Hello everyone! During this year's Google Summer of Code I[0] will be working on reducing the Round-Trip-Time (RTT) for preemptively built circuits.[1] My mentors are Mike and Aaron. A brief summary of the project: RTTs of circuits can be measured by violating the exit policy of the exit node and the resulting error can be timed in a measuring client. It is assumed that the RTTs are FrÃchet-distributed which could be used to reject a preemptively built circuit if its RTT is below a certain threshold value. A basic algorithm will be implemented to gather the required data for further statistical analysis which should help answering open questions like: â Are the RTTs FrÃchet-distributed? â Does this strategy make new attacks feasible? â How many probes per circuit are needed to do reasonable estimations? â How much additional load is added to the network? â What is an appropriate cut-off percentile? â Does the strategy work in terms of anonymity and performance? â Does the RTT vary for destination ports? (This might be the case for destination ports that occur rarely in exit policies.) â Does this strategy also work if guard nodes are congested? Best, Robert [0] "ra_" on OFTC [1] http://www.google-melange.com/gsoc/project/google/gsoc2013/ra_/19001
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