Resending to tor-dev with correct email address. Sorry to those receiving 2 copies.
Dear Team,
I have started on a draft design document for Project cute.
Please let me have your kind comments and suggestions.
(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/sponsors/Otter/Cute)
All the best,
SiNA
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"Cute" design and challenges - draft 0.1
By: SiNA Rabbani - sina redteam io
*Overview*
Project Cute is part of the Otter contract. This project is to provide
(in the parlance of our time) "point-click-publish" hidden services to support
more effective documenting and analysis of information and evidence documenting
of ongoing human rights violations and corresponding training and advocacy Our
goal is to improve hidden services so that they're more awesome, and to create
a packaged hidden-service blogging platform which is easy for users to run.
*Objective*
To make secure publishing available to activists who are not IT professionals.
*Activities*
Tor offers Hidden Services, the ability to host web sites in the Tor Network.
Deploying hidden services successfully requires the ability to configure a
server securely. Mistakes in setup can be used to unmask site admins and the
location of the server. Automating this process will reduce user error.
We have to write "point-click-publish" plugins that work with existing blogging
and micro-blogging software.
*Expected results*
The result will be a way to provide portals to submit text, pictures, and video.
These sites will not have the ability to log information that can be used to
track down citizen journalists or other users, and will be resistant to
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.
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*Introduction*
This document describes the technical risks associated with running a web-based
blog tool and exposing it over a hidden service (.onion address). Our goal is to
create a packaged blogging platform that is easy to operate for the
non-technical user, while protecting the application from a set of known attacks
that can reveal and compromise the network identity.
Hidden-services make it possible for content providers and citizen
journalists to offer web-applications such as blogs and websites, hosted
completely behind a firewall (NAT Network) never revealing the public IP of such
services. By design, Hidden Services are resilient to attacks such as traffic
analysis and DDoS, therefore it becomes compelling for the adversary to focus
on the application layer vulnerabilities.
According to OWASP Top 10, Injection is the number one security risk for
web applications. "Injection flaws, such as SQL, OS, and LDAP injection occur
when untrusted data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query.
The attacker?s hostile data can trick the interpreter into executing
unintended commands or accessing data without proper authorization." [1]
Running a site such as WordPress involves a LAMP (Linux, Apache, Mysql, PHP)
installation. This stack needs to be carefully configured and implemented to
meet the desired privacy and security requirements. However, default
configuration files are not suitable for privacy and lead to the leakage of
identity.
WordPress is the most popular blog platform on the Internet. We select WordPress
due to it's popular and active core development. WordPress features a plug-in
architecture and a template system, "Plugins can extend WordPress
to do almost anything you can imagine. In the directory you
can find, download, rate, and comment on all the best plugins Âthe
WordPress community has to offer." http://wordpress.org/plugins/
Themes and plugins are mostly developed by programmers with little or no
security in mind. New code is easily added to the site without the need for any
programming skills. This is recipe for disaster, a quick look at the publicly
available plugin repository and security forums reveals many of the OWASP top 10
vulnerabilities such as XSS and injection vulnerabilities:
http://packetstormsecurity.com/search/?q=wordpress
http://wordpress.org/plugins/
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*Adversary Model*
We use the range of attacks available to the adversary adversary as the base for
our Threat Model and proposed requirements.
*Adversary Goals*
    *Code Injection*
    This is the most direct compromise that can take place; the ability for
    the adversary to execute code on the host machine is disastrous.
    *XSS the front-end, DoS the back-end*
    The adversary can overwhelm the database backed or the web-server of a
    dynamically hosted application, denying access to the service.
    *Location/Identity information*
    Applications that are not designed with privacy in mind tend to reveal
    information by default. For example, WordPress includes the name of the
    editor of a post inside the RSS feed: <dc:creator>John Smith</dc:creator>
*Adversary Capabilities - Positioning*
The adversary can position themselves at a number of places to execute their
attacks.
    *Local Network/ISP/Upstream Provider*
    The attacker can hijack the DNS of the plugin repository or perform a
    man-in-the-middle attack and push malicious code into the blog.
    *Third party service providers*
    It is common for a blog to email authentication information.
    This information is at risk of social and legal attacks.
    The repository of the blog's source code where themes and plugins are
    downloaded is a target for the adversary to insert malicious code.
*Adversary Capabilities - Attacks*
The adversary can perform the following attacks in order to accomplish varies
aspects of their goals. Most of these attacks are due to the dynamic and
Web 2.0 nature of blog platforms.
    *SQL Injection & XSS*
    Dynamic sites take advantage of databases for content storage and
    JavaSript for client-side presentation. Programming mistakes can lead to
    code injection on server or client side.
