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Proposal idea: User path configuration
Filename: xxx-user-path-config.txt
Title: Configuration options regarding circuit building
Author: Sebastian Hahn
Created: 01-March-2010
Status: Draft
Overview:
This document outlines how Tor handles the user configuration
options
to influence the circuit building process.
Motivation:
Tor's treatment of the configuration *Nodes options was surprising
to many
users, and quite a few conspiracy theories have crept up. We
should update
our specification and code to better describe and communicate what
is going
during circuit building, and how we're honoring configuration. So
far,
we've been tracking a bugreport about this behaviour (
https://bugs.torproject.org/flyspray/index.php?
do=details&id=1090 ) and
Nick replied in a thread on or-talk (
http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Feb-2010/msg00117.html ). This
proposal
tries to document our intention for those configuration options.
Design:
Five configuration options are available to users to influence Tor's
circuit building. EntryNodes and ExitNodes define a list of nodes
that
are for the Entry/Exit position in all circuits. ExcludeNodes is a
list of
nodes that are used for no circuit, and ExcludeExitNodes is a list
of
nodes that aren't used as the last hop. StrictNodes defines Tor's
behaviour
in case of a conflict, for example when a node that is excluded is
the only
available introduction point. Setting StrictNodes to 1 breaks Tor's
functionality in that case, and it will refuse to build such a
circuit.
Neither Nick's email nor bug 1090 have clear suggestions how we
should
behave in each case, so I tried to come up with something that made
sense to me.
Security implications:
Deviating from normal circuit building can break one's anonymity,
so the
documentation of the above option should contain a warning to make
users
aware of the pitfalls.
Specification:
It is proposed that the "User configuration" part of path-spec
(section
2.2.2) be replaced with this:
Users can alter the default behavior for path selection with
configuration
options. In case of conflicts (excluding and requiring the same
node) the
"StrictNodes" option is used to determine behaviour. If a nodes is
both
excluded and required via a configuration option, the exclusion
takes
preference.
- If "ExitNodes" is provided, then every request requires an exit
node on
the ExitNodes list. If a request is supported by no nodes on
that list,
and "StrictNodes" is false, then Tor treats that request as if
ExitNodes
were not provided.
- "EntryNodes" behaves analogously.
- If "ExcludeNodes" is provided, then no circuit uses any of the
nodes
listed. If a circuit requires an excluded node to be used, and
"StrictNodes" is false, then Tor uses the node in that position
while
not using any other of the excluded nodes.
- If "ExcludeExitNodes" is provided, then Tor will not use the nodes
listed for the exit position in a circuit. If a circuit requires
an
excluded node to be used in the exit position and "StrictNodes" is
false, then Tor builds that circuit as if ExcludeExitNodes were
not
provided.
- If a user tries to connect to or resolve a hostname of the form
<target>.<servername>.exit and the "AllowDotExit" configuration
option
is set to 1, the request is rewritten to a request for <target>,
and the
request is only supported by the exit whose nickname or
fingerprint is
<servername>. If "AllowDotExit" is set to 0 (default), any
request for
<anything>.exit is denied.
- When any of the *Nodes settings are changed, all circuits are
expired
immediately, to prevent a situation where a previously built
circuit
is used even though some of its nodes are now excluded.
Compatibility:
The old Strict*Nodes options are deprecated, and the StrictNodes
option is
new. Tor users may need to update their configuration file.