Re: [tor-dev] proposal 240: Early signing key revocation for directory authorities.

[Peter Palfrader <weasel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Sun, 11 Jan 2015, Nick Mathewson wrote:

> On Sun, Jan 11, 2015 at 4:23 AM, Peter Palfrader <weasel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Sat, 10 Jan 2015, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> >
> >>    This proposal describes a simple way for directory authorities to
> >>    perform signing key revocation.
> >>
> >> 2. Specification
> >>
> >>    We add the following lines to the authority signing certificate
> >>    format:
> >>
> >>      revoked-signing-key SP algname SP FINGERPRINT NL
> >
> > Why not implictly revoke any previous signing key when we see a new,
> > valid signing key certificate with a later published timestamp?
> >
> > It would appear to be simpler and require less state.
> 
> My main worry there is that it's possible to accidentally publish a
> certificate in the far future.  If we can prevent that from ever
> happening, then we can probably just do what you suggest.  Any
> thoughts?

That wouldn't be a valid certificate yet.  It would only become valid
after its published timestamp.

-- 
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