On 11 May (16:47:24), Nick Mathewson wrote:
> ```
> Filename: 319-wide-everything.md
> Title: RELAY_FRAGMENT cells
> Author: Nick Mathewson
> Created: 11 May 2020
> Status: Open
> ```
>
> (This proposal is part of the Walking Onions spec project.)
>
> # Introduction
>
> Proposal 249 described a system for `CREATE` cells to become wider, in order to
> accommodate hybrid crypto. And in order to send those cell bodies across
> circuits, it described a way to split `CREATE` cells into multiple `EXTEND`
> cells.
>
> But there are other cell types that can need to be wider too. For
> example, `INTRODUCE` and `RENDEZVOUS` cells also contain key material
> used for a handshake: if handshakes need to grow larger, then so do
> these cells.
>
> This proposal describes an encoding for arbitrary "wide" relay cells,
> that can be used to send a wide variant of anything.
>
> To be clear, although this proposal describes a way that all relay
> cells can become "wide", I do not propose that wide cells should
> actually be _allowed_ for all relay cell types.
>
> # Proposal
>
> We add a new relay cell type: `RELAY_FRAGMENT`. This cell type contains part
> of another relay cell. A `RELAY_FRAGEMENT` cell can either introduce a new
Typo: RELAY_FRAGEMENT --> RELAY_FRAGMENT
> fragmented cell, or can continue one that is already in progress.
>
> The format of a RELAY_FRAGMENT body is one of the following:
>
> // First body in a series
> struct fragment_begin {
> // What relay_command is in use for the underlying cell?
> u8 relay_command;
> // What will the total length of the cell be once it is reassembled?
> u16 total_len;
> // Bytes for the cell body
> u8 body[];
> }
>
> // all other cells.
> struct fragment_continued {
> // More bytes for the cell body.
> u8 body[];
> }
>
> To send a fragmented cell, first a party sends a RELAY_FRAGMENT cell
> containing a "fragment_begin" payload. This payload describes the total
> length of the cell, the relay command
>
> Fragmented cells other than the last one in sequence MUST be sent full of
> as much data as possible. Parties SHOULD close a circuit if they receive a
> non-full fragmented cell that is not the last fragment in a sequence.
>
> Fragmented cells MUST NOT be interleaved with other relay cells on a circuit,
> other than cells used for flow control. (Currently, this is only SENDME
> cells.) If any party receives any cell on a circuit, other than a flow
> control cell or a RELAY_FRAGEMENT cell, before the fragmented cell is
Typo: RELAY_FRAGEMENT --> RELAY_FRAGMENT
> complete, than it SHOULD close the circuit.
>
> Parties MUST NOT send extra data in fragmented cells beyond the amount given
> in the first 'total_len' field.
Should the circuit be closed or the fragments dropped?
>
> Not every relay command may be sent in a fragmented cell. In this proposal,
> we allow the following cell types to be fragmented: EXTEND2, EXTENDED2,
> INTRODUCE1, INTRODUCE2, RENDEZVOUS. Any party receiving a command that they
> believe should not be fragmented should close the circuit.
Probably we want RENDEZVOUS1 and RENDEZVOUS2.
>
> Not all lengths up to 65535 are valid lengths for a fragmented cell. Any
> length under 499 bytes SHOULD cause the circuit to close, since that could
> fit into a non-fragmented RELAY cell. Parties SHOULD enforce maximum lengths
> for cell types that they understand.
>
> All `RELAY_FRAGMENT` cells for the fragmented cell must have the
> same Stream ID. (For those cells allowed above, the Stream ID is
> always zero.) Implementations SHOULD close a circuit if they
> receive fragments with mismatched Stream ID.
>
> # Onion service concerns.
>
> We allocate a new extension for use in the ESTABLISH_INTRO by onion services,
> to indicate that they can receive a wide INTRODUCE2 cell. This extension
> contains:
>
> struct wide_intro2_ok {
> u16 max_len;
> }
>
> We allocate a new extension for use in the `ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS`
> cell, to indicate acceptance of wide `RENDEZVOUS2` cells. This
> extension contains:
>
> struct wide_rend2_ok {
> u16 max_len;
> }
>
> (Note that `ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS` cells do not currently have a an
> extension mechanism. They should be extended to use the same
> extension format as `ESTABLISH_INTRO` cells, with extensions placed
> after the rendezvous cookie.)
Why would a client need to announce wide cells in the ESTABLISH phase as
opposed to using protover "Relay=N" ?
The maximum length of a fragmented cell is capped to 2^16 (u16) so we don't
really need the establish process to inform us of the maximum expected length
but rather use the max_len in the first fragment?
Furthermore, ESTABLISH_INTRO has extensions (only 1 as of today) so they could
also be fragments themselves and thus I'm not sure I see the point of having
two different ways of "expecting" fragments for the ESTABLISH_* cells and the
INTRO/RENDEZVOUS cells?
>
> # Handling RELAY_EARLY
>
> The first fragment of each EXTEND cell should be tagged with `RELAY_EARLY`.
> The remaining fragments should not. Relays should accept `EXTEND` cells if and
> only if their _first_ fragment is tagged with `RELAY_EARLY`.
>
> > Rationale: We could allow any fragment to be tagged, but that would give
> > hostile guards an opportunity to move RELAY_EARLY tags around and build a
> > covert channel. But if we later move to a relay encryption method that
> > lets us authenticate RELAY_EARLY, we could then require only that _any_
> > fragment has RELAY_EARLY set.
>
> # Compatibility
>
> This proposal will require the allocation of a new 'Relay' protocol version,
> to indicate understanding of the RELAY_FRAGMENTED command.
Here is a thought about a DoS vector. Here goes:
As an upper limit of 65KB total fragment size, it represents ~126 cells in
total so I could basically send *125* cells and then stop which will put in
memory a bit more than 64KB and it will stay there until the last fragment is
received.
And then I do that on 1000 different circuits bringing the total count in
memory to 64GB. All stuck there, all "waiting" for the last fragment.
Our OOM would kick in killing circuits but it just seems to me a very easy way
to continously kick the OOM of a _service_ which is pretty bad side channel.
Thoughts?
Cheers!
David
--
dApigzB8NtOQEAlKqhqbshxjxOMakjiX9LGU9wvhFqs=
Attachment:
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
_______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev