may succeed.
+
+ * Increasing the delay between connections mitigates the above issues,
+ but reduces perceived performance, particularly at bootstrap time
+ (pre-emptive circuits hide these delays after bootstrap).
+
+ The proposed designs are as listed as follows:
+
+ * Section 3.1.1: First Successful Authentication
+
+ * Section 3.1.2: TCP Connection to Preferred Address On First Authenticated
+ Connection
+
+ * Section 3.1.3: TCP Connection to Preferred Address On First TCP Success
+
+3.1.1. First Successful Authentication
+
+ In this design, Tor will first connect to the preferred address and
+ attempt to authenticate. After a 1.5 second delay (based on Onionperf
+ data), Tor will connect to the alternate address and try to authenticate.
+ On the first successful authenticated connection, we close the other
+ connection.
+
+ This design places the least connection load on the network, but might
+ add extra TLS load.
+
+3.1.2. TCP Connection to Preferred Address On First Authenticated Connection
+
+ This design attempts a TCP connection to a preferred address. On a failure
+ or a 1.5 second delay, we try the alternative address.
+
+ On the first successful TCP connection Tor attempts to authenticate
+ immediately. On the first authentication success, Tor closes the other
+ connection.
+
+ This design is the most reliable for clients, but increases the connection
+ load on dual-stack guards and authorities. For instance, this can be used
+ to amplify a DoS attack on the Tor network.
+
+3.1.3. TCP Connection to Preferred Address On First TCP Success
+
+ In this design, we will connect via TCP to the first preferred address. On
+ a failure or after a 1.5 second delay, we attempt to connect via TCP to the
+ alternate address. On a success, Tor attempts to authenticate and closes
+ the other connection.
+
+ This design is the closest to RFC 8305 and is similar to how Happy Eyeballs
+ is implemented in a web browser.
+
+3.2. Recommendations for Implementation of Section 3.1 Proposals
+
+ We should start with implementing and testing the implementation as
+ described in Section 3.1.1 (First Successful Authentication), and then
+ doing the same for the implementations described in 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 if
+ desired or required.
+
+3.3. Handling Connection Successes And Failures
+
+ Should a connection to a guard succeed and is authenticated via TLS, we
+ can then use the connection. In this case, we should cancel all other
+ connection timers and in-progress connections. Cancelling the timers is
+ necessary so we don't attempt new unnecessary connections when our
+ existing connection is successful, preventing denial-of-service risks.
+
+ However, if we fail all available and allowed connections, we should tell
+ the rest of Tor that the connection has failed. This is so we can attempt
+ another guard relay.
+
+3.4. Connection Attempt Delays
+
+ As mentioned in [TEOR-P306-REP], initially, clients should prefer IPv4
+ by default. The Connection Attempt Delay, or delay between IPv4 and IPv6
+ connections should be 1.5 seconds. This is to avoid the overhead from
+ tunneled IPv6 connections.
+
+ The Minimum Connection Attempt Delay should not be dynamically adjusted
+ as it adds privacy risks. This value should be fixed at 10 ms as per
+ RFC 8305 and could be adjusted using a proposed consensus parameter called
+ ConnectionAttemptDelay. ConnectionAttemptDelay should be in milliseconds.
+
+ The Maximum Connection Attempt Delay should also not be dynamically adjusted
+ for privacy reasons, but the maximum should be higher than the RFC 8305
+ recommendation of 2 seconds. For Tor, we should make this timeout value 30
+ seconds to match Tor's existing timeout.
+
+ We should also make it possible for users to set the Maximum Connection
+ Attempt value higher for slower and higher-latency networks such as dial-up
+ and satellite.
+
+4. Option Changes
+
+ As we enable IPv6-enabled clients to connect out of the box, we should
+ adjust the default options to enable IPv6 while not breaking IPv4-only
+ clients.
+
+4.1. New Default Options for Prop306
+
+ The new default options should be:
+
+ * ClientUseIPv4 as 1 (to enable IPv4)
+
+ * ClientUseIPv6 as 1 (to enable IPv6)
+
+ * ClientPreferIPv6ORPort as 0 (for load-balancing reasons so we don't
+ overload IPv6-only guards)
+
+ One thing to note is that clients should be able to connect with the above
+ options on IPv4-only, dual-stack, and IPv6-only networks, and they should
+ also work if ClientPreferIPv6ORPort is 1. This means we shouldn't expect
+ IPv4 or IPv6 to work if ClientUseIPv4 or ClientUseIPv6 is set.
+
+ When the majority of clients are IPv6-capable, we could set the default
+ value of ClientPreferIPv6ORPort to 1 in order to take advantage of IPv6.
+
+4.2. Prop306 Consensus Parameters
+
+ We could have the following consensus parameters:
+
+ * ClientUseIPv6
+
+ * ClientPreferIPv6ORPort (when most of the guards have IPv6 and it is fast)
+
+ Should we have the consenus parameters, the values for these options should
+ be set to the values of the similarly-named options as described in Section
+ 4.1 including the consideration for ClientPreferIPv6ORPort.
+
+5. Statistics
+
+5.1. Relay Statistics
+
+ Relays could measure the number of successful IPv4 and IPv6 connections.
+ We could also send this information to directory authorities.
+
+ However, should we implement Section 5.1, we should consider the privacy
+ implications of these statistics, and whether they should be public or not.
+
+5.2. Client Heartbeat Messages
+
+ In a Tor session, we should count the number of IPv4 and IPv6 connections
+ to ORPorts, and distinguish between authenticated (relay, authority
+ reachability) and unauthenticated (client, bridge) connections. These
+ statistics should be included in the Heartbeat logs.
+
+6. Deploying Prop306
+
+ This section describes the information necessary for deployment of Prop306
+ on Tor clients and in Tor Browser.
+
+6.1. Initial Feasibility Testing
+
+ We should test this proposal with the following scenarios:
+
+ * Different combinations of values for the options ClientUseIPv4,
+ ClientUseIPv6, and ClientPreferIPv6ORPort on IPv4-only, IPv6-only,
+ and dual-stack connections
+
+ * Dual-stack connections of different technologies, including high-bandwidth
+ and low-latency (e.g. fiber), moderate-bandwidth and moderate-latency
+ (e.g. DSL, LTE), and high-latency and low-bandwidth (e.g. satellite,
+ dial-up) to see if Prop306 is reliable and feasible
+
+6.2. Minimum Viable Prop306 Product
+
+ The mimumum viable product for Prop306 must include the following:
+
+ * Implementation of one of the algorithms in Section 3.1 along with the
+ changes described in Sections 2.1 and 2.2
+
+ * The Connection Success/Failure mechanism in Section 3.3 and Connection
+ Delay mechanism in Section 3.4 (the consensus parameter is optional)
+
+ * A default setup capable of both IPv4 and IPv6 connections with the
+ options described in Section 4.1
+
+6.3. Optional Features
+
+ Some features which are optional include:
+
+ * Consensus Parameter ConnectionAttemptDelay (Section 3.4) - We will need
+ this if the Minimum Connection Attempt Delay needs to be dynamically
+ adjusted
+
+ * Consensus Parameters ClientUseIPv6 (Section 4.2), and
+ ClientPreferIPv6ORPort (Section 4.2) - We will need this if we desire
+ the ability for clients to prefer IPv6 when the majority of clients
+ and relays are IPv6-capable without changing the configuration
+
+ * Prop306 Statistics (Section 5) - While optional, this may be useful for
+ debugging and reliability testing, and metrics on IPv4 vs. IPv6
+
+7. Acknowledgments
+
+ Thank you so much to teor for the discussion of the happy eyeballs proposal.
+ I wouldn't have been able to do this has it not been for your help.
+
+8. Refrences
+
+ [P299-TRAC]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29801
+
+ [TEOR-P306-REP]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2019-July/013919.html
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