Thus spake Fabian Keil (freebsd-listen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx):
> Mike Perry <mikeperry@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > The idea is that users should be able to choose if they would like
> > to have either two or three hop paths through the tor network.
> >
> > This value should be modifiable from the controller, and should be
> > available from Vidalia.
>
> Did you consider (and reject) making the hop count also changeable
> through special host names so HTTP users could change it depending
> on the URL, or would that be an anonymity problem?
I had not considered this. It seems OK, though historically adding
suffixes to urls seems to not work very well in several cases if there
isn't something to scrub the suffix out (like privoxy ;).
I put it as Phase 6 of the proposal in SVN.
> If different guards would be used for different hop counts,
> fingerprinting based on the traffic might be easier for a
> MITM between the user and most of the guard nodes, but if
> the position of the user is constant, that's already
> possible in cases like your [1] and the gathered information
> ("this Tor user is the same Tor user I saw x days ago") is
> probably not too threatening anyway.
>
> Of course this should also only be an issue as long as the
> proposed leaky-exit method isn't implemented.
Yeah, the plan would be to use the same guards, even before the
leaky-exit stuff is implemented.
--
Mike Perry
Mad Computer Scientist
fscked.org evil labs
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