Hi,
Here is an initial draft of Proposal 311: Relay IPv6 Reachability.
This proposal includes:
* relay IPv6 ORPort extends, and
* relay IPv6 ORPort reachability checks.
This is the first of 3 proposals:
* Proposal 311: Relay IPv6 Reachability
* Proposal 312: Automatic Relay IPv6 Addresses
* Proposal 313: Relay IPv6 Statistics
(I haven't written the others yet!)
I also want to make some minor changes to Proposal 306, so that bridge
IPv6 behaviour stays in sync with client IPv6 behaviour.
There are still a few TODO items in the proposal, mostly about Tor's
current behaviour. If you know the answers, please let me know.
The full text is included below, and it is also available as a GitHub
pull request:
https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/103
The related tickets are #24404 (proposal) and #24403 (implementation):
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24404
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24403
Please feel free to reply on this list, or via GitHub pull request
comments.
Filename: 311-relay-ipv6-reachability.txt
Title: Tor Relay IPv6 Reachability
Author: teor
Created: 22-January-2020
Status: Draft
Ticket: #24404
0. Abstract
We propose that Tor relays and bridges should check the reachability of
their IPv6 ORPort, before publishing their descriptor. To check IPv6 ORPort
reachability, relays and bridges need to be able to extend circuits via
other relays, and back to their own IPv6 ORPort.
1. Introduction
Tor relays and bridges currently check the reachability of their IPv4
ORPort and DirPort before publishing them in their descriptor. But relays
and bridges do not test the reachability of their IPv6 ORPorts.
However, Directory Authorities make direct connections to relay IPv4 and
IPv6 ORPorts, to test each relay's reachability. Once a relay has been
confirmed as reachable by a majority of authorities, it is included in the
consensus. (Currently, 6 out of 9 Directory Authorities perform IPv4 and
IPv6 reachability checks. The others just check IPv4.)
The Bridge authority makes direct connections to bridge IPv4 ORPorts, to
test each bridge's reachability. Depending on its configuration, it may also
test IPv6 ORPorts. Once a bridge has been confirmed as reachable by the
bridge authority, it is included in the bridge networkstatus used by
BridgeDB.
Many relay and bridge operators don't know when their relay's IPv6 ORPort is
unreachable. They may not find out until they check [Relay Search], or
their traffic may drop. For new operators, it might just look like Tor
simply isn't working, or it isn't using much traffic. IPv6 ORPort issues
are a significant source of relay and bridge operator support requests.
Implementing IPv6 ORPort reachability checks will provide immediate, direct
feedback to operators in the relay or bridge's logs. It also enables future
work, such as automatically discovering relay and bridge addresses for IPv6
ORPorts (see [Proposal 312]).
2. Scope
This proposal modifies Tor's behaviour as follows:
Relays:
* circuit extension,
* OR connections for circuit extension,
* reachability testing.
Bridges:
* reachability testing only.
This proposal does not change client behaviour.
When this proposal describes Tor's current behaviour, it covers all
supported Tor versions (0.3.5.7 to 0.4.2.5), as of January 2020.
3. Allow Relay IPv6 Extends
To check IPv6 ORPort reachability, relays and bridges need to be able to
extend circuits via other relays, and back to their own IPv6 ORPort.
We propose that relays start to extend some circuits over IPv6 connections.
We do not propose any changes to bridge extend behaviour.
3.1. Current IPv6 ORPort Implementation
Currently, all relays and bridges must have an IPv4 ORPort. IPv6 ORPorts
are optional for relays and bridges.
Tor supports making direct IPv6 OR connections:
* from directory authorities to relay ORPorts,
* from the bridge authority to bridge ORPorts,
* from clients to relay and bridge ORPorts.
Tor relays and bridges accept IPv6 ORPort connections. But IPv6 ORPorts are
not currently included in extend requests to other relays. And even if an
extend cell contains an IPv6 ORPort, bridges and relays will not extend
via an IPv6 connection to another relay.
Instead, relays will extend circuits:
* Using an existing authenticated connection to the requested relay
(which is typically over IPv4), or
* Over a new connection via the IPv4 ORPort in an extend cell.
If a relay receives an extend cell that only contains an IPv6 ORPort, the
extend typically fails.
3.2. Relays Extend to IPv6 ORPorts
We propose that relays make some connections via the IPv6 ORPorts in
extend cells.
Relays will extend circuits:
* using an existing authenticated connection to the requested relay
(which may be over IPv4 or IPv6), or
* over a new connection via the IPv4 or IPv6 ORPort in an extend cell.
Since bridges try to imitate client behaviour, they will not adopt this new
behaviour, until clients begin routinely connecting via IPv6. (See
[Proposal 306].)
3.2.1. Making IPv6 ORPort Extend Connections
Relays can make a new connection over IPv6 when:
* there is no existing authenticated connection to the requested relay,
and
* the extend cell contains an IPv6 ORPort.
If these conditions are satisfied, and the extend cell also contains an
IPv4 ORPort, we propose that the relay choose between an IPv4 and an IPv6
connection at random.
If the extend cell does not contain an IPv4 ORPort, we propose that the
relay connects over IPv6. (Relays should support IPv6-only extend cells,
even though they are not used to test relay reachability in this proposal.)
A successful IPv6 connection also requires that:
* the requested relay has an IPv6 ORPort.
But extending relays must not check the consensus for other relays' IPv6
information. Consensuses may be out of date, particularly when relays are
doing reachability checks for new IPv6 ORPorts.
See section 3.3.2 for other situations where IPv6 information may be
incorrect or unavailable.
3.2.2. No Tor Client Changes
Tor clients currently include IPv4 ORPorts in their extend cells, but they
do not include IPv6 ORPorts.
We do not propose any client IPv6 extend cell changes at this time.
The Tor network needs more IPv6 relays, before clients can safely use
IPv6 extends. (Relays do not require anonymity, so they can safely use
IPv6 extends to test their own reachability.)
We also recommend prioritising client to relay IPv6 connections
(see [Proposal 306]) over relay to relay IPv6 connections. Because client
IPv6 connections have a direct impact on users.
3.3. Alternative Extend Designs
We briefly mention some potential extend designs, and the reasons that
they were not used in this proposal.
(Some designs may be proposed for future Tor versions, but are not necessary
at this time.)
3.3.1. Future Relay IPv6 Extend Behaviour
Random selection of extend ORPorts is a simple design, which supports IPv6
ORPort reachability checks.
However, it is not the most efficient design when:
* both relays meet the requirements for IPv4 and IPv6 extends,
* a new connection is required,
* the relays have either IPv4 or IPv6 connectivity, but not both.
In this very specific case, this proposal results in an average of 1
circuit extend failure per new connection. (Because relays do not try to
connect to the other ORPort when the first one fails.)
If relays try both the IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts, then the circuit would
succeed. For example, relays could try the alternative port after a 250ms
delay, as in [Proposal 306]. This design results in an average circuit delay
of up to 125ms per new connection, rather than failure.
However, partial relay connectivity should be uncommon. And relays keep
connections open long-term, so new relay connections are a small proportion
of extend requests.
Therefore, we defer implementing any more complex designs. Since we propose
to use IPv6 extends to test relay reachability, occasional circuit extend
failures have a very minor impact.
3.3.2. Future Bridge IPv6 Extend Behaviour
When clients automatically connect to relay IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts by
default, bridges should also adopt this behaviour. (For example,
see [Proposal 306].)
3.3.3. Rejected Extend Designs
Some designs may never be suitable for the Tor network.
We rejected designs where relays check the consensus to see if other
relays support IPv6, because:
* relays may have different consensuses,
* the extend cell may have been created using a version of the
[Onion Service Protocol] which supports IPv6, or
* the extend cell may be from a relay that has just added IPv6, and is
testing the reachability of its own ORPort (see Section 4).
We avoided designs where relays try to learn if other relays support IPv6,
because these designs:
* are more complex than random selection,
* potentially leak information between different client circuits,
* may enable denial of service attacks, where a flood of incorrect extend
cells causes a relay to believe that another relay is unreachable on an
ORPort that actually works, and
* require careful tuning to match the typical interval at which network
connectivity is actually changing.
4. Check Relay and Bridge IPv6 ORPort Reachability
We propose that relays and bridges check their own IPv6 ORPort reachability.
To check IPv6 ORPort reachability, relays and bridges extend circuits via
other relays, and back to their own IPv6 ORPort.
IPv6 reachability failures may result in a relay or bridge refusing to
publish its descriptor, if enough existing relays support IPv6 extends.
4.1. Current Reachability Implementation
Relays and bridges check the reachability of their IPv4 ORPorts and
DirPorts, and refuse to publish their descriptor if either reachability
check fails.
IPv4 ORPort reachability checks succeed when any create cell is received on
any inbound OR connection. The check succeeds, even if the cell is from an
IPv6 ORPort, or a circuit built by a client.
Directory Authorities make direct connections to relay IPv4 and IPv6
ORPorts, to test each relay's reachability. Relays that fail either
reachability test, on enough directory authorities, are excluded from the
consensus.
The Bridge authority makes direct connections to bridge IPv4 ORPorts, to
test each bridge's reachability. Depending on its configuration, it may also
test IPv6 ORPorts. Bridges that fail either reachability test are excluded
from BridgeDB.
4.2. Checking IPv6 ORPort Reachability
We propose that testing relays (and bridges) select some IPv6 extend-capable
relays for their reachability circuits, and include their own IPv4 and IPv6
ORPorts in the final extend cells on those circuits.
The final extending relay will extend to the testing relay:
* using an existing authenticated connection to the testing relay
(which may be over IPv4 or IPv6), or
* over a new connection via the IPv4 or IPv6 ORPort in the extend cell.
The testing relay will confirm that test circuits can extend to both its
IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts.
4.2.1. Selecting the Final Extending Relay
IPv6 ORPort reachability checks require an IPv6 extend-capable relay as
the second-last hop of reachability circuits. (The testing relay is the
last hop.)
IPv6-extend capable relays must have:
* Relay subprotocol version 3 (or later), and
* an IPv6 ORPort.
(See section 5.1 for the definition of Relay subprotocol version 3.)
The other relays in the path do not require any particular protocol
versions.
4.2.2. Extending from the Second-Last Hop
IPv6 ORPort reachability circuits should put the IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts in
the extend cell for the final extend in reachability circuits.
Supplying both ORPorts makes these extend cells indistinguishable from
future client extend cells.
If reachability succeeds, the testing relay (or bridge) will accept the
final extend on one of its ORPorts, selected at random by the extending
relay (see section 3.2.1).
4.2.3. Separate IPv4 and IPv6 Reachability Flags
Testing relays (and bridges) will record reachability separately for IPv4
and IPv6 ORPorts, based on the ORPort that the test circuit was received on.
4.2.4. No Changes to DirPort Reachability
We do not propose any changes to relay IPv4 DirPort reachability checks at
this time.
The following configurations are currently not supported:
* bridge DirPorts, and
* relay IPv6 DirPorts.
Therefore, they are also out of scope for this proposal.
4.3. Refuse to Publish Descriptor if IPv6 ORPort is Unreachable
If an IPv6 ORPort reachability check fails, relays (and bridges) should log
a warning.
In addition, if IPv6ORPort reachability checks are reliable, based on the
number of relays in the network that support IPv6 extends, relays should
refuse to publish their descriptor.
4.3.1. Refusing to Publish the Descriptor
We set a threshold of consensus relays for reliable IPv6 ORPort checks:
* at least 30 relays, and
* at least 1% of the total consensus weight,
must support IPv6 extends.
We chose these parameters so that the number of relays is triple the
number of directory authorities, and the consensus weight is high enough
to support occasional reachability circuits.
