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El 04/05/14 07:42, Christopher Baines
escribió:
Hi Christopher. You are correct a minority can't do much harm, but they don't contribute. What's the point on keeping them? I don't meant to be rude, but also minority is relative. Can you please tell us what is the total number of IPs? I ask you because you were working there so you likely know better. If is 3 then one bad node is 33% of failed connections, If they are 50 one is only 2%.On 04/05/14 11:43, waldo wrote:El 02/05/14 02:34, Christopher Baines escribió:On 02/05/14 00:45, waldo wrote:I am worried about an attack coming from evil IP based on forced disconnection of the HS from the IP. I don't know if this is possible but I am worried that if you pick a new circuit randomly could be highly problematic. Lets say I am NSA and I own 10% of the routers and disconnecting your HS from an IP I control, if you select a new circuit randomly, even if the probabilities are low, eventually is a matters of time until I force you to use an specific circuit from those convenient to me in order to have a possible circuit(out of many) that transfers your original IP as metadata through cooperative routers I own and then do away with the anonymity of the hidden service.Yeah, that does appear plausible. Are there guard nodes used for hidden service circuits (I forget)?No idea, according to this docs https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en there aren't guards in the circuits to the IP in step one(not mentioned). They are definitely used on step five to protect against a timing attack with a corrupt entry node. Even if they are used, I still see some problems. I mean it looks convenient to try to reconnect to the same IP but in real life you are going to find nodes that fail a lot so if you picked an IP that has bad connectivity reconnecting to it is not gonna contribute at all with the HS scalability or availability of your HS, on the contrary.I don't think a minority of bad IP's will do much to hurt a hidden service. What I've had noticed is that initial connection is what causes most troubles. Once you establish a rendezvous with the HS things go smooth. Is my personal experience don't know what others experience. I've noticed also that usually highly used services like the hidden wiki tend to behave a whole lot better. No idea why. Could be related to the HSDir query and this http://donncha.is/2013/05/trawling-tor-hidden-services/. Don't know if that was fixed.Clients will try connecting through all IP's until giving up, and this will only happen when they initially connect. Yes I meant measuring a larger time period and over different circuits as the cause of disconnection could have being the circuit failing and not the IP.Maybe a good idea would be to try to reconnect and if it is failing too much select another IP.It currently does do this, but on probably a shorter time period than you are suggesting. It keeps a count of connection failures while trying to reconnect, but this is reset once a new connection is established. What happens if the HS just goes offline for a while? It keeps trying to connect, finds that it can't connect to the IPs and picks another set? You are differentiating that case? How do they coordinate which one publishes the descriptor? Wich one puts the first descriptor? This gets complicated, as you need to ensure that each instance of the service is using the same introduction points, I saw your answer to another person and seems to me is related to this you are saying If the "service key"'s (randomly generated keys per introduction point) are used, then this would complicate/cause problems with the multiple instances connecting to one introduction point. Only one key would be listed in the descriptor, which would only allow one instance to get the traffic. What if the instances interchange keys and use the same? Master/slave for example and one of them take the master role if the master goes offline. Lets say master instance creates the IPs and sends a message to the rest to connect there. How about changing the descriptor to host several keys per IP in case previous is not possible/too difficult? Why this needs to be ensured? Does it breaks something? I understand it could be convenient to have at least two to avoid correlation attacks from the IP but why all? What would happen if one instance goes offline? The whole thing breaks? The desirable behavior I think in that case is that other instances take over and split load as if nothing happened. I also think is highly desirable they are indistinguishable to provide less information (enumeration, etc). If they use the same key, you could send the rendezvous message to all instances from the IP as all would have the same private key and can decrypt it (if the IP is not shared by different HS, don't know if this is possible currently). So the message doesn't gets lost in a failed circuit. If it is shared by several HSs some routing could be convenient but not necessary IMHO as they don't have the key to decrypt and statistics gathering could be blinded by the HS sending bogus RV messages that later discards. Instances could negotiate which one is going to answer even if the one who is going to answer is not connected to the IP if instances talk to each other. Let's say I could have a master that receives information of the load of slaves and receives the RV messages all instances receive. Later instructs the instance with less load to answer. it seems to me that tracking connectivity failures over the long