Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 328: Make Relays Report When They Are Overloaded

[Mike Perry <mikeperry@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On 3/2/21 6:01 PM, George Kadianakis wrote:
> 
> David Goulet <dgoulet@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> 
>> Greetings,
>>
>> Attached is a proposal from Mike Perry and I. Merge requsest is here:
>>
>> https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec/-/merge_requests/22
>>
> 
> Hello all,
> 
> while working on this proposal I had to change it slightly to add a few
> more metrics and also to simplify some engineering issues that we would
> encounter. You can find the changes here:
>            https://gitlab.torproject.org/asn/torspec/-/commit/b57743b9764bd8e6ef8de689d14483b7ec9c91ec
> 
> Mike, based on your comments in the #40222 ticket, I would appreciate
> comments on the way the DNS issues will be reported. David argued that
> they should not be part of the "overload-general" line because they are
> not an overload and it's not the fault of the network in any way. This
> is why we added them as separate lines. Furthermore, David suggested we
> turn them into a threshold "only report if 25% of the total requests
> have timed out" instead of "only report if at least one time out has
> occured" since that would be more useful.

I'm confused by this confusion. There's pretty clear precedent for
treating packet drops as a sign of network capacity overload. We've also
seen it experimentally specifically with respect to DNS, during Rob's
experiment. We discussed this on Monday.

However, I agree there's a chance that a single packet drop can be
spurious, and/or could be due to ephemeral overload as TCP congestion
causes. But 25% is waaaaaaaaaay too high. Even 1% is high IMO, but is
more reasonable. We should ask some exits what they see now. The fact
that our DNS scanners are not currently seeing this at all, and the
issue appeared only for the exact duration of Rob's experiment, suggests
that DNS packets drops are extremely rare in healthy network conditions.

Furthermore, revealing the specific type of overload condition
increases the ability for the adversary to use this information for
various attacks. I'd rather it be combined in all cases, so that the
specific cause is not visible. In all cases, the reaction of our systems
should be the same: direct less load to relays with this line. If we
need to dig, that's what MetricsPort is for.

In fact, this DNS packet drop signal may be particularly useful in
traffic analysis attacks. Its reporting, and likely all of this overload
reporting, should probably be delayed until something like the top of
the hour after it happens. We may even want this delay to be a consensus
parameter. Something like "Report only after N minutes", or "Report only
N minute windows", perhaps?

> We also decided to simplify the 'overload-ratelimits' line to make it
> easier to implement (learning whether it was a burst or rate overload in
> Tor seems to be quite hard, so we decided to merge these two events).

Ok, this makes sense.

-- 
Mike Perry
_______________________________________________
tor-dev mailing list
tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev