[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 258: Denial-of-service resistance for directory authorities



On 29 October 2015 at 11:25, Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>    There are two possible ways a new connection to a directory
>    authority can be established, directly by a TCP connection to the
>    DirPort, or tunneled inside a Tor circuit and initiated with a
>    begindir cell.  The client can originate the former as direct
>    connections or from a Tor exit, and the latter either as fully
>    anonymized circuits or one-hop links to the dirauth's ORPort.

Relays fetch the consensus from a V2Dir. Thus there is no risk that an
attacker can prevent an exit from fetching a consensus by (trying to)
DOS the DirAuths through it. I believe that's correct, just wanted to
say it out loud and let everyone confirm I guess.

-tom
_______________________________________________
tor-dev mailing list
tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev