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[tor-dev] Can we stop sanitizing nicknames in bridge descriptors?
Hi everybody,
we're discussing in #5684 whether we can stop sanitizing nicknames in
the bridge descriptors that we publish here:
https://metrics.torproject.org/data.html#bridgedesc
The sanitizing process is described here:
https://metrics.torproject.org/formats.html#bridgedesc
When we started making sanitized bridge descriptors available on the
metrics website we replaced all contained nicknames with "Unnamed". The
reason was that "bridge nicknames might give hints on the location of
the bridge if chosen without care; e.g. a bridge nickname might be very
similar to the operators' relay nicknames which might be located on
adjacent IP addresses."
This was an easy decision back then, because we didn't use the nickname
for anything. This has changed with #5629 where we try to count EC2
bridges which all have a similar nickname. So, while we don't have that
information, there'd now be a use for it. Another advantage of having
bridge nicknames would be that they're easier to look up in a status
website like Atlas (which doesn't support searching for bridges yet).
We should re-consider whether it still makes sense to sanitize nicknames
in bridge descriptors or not.
Regarding the reasoning above, couldn't an adversary just scan adjacent
IP addresses of all known relays, not just the ones with similar
nicknames? And are we giving away anything else with the nicknames?
It would be great to get some feedback here whether leaving nicknames in
the sanitized descriptors is a terrible idea, and if so, why.
If nobody objects within the next, say, two weeks, I'm going to make an
old tarball from 2008 available with original nicknames. And if nobody
screams, I'll provide the remaining tarballs containing original
nicknames another two weeks later.
Thanks!
Karsten
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