In small networks with:
* less than 2000 relays, or
* a total consensus weight of zero,
the threshold should be the minimum tor network size to test reachability:
* at least 2 relays, excluding this relay.
(Note: we may increase this threshold to 3 or 4 relays if we discover a
higher minimum during testing.)
If the current consensus satisfies this threshold, testing relays (and
bridges) that fail IPv6 ORPort reachability checks should refuse to publish
their descriptors.
To ensure an accurate threshold, testing relays should exclude:
* the testing relay itself, and
* relays that they will not use in testing circuits,
from the:
* relay count, and
* the numerator of the threshold percentage.
Typically, relays will be excluded if they are in the testing relay's:
* family,
* IPv4 address /16 network,
* IPv6 address /32 network (a requirement as of Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha),
unless EnforceDistinctSubnets is 0.
As a useful side-effect, these different thresholds for each relay family
will reduce the likelihood of the network flapping around the threshold.
If flapping has an impact on the network health, directory authorities
should set the AssumeIPv6Reachable consensus parameter. (See the next
section.)
4.3.2. Add AssumeIPv6Reachable Option
We add an AssumeIPv6Reachable torrc option and consensus parameter.
If IPv6 ORPort checks have bugs that impact the health of the network,
they can be disabled by setting AssumeIPv6Reachable=1 in the consensus
parameters.
If IPv6 ORPort checks have bugs that impact a particular relay (or bridge),
they can be disabled by setting "AssumeIPv6Reachable 1" in the relay's
torrc.
This option disables IPv6 ORPort reachability checks, so relays publish
their descriptors if their IPv4 ORPort reachability checks succeed.
The default for the torrc option is "auto", which checks the consensus
parameter. If the consensus parameter is not set, the default is "0".
"AssumeReachable 1" overrides all values of "AssumeIPv6Reachable",
disabling both IPv4 and IPv6 ORPort reachability checks.
4.4. Optional Efficiency and Reliability Changes
We propose some optional changes for efficiency and reliability, and
describe their impact.
Some of these changes may be more appropriate in future releases, or
along with other proposed features.
4.4.1. Extend IPv6 From All Supported Second-Last Hops
The testing relay (or bridge) puts both IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts in its final
extend cell, and the receiving ORPort is selected at random by the
extending relay (see sections 3.2.1 and 4.2). Therefore, approximately half
of IPv6 ORPort reachability circuits will actually end up confirming IPv4
ORPort reachability.
We propose this optional change, to improve the rate of IPv6 ORPort
reachability checks:
If the second-last hop of an IPv4 ORPort reachability circuit supports IPv6
extends, testing relays may put the IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts in the extend
cell for the final extend.
As the number of relays that support IPv6 extends increases, this change
will increase the number of IPv6 reachability confirmations. In the ideal
case, where the entire network supports IPv4 and IPv6 extends, IPv4 and IPv6
ORPort reachability checks would require a similar number of circuits.
4.4.2. Close Existing Connections Before Testing Reachability
When a busy relay is performing reachability checks, it may already have
established inbound or outbound connections to the second-last hop in its
reachability test circuits. The extending relay may use these connections
for the extend, rather than opening a connection to the target ORPort
(see sections 3.2 and 4.2.2).
Bridges only establish outbound connections to other relays, and only over
IPv4 (except for reachability test circuits). So they are still potentially
affected by this issue.
We propose these optional changes, to improve the efficiency of IPv4 and
IPv6 ORPort reachability checks:
Testing relays (and bridges):
* close any outbound connections to the second-last hop of reachability
circuits, and
* close inbound connections to the second-last hop of reachability
circuits, if those connections are not using the target ORPort.
Even though it is unlikely that bridges will have inbound connections to
a non-target ORPort, bridges should still do inbound connection checks, for
consistency.
These changes are particularly important if a relay is connected to all
other relays in the network, but only over IPv4. (Or in the future, only
over IPv6.)
We expect that these changes will slightly increase the number of relay
re-connections, but reduce the number of reachability test circuits
required to confirm reachability.
4.4.3. Accurately Identifying Test Circuits
The testing relay (or bridge) may confirm that the create cells it is
receiving are from its own test circuits, and that test circuits are
capable of returning create cells to the origin.
Currently, relays confirm reachability if any create cell is received on
any inbound connection (see section 4.1). Relays do not check that the
circuit is a reachability test circuit, and they do not wait to receive the
return created cell. This behaviour has resulted in difficult to diagnose
bugs on some rare relay configurations.
We propose these optional changes, to improve the efficiency of IPv4 and
IPv6 ORPort reachability checks:
Testing relays may:
* check that the create cell is received from a test circuit
(by comparing the received cell to the cells sent by test circuits),
* check that the create cell is received on an inbound connection
(this is existing behaviour),
* if the create cell from a test circuit is received on an outbound
connection, destroy the circuit (rather than returning a created cell),
and
* check that the created cell is returned to the relay on a test circuit
(by comparing the remote address of the final hop on the circuit, to
the local IPv4 and IPv6 ORPort addresses).
TODO: work out how to efficiently match inbound create cells to test
circuits.
4.4.4. Allowing More Relay IPv6 Extends
Currently, clients, relays, and bridges do not include IPv6 ORPorts in their
extend cells.
In this proposal, we only make relays (and bridges) extend over IPv6 on
the final hop of test circuits. This limited use of IPv6 extends means that
IPv6 connections will still be uncommon.
We propose these optional changes, to increase the number of IPv6
connections between relays:
To increase the number of IPv6 connections, relays that support IPv6
extends may want to use them for all hops of their own circuits. Relays
make their own circuits for reachability tests, bandwidth tests, and
ongoing preemptive circuits. (Bridges can not change their behaviour,
because they try to imitate clients.)
We propose a torrc option and consensus parameter SendIPv6CircuitExtends,
which is only supported on relays (and not bridges or clients). This option
makes relays send IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts in all their extend cells, when
supported by the extending and receiving relay. (See section 3.2.1.)
TODO: Is there a shorter name, that isn't easily confused with enabling
support for other nodes to perform IPv6 extends via this relay?
The default value for this option is "auto", which checks the consensus
parameter. If the consensus parameter is not set, it defaults to "0" in
the initial release.
Once IPv6 extends have had enough testing, we may enable
SendIPv6CircuitExtends on the network. The consensus parameter will be set
to 1. The default will be changed to "1" (if the consensus parameter is not
set).
We defer any client (and bridge) changes to a separate proposal, to be
implemented when there are more IPv6 relays in the network. But we note
that relay IPv6 extends will provide some cover traffic when clients
eventually use IPv6 extends in their circuits.
As a useful side effect, increasing the number of IPv6 connections in the
network makes it more likely that an existing connection can be used for
the final hop of a relay IPv6 ORPort reachability check.
4.5. Alternate Reachability Designs
We briefly mention some potential reachability designs, and the reasons that
they were not used in this proposal.
4.5.1. Removing IPv4 ORPorts from Extend Cells
We avoid designs that only include IPv6 ORPorts in extend cells, and remove
IPv4 ORPorts.
Only including the IPv6 ORPort would provide slightly more specific
reachability check circuits. However, we don't need IPv6-only designs,
because relays continue trying different reachability circuits until they
confirm reachability.
IPv6-only designs also make it easy to distinguish relay reachability extend
cells from other extend cells. This distinguisher will become more of an
issue as IPv6 extends become more common in the network (see sections 4.2.2
and 4.4.4).
Removing the IPv4 ORPort also provides no fallback, if the IPv6 ORPort is
actually unreachable. IPv6-only failures do not affect reachability checks,
but they will become important in the future, as other circuit types start
using IPv6 extends.
IPv6-only reachability designs also increase the number of special cases in
the implementation. (And the likelihood of subtle bugs.)
