[tor-dev] New Proposal: Preferring IPv4 or IPv6 based on IP Version Failure Count

["Neel Chauhan" <neel@xxxxxxxxx>]

Hi tor-dev@ mailing list,

I have been working on Bug #27491 (https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27491) and have been asked to write a proposal. My proposal is attached to this email as a text file.

I would really appreciate your comments on this proposal (is it good, bad, any problems with it?).

Thank You,

Neel Chahan

Filename: xxx-ip-failure-count.txt
Title: Preferring IPv4 or IPv6 based on IP Version Failure Count
Author: Neel Chauhan
Created: 25-Jan-2019
Status: Draft
Ticket: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27491

1. Introduction

   As IPv4 address space becomes scarce, ISPs and organizations will deploy
   IPv6 in their networks. Right now, Tor clients connect to guards using
   IPv4 connectivity by default.

   When networks first transition to IPv6, both IPv4 and IPv6 will be enabled
   on most networks in a so-called "dual-stack" configuration. This is to not
   break existing IPv4-only applications while enabling IPv6 connectivity.
   However, IPv6 connectivity may be unreliable and clients should be able
   to connect to the guard using the most reliable technology, whether IPv4
   or IPv6.

   In ticket #27490, we introduced the option ClientAutoIPv6ORPort which adds
   preliminary "happy eyeballs" support. If set, this lets a client randomly
   choose between IPv4 or IPv6. However, this random decision does not take
   into account unreliable connectivity or network failures of an IP family.
   A successful Tor implementation of the happy eyeballs algorithm requires
   that unreliable connectivity on IPv4 and IPv6 are taken into consideration.

   This proposal describes an algorithm to take into account network failures
   in the random decision used for choosing an IP family and the data fields
   used by the algorithm.

2. Failure Counter Design

   I propose that the failure counter uses the following fields:

      * IPv4 failure count

      * IPv4 failure count from no route (autofail)

      * IPv6 failure count

      * IPv6 failure count from no route (autofail)

   These entries will exist as internal counters for the current session, and
   as a list of the previous counts of these counters from previous sessions in
   the state file.

   These values will be stored as 32-bit unsigned integers for the current
   session, and as comma seperated values in the statefile.

   The list capacity will be the 4 most recent sessions for each field above
   stored in the state file with the least recent first. This is for the
   following reasons:

      * We can forget about the oldest sessions without having to keep the
        exact timestamp when a client failed. This prevents an attacker from
        getting detailed failure information from the state file.

      * Some clients (mobile phones, laptops) may switch between networks of
        which may be more or less reliable than the previous in terms of IPv4
        or IPv6. In this case, it makes less sense to remember old failures
        caused on a different network from the current one.

   When Tor is being closed, and there are less than four entries for each
   field, we will append the current session at the end. If there are four
   entries, we will remove the oldest entry and then add the current session's
   values at Tor's shutdown.

3. Failure Probability Calculation

   The failure count of one IP version will increase the probability of the
   other IP version. For instance, a failure of IPv4 will increase the IPv6
   probability, and vice versa.

   When the IP version is being chosen, I propose that these values will be
   included in the guard selection code:

      * IPv4 failure points

      * IPv6 failure points

      * Total failure points

   These values will be stored as 32-bit unsigned integers.

   A generic failure of an IP version will add one point to the failure point
   count values of the particular IP version which failed.

   A failure of an IP version from a "no route" error which happens when
   connections automatically fail will be counted as two failure points
   for the automatically failed version.

   The failure points for both IPv4 and IPv6 is sum of the values in the state
   file plus the current session's failure values. The total failure points is
   a sum of the IPv4 and IPv6 failure points.

   The probability of a particular IP version is the failure points of the
   other version divided by the total number of failure points, multiplied
   by 8 and stored as an integer. We will call this value the summarized
   failure point value (SFPV). The reason for this summarization is to
   emulate a probability in 1/8 intervals by the random number generator.

   In the random number generator, we will choose a random number between 0
   and 8. If the random number is less than the IPv6 SFPV, we will choose
   IPv4. If it is equal or greater, we will choose IPv6.

   If the probability is 0/8 with a SFPV value of 0, it will be rounded to
   1/8 with a SFPV of 1. Also, if the probability is 8/8 with a SFPV of 8,
   it will be rounded to 7/8 with a SFPV of 7. The reason for this is to
   accomodate mobile clients which could change networks at any time (e.g.
   WiFi to cellular) which may be more or less reliable in terms of a
   particular IP family when compared to the previous network of the client.

4. Acknowledgements

   Thank you teor for aiding me with the implementation of Happy Eyeballs in
   Tor. This would not have been possible if it weren't for you.

_______________________________________________
tor-dev mailing list
tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev