[tor-dev] Fact-checking a claim about relay/bridge fingerprint authentication

[David Fifield <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Cecylia, Arlo, Serene, Shelikhoo, and I are writing a research paper
about Snowflake. Here is a draft:
https://www.bamsoftware.com/papers/snowflake/snowflake.20231003.e6e1c30d.pdf

We're writing to check a factual claim in the section about having
multiple backend bridges. Basically, we wanted it to be possible for
there to be multiple Snowflake bridge sites run by different groups of
people, and we did not want to share the same relay identity keys across
all bridge sites, because of the increased risk of the keys being
exposed. Therefore every bridge site has its own relay identity, which
requires the client to know the relay fingerprints in advance and that
it be the client (and not, e.g., the broker) that decides which bridge
to use.

1. Is our general description (quoted below) of the design constraints
   as they bear on Tor correct?
2. Is §4.2 "CERTS cells" the right part of tor-spec to cite to make our
   point?
   https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec/-/blob/b345ca044131b2eb18e6ae0d5f23643a92aeff34/tor-spec.txt#L707

https://github.com/turfed/snowflake-paper/blob/e6e1c30dde6716dc5e54a32f2134f19068a7f395/snowflake.tex#L2146
	A Tor bridge is identified by a long-term identity public key.
	If, on connecting to a bridge, the client finds that the
	bridge's identity is not the expected one, the client will
	terminate the connection \cite[\S 4.2]{tor-spec}. The Tor client
	can configure at most one identity per bridge; there is no way
	to indicate (with a certificate, for example) that multiple
	identities should be considered equivalent. This constraint
	leaves two options: either all Snowflake bridges must share the
	same cryptographic identity, or else it must be the client that
	makes the choice of what bridge to use. While the former option
	is possible to do (by synchronizing identity keys across
	servers), every added bridge would increase the risk of
	compromising the all-important identity keys. Our vision was
	that different bridge sites would run in different locations
	with their own management teams, and that any compromise of a
	bridge site should affect that site only.

In my own experiments, providing an incorrect relay fingerprint leads to
errors in connection_or_client_learned_peer_id:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/blob/tor-0.4.7.13/src/core/or/connection_or.c#L1897
[warn] Tried connecting to router at 192.0.2.3:80 ID=<none> RSA_ID=2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A71, but RSA + ed25519 identity keys were not as expected: wanted 1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 + no ed25519 key but got 2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72 + 1zOHpg+FxqQfi/6jDLtCpHHqBTH8gjYmCKXkus1D5Ko.
[warn] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 14% (handshake): Handshaking with a relay. (Unexpected identity in router certificate; IDENTITY; count 1; recommendation warn; host 1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 at 192.0.2.3:80)
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