Re: [tor-dev] tor-dev Digest, Vol 60, Issue 2

Hi Flipchan,

There are reference implementation of quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms, such

as NTRU encryption algorithm (in libntruencrypt):
https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/NTRUEncrypt

and BLISS signature algorithm,
http://bliss.di.ens.fr/

Those are independent softwares. But for what I understand, common crypto libraries,

such as crypto in openssl, libgcrypt, crypto++, do not have quantum-safe crypto, except
wolfssl that supports NTRU.
https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl

We also have libgcrypt with NTRU supports,
https://github.com/wwhyte-si/libgcrypt-ntru
but it is not an official release.
Â

Cheers,

Zhenfei

On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 5:49 PM, Flipchan <flipchan@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

How would u add quantum-safe
crypto? I havent seen anyone puttin a pub lib that anyone can import

tor-dev-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx skrev: (2 januari 2016 13:00:02 CET)

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Today's Topics:

   1. Re: Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor (Ryan Carboni)
   2. Re: Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor (Yawning Angel)




Message: 1
Date: Fri, 1 Jan 2016 19:33:31 -0800
From: Ryan Carboni <ryacko@xxxxxxxxx>
To: tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor
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 <CAO7N=i2MspE1N5eOczCyT9RCPORgUJboSOY3vUMGKL5FSzAPnw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
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The first step should be replacing the long-term keys with quantum-safe
crypto.
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Message: 2
Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 04:19:28 +0000
From: Yawning Angel <yawning@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor
Message-ID: <20160102041928.15e0cbc3@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
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On Fri, 1 Jan
2016 19:33:31 -0800
Ryan Carboni <ryacko@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

 The first step should be replacing the long-term keys with
 quantum-safe crypto.

Wrong.

There are NO usable PQ signature primitives that are suitable for
deployment.  Adding 1408+ bytes to every single microdescriptor is
not a realistic proposition.  Signing is also quite expensive unless you
have AVX2, and will decimate circuit build performance.

Protecting against Quantum Computer equipped active Man-In-The-Middle
attacks is the least important thing to do in terms of user safety.

By modifying the link handshake to incorporate a PQ key exchange
algorithm with ephemeral keys as in the proposal, user data being
generated right now will be protected from bulk decryption later, in
the event of
a Curve25519 break (probably by a large enough Quantum
Computer), which is a far more realistic threat to be concerned about.

--
Sincerly Flipchan

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