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Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: Capturing Traffic Statistics from Exit Relays
On Monday, March 18, 2013, Moritz Bartl wrote:
On 18.03.2013 12:05, Zack Weinberg wrote:
> Â* TCP port
> Â* "Public suffix" + 1 domain component of destination
> Â Â(example.com, example.co.uk)
I am not sure I like this. Maybe we might want to limit it to popular
destinations -- drop sites that only get few hits? And rougher access
numbers (50 hits, 100, etc)?
The "differential privacy" sanitization algorithm discussed in the next section is in fact a more systematic and theoretically grounded way of doing just this. Sites that are rarely visited will have their true visit rate overwhelmed by the added noise, which can either add to or subtract from the number. ÂSites that are frequently visited will simply have their true visit count rendered uncertain.
I shall look into the possibility of adding completely fake visits toÂthe statistics as well.
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