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Re: Uptime Sanity Checking
- To: or-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: Re: Uptime Sanity Checking
- From: coderman <coderman@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2007 04:00:24 -0800
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- Delivery-date: Fri, 09 Mar 2007 07:00:33 -0500
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On 3/8/07, Roger Dingledine <arma@xxxxxxx> wrote:
... Right now we're vulnerable to the situation where
an attacker signs up 1000 servers with uptimes of 2 years
question: how are nodes accepted into the verified directories currently?
i know the process is constrained and vetted somewhat, but no details
seem to be documented anywhere. (that is, it takes X days for Tor ops
to notice your notification and process accordingly (assuming your
request/node appear legitimate))
uptime anomalies should be instantly detectable to an observer
watching the network grow. discerning honest node contributors from
covert maliciousness is much more difficult though...