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Re: [tor-dev] On the visualization of OONI bridge reachability data
On 24/10/14 01:53, isis wrote:
> isis transcribed 6.6K bytes:
>> * The hashed fingerprint (as is the case for bridges in onionoo)
>> * The hashed ip:port
>
> Actually, my apologies, I was quite tired when I wrote this and totally
> completely wrong.
>
> A hashed ip:port would be a terrible idea because IPv4 space is only 2^32 and
> ports are 2^16. In total that's a 2^48 message space. Hashing for a preimage
> to get the bridge addresses in quite feasible in those constaints, as well as
> precomputing the attack offline.
>
> We should come up with a different way to hide ip:ports.
I'm lacking context, but just in case this is even remotely relevant,
here's how CollecTor sanitizes bridge IP addresses:
https://collector.torproject.org/formats.html#bridge-descriptors
All the best,
Karsten
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