[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]

Re: [tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor




On 3 Jan 2016, at 12:18, Ryan Carboni <ryacko@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

And yet the NSA is moving to prime numbers.

A large public key isn't a very good reason to not adopt quantum-safe crypto, it just means that it requires having the Tor project to be able to scale to a larger degree. I suggest hash tables, a percentage of which are pseudorandomly downloaded. Otherwise the Tor project won't scale to 10x the relays ... even ignoring quantum cryptography.

We had a GSOC project to produce "consensus diffs", so that clients could download the differences between each consensus each hour, rather than downloading a full consensus (~1.5MB).

It showed some great results, but still needs a little work before we merge it.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13339

Tim

Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
PGP 968F094B

teor at blah dot im
OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F

Attachment: signature.asc
Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail

_______________________________________________
tor-dev mailing list
tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev