Re: [tor-dev] Proposition: Applying an AONT to Prop224 addresses?

[Ian Goldberg <iang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Mon, Apr 03, 2017 at 03:04:47PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Hey people,
> 
> thanks for the R&D here. I'm currently trying to balance the tradeoffs
> here and decide whether to go ahead and implement this feature.
> 
> My main worry is the extra complexity this brings to our address
> encoding/decoding process and to our speficication, as well as when
> explaining the scheme to people.
> 
> Other than that, this seems like a reasonable improvement for a weird
> phishing scenario. I'm calling it weird because I'm not sure how an
> attacker can profit from being able to provide two addresses that
> correspond to the same key, but I can probably come up with a few
> scenarios if I think about it. Furthermore, this solution assumes a
> sloppy victim that does a partial spot-check (if the victim verified the
> whole address this design would make no difference).
> 
> BTW, isn't this phishing threat also possible in bitcoin (which is also
> using a 4-byte checksum that can be bruteforced)? Have there been any
> attacks of this nature?
> 
> Anyhow my first intuition is to just do this, as it seems like an
> improvement and it's probably not a huge amount of work. It can probably
> be done pretty cleanly if we abstract away the whole AONT construction
> and the custom-ish base32 encoding/decoding. I'm just worrying about
> putting more stuff in our already overloaded development bucket.
> 
> Is there a name for this AONT construction btw?

As my student Nik noticed, this isn't *technically* an AONT, since
diffusion only happens "to the left", but that's where we want to
randomize things if any bit of the address changes.

But if we're down to just pubkey + checksum + *1 bit of version*, then
I'm not totally sold on the point of the AONT, since there are exactly 0
bits that can be twiddled while not changing the pubkey.  *Note*: this
is assuming that if we ever change the version number, *then* we do an
AONT or something so that version 0 and version 1 addresses that have
the same pubkey end up looking totally different (at least at the left
end).
-- 
Ian Goldberg
Professor and University Research Chair
Cheriton School of Computer Science
University of Waterloo
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