On Sat, 2016-05-07 at 22:01 +0000, Yawning Angel wrote: > how an adversary will be limited to just this information, and not > things that enable a strong attack on it's own like packet timing > escapes me Yes, it's clear that an adversary who can get CPU timing can get packet timing. It's not clear if some adversary might prefer information about the seed to simplify their larger infrastructure, like say by not needing to worry about clock skew on their exit nodes, or even choosing to compromise exit nodes soon after the fact. > Hmm? The timing information that's available to a local attacker > would be the total time taken for `a` generation. Really? I know nothing about the limits of timing attacks. I just naively imagined they learn from the timing of CPU work vs memory writes or something. Jeff
Attachment:
signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part
_______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev