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Re: [tor-dev] Notes from the prop224 proposal reading group




On 29 Mar 2016, at 01:44, David Goulet <dgoulet@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On 24 Mar (16:55:57), George Kadianakis wrote:
George Kadianakis <desnacked@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:

[ text/plain ]
Hello,

so we had a meeting about the future of "Next Generation Hidden Services" aka prop224.
It was a good meeting.

We spent most of the time discussing the topics brought up here:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-March/010534.html
Please read the above mail to get up to speed with the topics of discussion.

<snip>

b) In prop224, why do intro points need to know the "intro point encryption key"
  and also what's the point of UPDATE-KEYS-SUBCMD?

  Nick told us that the main point of UPDATE-KEYS-SUBCMD is that so hidden
  services can rotate their intro point encryption key periodically, so that
  they can reset their replay caches. 

  That's a fair point. The big question here is, is this worth the complexity
  that MAINT_INTRO and UPDATE-KEYS-SUBCMD add to the protocol logic?

I'm not convinced that this feature is necessary.

I think we should remove it, and if it looks like it's needed later, we can write a separate, small proposal for it that gives reasons why it's needed.

Tim

Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
PGP 968F094B

teor at blah dot im
OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F

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