These designs may be appropriate in future, when there are IPv6-only bridges
or relays.
5. New Relay Subprotocol Version
We reserve Tor subprotocol "Relay=3" for:
* relays that support for IPv6 extends, and
* relays and bridges that support IPv6 ORPort reachability checks,
as described in this proposal.
5.1. Tor Specification Changes
We propose the following changes to the [Tor Specification], once this
proposal is implemented.
Adding a new Relay subprotocol version lets testing relays identify other
relays that support IPv6 extends. It also allows us to eventually recommend
or require support for IPv6 extends on all relays (and bridges).
Append to the Relay version 2 subprotocol specification:
Relay=2 has limited IPv6 support:
* Clients do not include IPv6 ORPorts in EXTEND2 cells.
* Relays do not not initiate IPv6 connections in response to
EXTEND2 cells containing IPv6 ORPorts.
However, relays accept inbound connections to their IPv6 ORPorts,
and will extend circuits via those connections.
"3" -- relays support extending over IPv6 connections in response to an
EXTEND2 cell containing an IPv6 ORPort. Relays and bridges perform
IPv6 ORPort reachability checks. Client behaviour does not change.
This subprotocol is advertised by all relays and bridges, regardless
of their configured ORPorts. But relays without a configured IPv6
ORPort may refuse to extend over IPv6. And bridges always refuse to
extend over IPv6, because they try to imitate client behaviour.
A successful IPv6 extend requires:
* Relay subprotocol version 3 (or later) and an IPv6 ORPort on the
extending relay,
* an IPv6 ORPort in the EXTEND2 cell, and
* an IPv6 ORPort on the accepting relay.
(Because different tor instances can have different views of the
network, these checks should be done when the path is selected.
Extending relays should only check local IPv6 information, before
attempting the extend.)
This subprotocol version is described in proposal 311, and
implemented in Tor 0.4.4.1-alpha. (TODO: check version after code is
merged).
6. Test Plan
We provide a quick summary of our testing plans.
6.1. Test IPv6 ORPort Reachability and Extends
We propose to test these changes using chutney networks with AssumeReachable
disabled. (Chutney currently enables AssumeReachable by default.)
We also propose to test these changes on the public network with a small
number of relays and bridges.
Once these changes are merged, volunteer relay and bridge operators will be
able to test them by:
* compiling from source,
* running nightly builds, or
* running alpha releases.
6.2. Test Existing Features
We will modify and test these existing features:
* IPv4 ORPort reachability checks
We do not plan on modifying these existing features:
* Relay reachability retries
TODO: Do relays re-check their own reachability? How often?
* Relay canonical connections
* "Too many connections" warning logs
But we will test that they continue to function correctly, and fix any bugs
triggered by the modifications in this proposal.
6.3. Test Legacy Relay Compatibility
We will also test IPv6 extends from newer relays (which implement this
proposal) to older relays (which do not). Although this proposal does not
create these kinds of circuits, we need to check for bugs and excessive
logs in older tor versions.
8. Ongoing Monitoring
To monitor the impact of these changes, relays should collect basic IPv4
and IPv6 connection and bandwidth statistics (see [Proposal 313]).
We may also collect separate statistics on connections from:
* clients (and bridges, because they act like clients), and
* other relays (and authorities, because they act like relays).
We do not propose to collect additional statistics on:
* bridges,
* circuit counts, or
* failure rates.
Collecting statistics like these could impact user privacy.
References:
[Onion Service Protocol]: In particular, Version 3 of the Onion Service Protocol supports IPv6: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/rend-spec-v3.txt
[Proposal 306]: One possible design for automatic client IPv4 and IPv6 connections is at https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/306-ipv6-happy-eyeballs.txt (TODO: modify to include bridge changes with client changes)
[Proposal 312]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/312-auto-relay-ipv6.txt (TODO)
[Proposal 313]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/313-relay-ipv6-stats.txt (TODO)
[Relay Search] https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html
[Tor Specification]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/tor-spec.txt
--
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