    *Inserting plugins or core updates*
    Blog platforms have automatic update install features, WordPress
    connects to a remote repositories to download updated code.
    Adversary can perform a man-in-the-middle attack and insert malicious
    code.
    *Misbehaving plugins/features*
    Some plugins depend on remote connections to provide a feature,
    for e which can lead to leakage of identity.
    *Brute-force the admin password*
    Weak passwords are vulnerable to brute-force attacks.
    Blog engines do not provide protection against such attacks.
    *Remotely exploiting the LAMP stack*
    A determined adversary has a very large attack surface to analyze
    and discover 0-day vulnerabilities in Apache, PHP or Mysql applications.
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*Proposed requirement*
    *Dynamic to Static*
    A simple yet effective way to protect dynamic websites is to save a 100%
    static copy, hosted with a lightweight and well configured http server.
    We propose Nginx which is a free, open-source, high-performance
    HTTP server. We have the option of extending existing WordPress plugins
    such as "Really-Static" (HTTP://word press.or/plugins/really-static/) to
    generate 100% static files.
    *Disable Comments and New User signup (POST REQUESTS)*
    The ability to receive and store comments involves actions and
    configurations that expose the installation to DoS and other web attacks.
    We propose to completely disable reader's backed interactions,
    specifically disabling New User Registration and Comment features.
    *SOCKS Proxy support for WordPress*
    WordPress has the ability to proxy its outgoing connections, however the
    current implementation only supports HTTP proxy. We propose to submit a
    patch to WordPress core, enabling SOCKS Proxy support:
    http://core.trac.wordpress.org/browser/tags/3.6.1/wp-includes/class-http.php
    *Update safety*
    Tor Project or a partner such as WordPress.org should maintain the latest
    copy of the WordPress source-code over a .onion address. This will allow
    for the Core application updates to take place without ever leaving the
    Tor network and we achieve end-to-end encryption without relying on the
    traditional SSL/CA model.
    *OnionPress plugin*
    Instead of hard-coding our modifications to control WordPress'
    functionalities, we propose to develop a custom plugin.
    The plugin will provide a new menu in the Administrative panel of the
    site. Providing options to interact with Hidden Service features.
    (Note that Administrative features are going to be restricted from
    the public and only available to localhost)
    *User Authentication/Permission Levels*
        a) Blog Administrator
        This person is hosting the blog on a local computer and has physical
        access to the installation. There is only 1 of such role. This
        login will be restricted to localhost only.
        b) Blog editors/contributors
        These are the active content publishers. Each person has the ability
        to remotely connect, login and publish content. Editors do not have
        any administrative permissions such as adding or deleting users.
        Each editor is assigned a dedicated key and .onion hostname using
        the HidServAuth and HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient features in
        stealth mode.
        "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient auth-type client-name,client-name,â
        If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized
        clients only. The auth-type can either be 'basic' for a
        general-purpose authorization protocol or 'stealth' for a less
        scalable protocol that also hides service activity from
        unauthorized clients. Only clients that are listed here are
        authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names
        are 1 to 19 characters long and only use characters in
        A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no spaces). If this option is set, the hidden
        service is not accessible for clients without authorization
        any more. Generated authorization data can be found in the
        hostname file. Clients need to Âput this authorization data
        in their configuration file using HidServAuth."
        c) Readers (the world)
        These are the site visitors, they will be able to send GET requests
        to the .onion address and receive HTML and multimedia content.
        No login or comment posting permissions granted.
    *Packaged System*
    We propose to design and develop a Debian based Live OS that can
    be started as a Virtual Machine or to boot a personal computer. This OS
    will include Tor, LAMP stack and a running copy of WordPress.
    The LAMP installation will be hardened and configured to meet our
    security desires. We require a secondary USB disk for persistent storage.
    Desired outcome is a point-and-click and maybe portable solution that
    can be launched from inside of Windows, Linux or Mac OSX.
    VirtualBox is a second candidate to host the VM.
    http://wiki.qemu.org/Main_Page and/or https://www.virtualbox.org/
    *Edge Cache Nodes*
    In order to provide "blazing-fast" access to the published content
    outside of the Tor network, we propose the deployment of caching servers
    operated by semi-trusted third party organizations or persons. These are
    similar to tor2web nodes:http://tor2web.or/
    The content providers (bloggers) would select from a list of available
    edge servers and send a pgp signed zip file of the latest static version
    over Tor. Edge servers will reduce traffic from the Tor network, also
    provide a chance for content to reach the world in case of a DDoS or
    technical issues with the Tor network itself.
    Having cached copies available remotely make it possible for the blogger
    to get on-line, publish content and go back off-line, minimizing the
    amount of time and traffic spent on the Internet.
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