[tor-dev] Onion DoS: Killing rendezvous circuits over the application layer

[George Kadianakis <desnacked@xxxxxxxxxx>]

Greetings!

This is another thread [0] about onion service denial-of-service attacks.

It has long been suggested that onion service operators should be given the
option to kill spammy rendezvous circuits at will if they feel they are causing
too much damage.

Right now this is possible using the HiddenServiceExportCircuitID torrc option
(introduced in #4700) and then using the CLOSECIRCUIT control port command to
close circuits.

Unfortunately, we have recently got reports that this technique is not viable
for busy onion services under DoS because their control port gets overwhelmed
by (useful for them) events, and it's basically rendered useless to the point
that any CLOSECIRCUIT command takes several seconds to become effective.

For this reason, multiple onion operators [1] have resorted to using the
actual HTTP protocol as a direct channel of communication to the Tor
daemon to request circuit shutdowns. This works by embedding a special
string (or HTTP error code) to the HTTP responses from nginx to the Tor
daemon and adding special custom code to the Tor daemon to close
circuits that carry this string. This seems to work well enough for
people so far.

This is a thread to discuss this approach and other alternatives since it seems
a useful tool against application-layer onion service denial of service attacks.

Let me go through the positives and negatives of actuallym erging this
defence upstream to little-t-tor:

---

Positives:

1) This is a solid defense that actually helps people and has been reported as
   a positive countermeasure in an area that has been hard to find concrete
   defences (also see [0]).

2) Seems like more and more people are doing this already in a custom ad-hoc
   fashion, so merging this upstream will at least give them a secure way of
   doing it (instead of writing custom C code).

3) It's actually a pretty simple patch in terms of tech-debt and maintaining it.

4) The more we address DoS vectors like this one, the less incentive will exist
   for DoS actors to exist. Effectively improving the long-term health of the
   network.

Negatives:

a) It's a dirty hotfix that blends the networking layers and might be annoying
   to maintain in the long-term.

b) It only works for HTTP (and without SSL?).

---

For me, point (1) is extremely important, since we've been struggling with
helping onion services that are getting DoSsed and this feature offers a solid
defense against practical attacks.

However, IMO the right way to do this feature, would be to improve the control
port code and design so that it doesn't get so overwhelmed by multiple
events. That said, I'm not sure exactly what kind of changes we would have to
do to the control port to actually make it a viable option, and it seems to me
like a pretty big project that serves as a medium-term to long-term solution
(which we have no resources to pursue right now), whereas the hack of this
thread is more of a short-term solution.

I'm looking forward to constructive feedback here, since this seems like a
controversial feature that users really need.

Thanks! :)

[0]: serving as a continuation of previous classics such as:
     https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2019-June/013875.html
     https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2019-July/013923.html
     etc.

[1]: http://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/804-A-New-Tor-Attack.html
     https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32511
_______________________________________________
tor-dev mailing list
tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev