Re: [tor-dev] Discussion on the crypto migration plan of the identity keys of Hidden Services

[grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx>]

> Yeah, unhappy people are both no fun and more likely to be confused by
> the new system.
>
>> Thoughts?

Not really following this talk, but for the parts that revolve
around a greater than 16 char onion address, I don't see
much problem here. There are some DNS RFC name length
limitations, maxpathlen posix, etc. But 16 vs a full sha-2/3
hash over some underlying keys is not a big deal. Look at
how it's already longer than practical memorization, if not
recognition. And how people just bookmark things. Look at I2P
sizes. People will whine, but even their current usage does
not merit such whine. Change in a name layer might, but
there is no name layer today. Flags are ok, people will
figure it out.

Now one single area I see problem is if you want to
interoperate with I2P / Phantom / Onioncat. That would still
be 'cool', yes. But does require some form of address magic
if you go wider than current 80 bits. zzz forum has posts about
how that could still work... since there won't be more
than 2^80 nodes ever anyways, you just need an address
map layer too.
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