term, and changing IP on some threshold could break this. Why would break it? I would create new IPs connect to them and would keep the old ones until the new ones become accessible (I could detect this by monitoring if I receive messages or by querying the HSDirs). The IP could act non cooperatively and send me bogus messages to try to confuse the HS and avoid it going away so probably checking both could be a good idea. I could also test if I start receiving messages through the new IPs. Just ideas. Why uncoordinated? Looks to me it would be convenient instances could talk. Load balance, taking over of failed instances, etc. Would take work to do that for sure but doesn't seems impossible to me. I guess the HSDir code would have to be modified to be able to host new signed information coming for the same HS while maintaining the old one. Maybe follow signed commands from the HS. Delete this IPs, add this other IPs with some limit to avoid the HS attack HSDirs flooding them to store bogus info). New question here could anyone flood an HSDir by posting a zillion descriptors for a zillion bogus HSs? The HS would have to select new ones, publish them wait until they become available before dropping circuits to the old ones.If the IP is doing it on purpose the HS Is going to go away so the control the IP has disconnecting your HS is capped for any attack known or unknown. If is not on purpose the HS goes throwing away failing nodes until it picks a good node as IP. I think it would cause over time, the tor network re-balance/readapt to new conditions itself. For instance in the case some IP is overloaded (maybe by DoS) causes the HS to go away from the IP. I would also rotate the IPs after using them some time. I don't think is good to have one IP for too long. Doesn't sounds good to me. If for instance I am big daddy and know your IPs I could go there seize the computers and start gathering funny statistics about your HS. Or simply censor your HS by dropping messages from clients trying to send you the rendezvous point (is this possible? looks like it is if I drop introduce messages and generate fake ones). You wouldn't even know cause I can keep your connected and receiving fake connections. Only maybe if you try to check the IP by trying to send a rendezvous point from your HS to your HS (this IP quality test would be great if tor would do it periodically). I somehow do it myself manually when I notice the HS is superhard to reach. Sometimes it works great, sometimes even being turned on the server and online, is not visible. So you have to take down tor and restart it and wait again for a while. I was thinking maybe you could select new ones and inform HSDirs about the change and after the new ones are known end circuits to the previous IPs and with that avoid the overhead of the rotation. I would rebuild circuits to the IP from time to time (originating from the HS). Multiple connections to the same IP would permit to do this better since I can make a new one and afterwards kill a previous circuit remaining connected all the time.Lots of things here, generally, some things seem quite hard to do in a uncoordinated, distributed manor (e.g. IP rotation). Regarding entry guards this is one article speaking about them, don't know if up to date:And I am not to sure that things like IP rotation and rebuilding circuits to IP's will even help with anonymity issues. https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/entry-guards Seems they are always used for all sort of circuits including HS. So if you reused the code they are being selected. I am still concerned that if things stay too long in one way, big players (antidemocratic governments for instance) could do things. Keep in mind that if you have more running instances of your HS the chances to locate one of them increases since I only have to locate one of your instances to know who you are. Ok take a look at this attack, correct me if I am wrong and some point is not possible (I invite anyone to proof me wrong). As I said I appreciate your work, but it needs to be challenged to be accepted by the community so it doesn't stays in a limbo of "I don't know" and is better to patch every possible hole before it becomes mainstream. Suppose I am an totalitarian government and you are a dissident running an HS over Tor in the same country. 1 - I start introducing high availability high bandwidth corrupt nodes to the network across the globe (I could rent servers in case you decide to connect to nodes offshore or simply deploy nodes in another country), the more I put the higher the chances of being a stone in your anonymity path. To lower the budget I could host several Tor routers in one computer with several network interfaces and fast CPU/crypto hard for OpenSSL. 2 - I see you are using some IPs (I can query the HSDirs to get some) so If I am not lucky to be your HS's IP at start, I go flooding those you select to take them offline in order to force you switch so you pick eventually one of my corrupt nodes as IP. Is not clear to me if choosing them in a deterministic way gets in the way of this or helps. If is deterministic I could precalculate how many nodes I have to force go offline until you pick one of mine, so I could shutdown those nodes that will never be selected and lower my budget at least. I could bribe some ISP to rent servers with specific IP numbers(don't know if you selected this) or bribe the IP operator if he/she publishes the contact email. You can't even suspect if you don't know the flooded IP operator as is totally normal a node going offline. So no dust raised (there is a way to make a Tor router publicly publish it was attacked so other ppl can be warned?). 3 - I become one of your IPs at least. This is a good achievement. From now on I know you are going to connect back to me using some circuit that can contain corrupt nodes or not when I disconnect you. When you connect back to me you have the counter reset so I can disconnect you as much as I want. 4 - I know your last node so if it is not mine I disconnect your circuit until you select a circuit that contains one of my corrupt nodes as the last one. 5 - When you do I can see the previous node in your circuit. If it is not mine I disconnect you and go to step 4. If it is, I learn about one of your guards. I stay for a while going to step 4 to enumerate your guards. The more you have the longer it takes, the less guards the easier for me. But I can continue the attack as long as I know one of the guards to gain time and see if I have success. I could flood your guard to force you select another guard and accelerate the process. Or globally block access to the guard. 6 - Once I learn all your guards I can do some things in front of that. - Since your instance is going to connect to those nodes for a long while, I could censor your instance flooding those nodes at least until you notice and select new guard nodes (I can be insidious here repeating the attack over and over again and for each instance). I could wait to enumerate all the guard nodes of all of your instances since all connect to my IP. - Since I am a big government and I have control of the ISP you are using, I could monitor incoming connections to your guard nodes. I record all network IP numbers connecting to those nodes for a while. Maybe I could filter here some nodes with some heuristics (nodes that only connect to those guards since the probability of another node connecting to those specific guards should be low) but not necessarily as I am going to filter later. Notice that HSs stay connected for looong time periods so the connection time of a server should be longer than a client and I could discard nodes with that information. Once I have enough information I disconnect you from the net some small amount of time to avoid you leave my IP leaving some room for random failed circuits. I can tell the ISPs to do this for me. Is totally normal a disconnection so no dust raised. I can take my time too. Disconnect you today, wait some time and disconnect you again. I could do some things for the case of an HS hosted offshore. Bribe ISP employees, cause DoS to ISPs or individual computers, sell backdoored routers, backdoor router firmware, but that is less realistic and harder. Not discardable IMHO but I am going for the easy case here. Notice I don't care which circuit you use from now on to reconnect back to me even if you select new guards. I could monitor if your HS answers to RV messages using several preselected RV points too. If once I disconnect those nodes, I don't see any instance go away I discard those nodes as hosting the HS. If I see some of the instances go away then your node is in that subset. I perform a binary search here disconnecting half nodes every time so the disconnection number it takes me is O(log(n)) where n is the total number of nodes I see connecting to those guards. I repeat each of this steps several times to filter with statistics the casual circuit failure of your HS to my IP. If two or more instances use the same IP I would still see some instances staying or going so seems it doesn't protects against the attack at all even if they are indistinguishable. If you close circuits and reopen new ones from time to time I would get noise here but maybe I could filter with statistics. - I could in some cases seize a guard node or bribe the operator. If so far there are no flaws, I can spy you to know where you are hosting computers and seize them without giving you time to turn them off and use plausible deniability crypto soft (truecrypt) and be able to claim you where routing instead of hosting the HS (by cloning the router without the HS data). With multiple instances seems to me now becomes desirable to host at least one router per instance, to be able to deny you where hosting and claim you were routing. As looks it won't be possible to correlate the router down with the HS down (other instances would hide that if they are indistinguishable and take over when one instance goes down). Now if you instead rotate the IPs from time to time, I would be forced to go back to step 2 of the attack but on the other side your chances of selecting a corrupt IP or a corrupt node in your circuits increase. I as hosting one of your IPs would have less control since is not going to last forever and would be time limited. Changing circuits could introduce noise in step 6 to some extent, on the other side increases the chances of selecting a corrupt node in your circuit. So probably all of this would have to be studied with statistics and current Tor network size. Looks to me this could have more implications in other areas. Again small is relative. Earlier you mentioned some nodes failing where not going to affect too much the service so seems contradictory to me. Can you please mention numbers? Can't this number be increased?In some previous messages about the subject I saw that HSDirs provide all the HS IPs. I don't like this way of doing things since let's say I have 6 IPs to my HS available to everyone. To cause a DoS to your HS seems to me all I have to do is cause a DoS to the IPs. And there is no need for everyone to know all the IPs of one HS all the time. All one user needs to connect is just some maybe for redundancy but not all. Is there some way to only provide part of the IPs of one HS to one user? Avoid enumeration? Maybe distribute partial information to HSDirs? Don't know, just thinking. Maybe "abuse" some caching effect on HSDirs and publish partial IP information on one end and partial in another end that only reaches all users in entirety over time.As the set of IP's is so small, I cannot think of any practical way to do this without it being trivial to break. This is not directly related to your work but could be worth discussing. I was thinking that one property that maybe could be exploited could be the fact that the whole Tor network has lots of computational power that is hard to match by a single player (unless the player is really big). This is a rough idea that could contain flaws and maybe could be improved. What if lets say the IP information is encrypted by the HS, doesn't provides the key and makes Tor clients "bruteforce" them to open the encrypted message containing the IP. All IP keys scattered through the keyspace that could be larger or shorter depending on the time I want you to spend looking for it. So any IP would have equal chance of being found. Passing the key through an ASIC resistant function and then encrypt with the result so big players would have to use at most GPU and somehow equalize different CPU powers through memory bandwidth. All Tor clients start looking at a different random position of the keyspace until they find one key to desencrypt one IP. From there they start to communicate with the IP if available and keep looking for the rest of the IPs (to be able to reconnect if the RV and the initial used IP go offline). Maybe re-connection to the RV could be desirable too to some extent to improve availability of HS in case the circuit fails. Don't know if currently possible. Maybe adding 1 bit of the key inside the encrypted message for another encrypted IP so finding through a route of decryption makes it more feasible than starting from zero (this could be a good idea or not). Therefore forcing anyone to follow a decryption path depending on where they start decrypting IPs information. To explain the idea better lets say I have 3 introduction points A B and C, but I don't see why there couldn't be more specially since the bulk of the traffic goes through the rendezvous and not through the IP, IPs could be shared by several HS and since is harder to cause a DoS to more nodes than just a few. lets say one Tor client starts looking at a random position and finds the key for B (now it can connect to B if available and pass the RV message) once decrypted it gets one bit for the key of C so starts looking for the key of C as is easier to find than the key for A. Then gets C and that gives it bits for A. Another Tor client starts random finds A and gets 1 bit for B (now it can connect to A and pass the RV message if available) goes to B and gets the bit for C. finds C. After a while the HS rotates IPs and the process starts again (not necessarily all at once could be a flow in a way some get replaced maintaining part of the old ones). So anyone trying to cause a DoS would have to perform all of that work again and be very quick to find all of the IPs before they are rotated again by the HS in order to flood all of the IPs. So at most all they could do is turn the HS intermittent (if enough CPU power and enough bandwidth). On the other side the Tor swarn would be very efective at finding them all. The big question that remains to me here is how much this causes a big player waste a load of resources without pushing out of the network small players (mobile devices for instance). The memory hard functions equalizes somehow devices by the memory bandwidth limit but still can make large differences. Seems to me that the more IPs are selected for an HS the more this can be achieved. One option I was thinking to fix that problem is for instance the HS could function normally if everything is running smooth, and if it detects that can't create circuits to the IPs switch to protective mode in a way that things work as usual if there is no attack but the system changes to defensive mode if there is an attack. Let me explain better. I as an HS work as normal. Suddenly I see all the circuits to my IPs can't be established (or router operator of my IP publish they are being attacked). I create new ones and see again that eventually I can't connect. That probably means someone is attacking my IPs. I switch to defensive mode and publish encrypted IPs. Clients notice they are encrypted and start each on their side to look for the IP keys. I could have degrees here and increase computational complexity to do away with the attack. Lets say maybe that only mobile devices get pushed away from the net but CPU and GPU nodes could still connect so the attack is only to a part. One problem could appear here is the time it takes the information published to HSDirs to reach clients. I ignore a lot of information about that part and I beleive is under active research ATM. The scheme doesn't pushes away big players with large computational power and bandwidth but can push away some medium players. Also it doesn't protects to other attacks for instance flooding through a RV (could puzzle solving be applied here? Let's say the harder the puzzle the more bandwidth I give to you) Regards Waldo
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