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[tor-dev] Walking onions status update: week 8
Walking Onions: week 8 update
On our current grant from the zcash foundation, I'm working on a
full specification for the Walking Onions design. I'm going to try to
send out these updates once a week.
My previous updates are linked below:
Week 1:
formats, preliminaries, git repositories, binary diffs,
metaformat decisions, and Merkle Tree trickery.
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-March/014178.html
Week 2:
Specifying details of SNIP and ENDIVE formats, in CDDL.
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-March/014181.html
Week 3:
Expanding ENDIVEs into SNIPs.
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-March/014194.html
Week 4:
Voting (part 1) and extending circuits.
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-March/014207.html
Week 5:
Voting (part 2)
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-April/014218.html
Week 6:
Editing, voting rules, and client behavior (part 1)
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-April/014222.html
Week 7:
Exit policies: How do they work?
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-April/014232.html
== Onion services: surprisingly easy! (but not?)
This week I started with a look at onion services and how to make
them work with Walking Onions [ONIONSPEC]. Most of my initial
thought had gone into the problem of finding and using HSDirs, and
so specifying this part went smoothly. I already havd a link
specifier for asking for a span of several entries in an ENDIVE, and
I already had a notion of truncating index values based on a network
parameter.
The harder part came when I wanted to talk about how to specify
introduction points and rendezvous points by their SNIPs. The hard
part here was managing the migration path. To avoid fingerprinting,
when we make changes to the onion service protocol of this kind, we
need to give a lot of onion services and clients the opportunity to
start supporting the new protocol all at once, and then to stop
supporting the old one all at once. This requires more network
parameters, somewhat carefully specified. I'm hoping we can turn
this into a more general pattern.
And the most irritating part is when I ran into the issue of
supporting HSv2 handshakes. Were it not for those, we wouldn't have
to keep TAP keys around any more -- and TAP keys would bloat SNIPs
to a pretty huge degree. The best answer here seems to be migrating
our legacy HSv2 services so they can use ntor onion keys for intro
and rendezvous points. That would also need to be done in a phased
way. [TAP-OUT-AGAIN].
The alternative way to keep HSv2 working with walking onions would
be to allow TAP keys to be distributed as part of the SNIP system.
That seems like a fair amount of work, though, and unlike using
ntor, it wouldn't have any positive benefit.
((Yes, HSv2 is deprecated. But I don't want to give people who
still use it a reason to avoid the walking onions transition.))
== Relay honesty and ENDIVE swapping
One of the issues with our current directory system is that multiple
consensus network documents are valid at the same time. In
practice, clients will accept fairly old documents, to avoid running
into trouble if the authorities have failed to vote. But this
client behavior gives hostile directory guards an opportunity to
select which of several recent documents to serve.
Walking Onions would make this problem worse, since every relay,
when it serves a SNIP, is serving part of a directory that it
knows a client is about to use. If we did nothing to mitigate the
problem, then hostile relays could mount an "ENDIVE swapping" attack
where they look at a client's choice of routing index, and then see
whether any live ENDIVE contains a SNIP that the attacker likes at
that position.
In [HONESTY] I described a few responses to this problem. The first
is that we should limit the rate at which the index layouts
change. The second is that all parties that look up SNIPs through a
relay should verify that the "published" times from each relay are
monotonically increasing.
The third response seems like the most useful to me: we would
recognize that under ordinary circumstances, the permissible
lifetime for an ENDIVE would be much shorter than it would be under
emergency (consensus failed) circumstances. That is, if everything
is going well, each relay should get a new ENDIVE every hour or so.
Only if there is no new ENDIVE should clients accept SNIPs that
are extremely old.
With this in mind, I'm proposing a rule that if a client sees _any_
valid SNIP published at time `T` or later, it should not accept any
SNIP published before time `T-Delta`. (Delta is a network
parameter.) With this rule in place, clients will insist on fresh
SNIPs when the network is working well, but will tolerate old ones
if the authorities are failing to reach consensus for a while.
== More questions of migration
One hard step in any proposal is dealing with migration questions.
I've stared to try to lay out a timeline in a new section
[MIGRATION]. This part isn't looking great to me right now. It
seems like it won't be safe to turn on Walking Onions for clients
until it's supported by most relays. Moreover, clients that use
Walking Onions won't be able to use relays (or at least, non-exit
relays) without support for it. This implies a longer migration
path than I'd like, but I don't see a way around it.
== And what about families?
Our existing family representation is quadratic in family size,
since every relay needs to list every other relay in the family.
This gets worse with Walking Onions, since SNIPs can't benefit from
compressing the repeated family entries.
At first I had hoped to use some kind of a max-clique algorithm to
infer the families at the authorities, and then encode clique
identifiers in the SNIPs. This isn't such a great idea, though:
I wasn't able to persuade myself that an adversary couldn't force
the authorities' burden to become exponential here.
Instead I think we should resurrect proposal 242, in an improved
version [BETTER-FAMILIES]. Instead of having to list every node in
a family, each relay in a family would include a signed certificate
from a "family key" attesting to their membership in the family.
The proposal addresses some tricky compatibility issues.
== Coming up next
This week is going to be rather busy on my end: I'll be a bit
startled if I get very much done with Walking Onions at all. My
hope is to edit the proposal, fill in gaps, and address pending
comments.
[BETTER-FAMILIES]
https://github.com/nmathewson/walking-onions-wip/blob/master/other-proposals/xxx-improved-242.md
[HONESTY] https://github.com/nmathewson/walking-onions-wip/blob/master/specs/08-tracking-relay-honesty.md
[MIGRATION] https://github.com/nmathewson/walking-onions-wip/blob/master/specs/09-migration.md
[ONIONSPEC] https://github.com/nmathewson/walking-onions-wip/blob/master/specs/07-onion-services.md
[TAP-OUT-AGAIN]
https://github.com/nmathewson/walking-onions-wip/blob/master/other-proposals/xxx-tap-out-again.md
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