El miÃ, 23-07-2014 a las 18:34 -0400, Roger Dingledine escribiÃ: > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 11:24:47PM +0100, Noel David Torres TaÃo wrote: > > What would happen if a Tor node changes behaviour and uses four or five > > relay steps instead of three? > > > > Would it enhance Tor's security? > > I assume you mean a Tor client? > > https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#ChoosePathLength I read that and it gave me the idea. I'm asking what would happen to the network if somebody recompiles Tor to use e.g. 4 relay steps, and if it is really noticeable to somebody. As far as I understand it, the first hop does not know anything but that it must hand off a certain payload to a next relay, and that relay's address, but it does not know if the payload has two or three more onion layers. > > > Is it possible to relay Tor through a Tor connection? I mean using Tor > > with its three steps to reach a Tor entry node to get three extra steps. > > Yes, it is possible. But it is currently considered a flaw, because it > can be used to work around the 'infinite path length' defenses. > http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#congestion-longpaths > https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/110-avoid-infinite-circuits.txt > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2667 > > > Would that difficult correlation attacks? > > Defending against correlation attacks is an open research, so "maybe". > But it's not clear how it would, since an adversary who can see or > measure your first hop (on the first circuit) and also your last hop > (on the last circuit) would still be in the right place to do the attack. I thought on that, but thought also that it may be more difficult to know which sites to monitor. > > --Roger Thanks Noel er Envite P.S. It seems it was silly, after all
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