Karsten Loesing transcribed 4.5K bytes: > On 16/10/14 10:57, isis wrote: > > Having private bridges in public bundles is actually harmful, because it > makes it look like bridges are not much used. If we want to suggest > bridge development or BridgeDB development to a sponsor and they look at > estimated user numbers compared to directly connecting users, they might > say that those few users are not worth their money. Okay, you got me â I'm totally on your side now. :) Dear Tor Browser Team, I am willing to curate your bundled bridges for you to ensure that they are public bridges. > I'm fine with this inaccuracy. The only thing that uses bridge pool > assignments is Onionoo/Atlas/Globe, and providing the information which > pool/ring BridgeDB picked for a bridge doesn't justify the effort. Hooray! Less work! > > Another thing to consider: should we allow a bridge operator to switch from > > `BridgeDistribution https` to `BridgeDistribution email`? Allowing this would, > > of course, decrease our potential to understand how bridges are being > > harvested/blocked, as well as nullifying some of the security considerations > > which influenced the separate-hashrings-for-separate-distribution-methods > > design choice. > > I'd say it's up to the bridge operator to decide how their bridge is > used, even if that makes it easier to enumerate/block their bridge. > Worth a comment in torrc, but no reason to ignore their choice. Fair enough. And, now that I think about it more, the default should probably be `BridgeDistribution any` to maintain consistent behaviour, meaning that bridge operators would have some chance of altering their assignment anyway if they manual set the option later. -- ââ isis agora lovecruft _________________________________________________________ OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35 Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
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