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Pseudonymity for tor: nym-0.1 (fwd)




Perhaps the developers will also be interested in this code, but let's keep the discussion in or-talk.
-J


---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2005 01:49:26 +0000 (UTC)
From: Jason Holt <jason@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: or-talk@xxxxxxxx
Subject: Pseudonymity for tor: nym-0.1


Per the recent discussion regarding tor and wikipedia, I've hacked together an implementation of the basic system from Chaum, Fiat and Naor's 1990 "Untraceable Electronic Cash" paper. This system allows CAs to blindly issue tokens (or "coins") which can then be "spent" elsewhere. It runs in perl, and comprises a CA, nym-maker, client application and auth checker (for the server).


The tarball is here:

http://www.lunkwill.org/src/nym/

Of course, it's useless at the moment since it gives out tokens indiscriminately (and probably has massive bugs), but if anyone actually cares about this idea, it will be (more or less) easy to do the following:

* Put up a sample CA and server that people can use (potentially as hidden services).

* Make the CA issue only one token per email address, or one token per IP address, one per computational puzzle, one for every $20 mailed in...

* Automatically expire CA keys and generate new ones on a regular basis (rather than bothering with CRLs)

* Instead of randomly generated tokens, have the CA sign an actual X.509 cert request, which will then become a perfectly valid X.509 cert useful as a client-side cert in unmodified browsers and web servers

* Create some sort of aid for maintaining server-side (or CA) blacklists of improperly behaving users

* Check to see if the protocol is actually still secure and properly implemented.

Comments welcome.

						-J