-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Same patch, updated to be compatible with current trunk. Karsten Loesing wrote: > Hi Nick, > > this patch 4a now contains two more changes as discussed on IRC: > > 1. The signatures of directory_initiate_command_routerstatus() and > directory_initiate_command() are left unchanged. Therefore there are now > two more functions especially for hidden service requests ending in _rend(). > > 2. The various connection and circuit structs don't reserve memory for > hidden service requests any more. Now there is a new struct rend_data_t > that holds all hidden-service-specific data and that is pointed to by > those data structures. I also moved the memory for storing rendezvous > cookie and hidden service identifier on service side to that new struct. > > --Karsten -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFI2U5f0M+WPffBEmURAvE5AJ9qUaIp7sTzAII+pGwUnT58wqcM0QCfUi5N BHDouj6sDHfVyu3bl1gU0AY= =CvOg -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Index: /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/doc/tor.1.in
===================================================================
--- /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/doc/tor.1.in (revision 16941)
+++ /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/doc/tor.1.in (working copy)
@@ -472,6 +472,15 @@
ReachableAddresses instead. (Default: 80, 443)
.LP
.TP
+\fBHidServAuth \fR\fIonion-address\fR \fIauth-cookie\fP \fIservice-name\fR
+Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16
+characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22
+characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal
+purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times
+for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and
+this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible.
+.LP
+.TP
\fBReachableAddresses \fR\fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP][:\fIPORT\fP]...\fP
A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows you
to connect to. The format is as
@@ -1266,6 +1275,18 @@
service. Possible version numbers are 0 and 2. (Default: 0, 2)
.LP
.TP
+\fBHiddenServiceAuthorizeClient \fR\fIauth-type\fR \fR\fIclient-name\fR,\fIclient-name\fR,\fI...\fP
+If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients
+only. The auth-type can either be 'basic' for a general-purpose
+authorization protocol or 'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also
+hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are
+listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names
+are 1 to 19 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_
+(no spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible
+for clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data
+can be found in the hostname file.
+.LP
+.TP
\fBRendPostPeriod \fR\fIN\fR \fBseconds\fR|\fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fR|\fBdays\fR|\fBweeks\fP
Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous
service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also
@@ -1450,6 +1471,8 @@
.TP
.B \fIHiddenServiceDirectory\fP/hostname
The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service.
+If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file
+also contains authorization data for all clients.
.LP
.TP
.B \fIHiddenServiceDirectory\fP/private_key
@@ -1454,6 +1477,11 @@
.TP
.B \fIHiddenServiceDirectory\fP/private_key
The private key for this hidden service.
+.LP
+.TP
+.B \fIHiddenServiceDirectory\fP/client_keys
+Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by authorized
+clients.
.SH SEE ALSO
.BR privoxy (1),
.BR tsocks (1),
Index: /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/circuitlist.c
===================================================================
--- /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/circuitlist.c (revision 16941)
+++ /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/circuitlist.c (working copy)
@@ -401,6 +401,7 @@
circuit_free_cpath(ocirc->cpath);
if (ocirc->intro_key)
crypto_free_pk_env(ocirc->intro_key);
+ tor_free(ocirc->rend_data);
} else {
or_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
@@ -720,7 +721,7 @@
}
/** Return a circ such that:
- * - circ-\>rend_query is equal to <b>rend_query</b>, and
+ * - circ-\>rend_data-\>query is equal to <b>rend_query</b>, and
* - circ-\>purpose is equal to <b>purpose</b>.
*
* Return NULL if no such circuit exists.
@@ -735,7 +736,9 @@
for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) {
if (!circ->marked_for_close &&
circ->purpose == purpose &&
- !rend_cmp_service_ids(rend_query, TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_query))
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_data &&
+ !rend_cmp_service_ids(rend_query,
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_data->onion_address))
return TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
}
return NULL;
@@ -764,7 +767,8 @@
continue;
if (!digest)
return TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
- else if (!memcmp(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_pk_digest,
+ else if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_data &&
+ !memcmp(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_data->rend_pk_digest,
digest, DIGEST_LEN))
return TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
}
@@ -1020,13 +1024,14 @@
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
tor_assert(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
tor_assert(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit);
+ tor_assert(ocirc->rend_data);
/* treat this like getting a nack from it */
log_info(LD_REND, "Failed intro circ %s to %s (awaiting ack). "
"Removing from descriptor.",
- safe_str(ocirc->rend_query),
+ safe_str(ocirc->rend_data->onion_address),
safe_str(build_state_get_exit_nickname(ocirc->build_state)));
rend_client_remove_intro_point(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit,
- ocirc->rend_query);
+ ocirc->rend_data);
}
if (circ->n_conn)
connection_or_send_destroy(circ->n_circ_id, circ->n_conn, reason);
Index: /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/circuituse.c
===================================================================
--- /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/circuituse.c (revision 16941)
+++ /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/circuituse.c (working copy)
@@ -121,8 +121,11 @@
return 0;
}
} else { /* not general */
- if (rend_cmp_service_ids(conn->rend_query,
- TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_query)) {
+ if ((conn->rend_data && !TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_data) ||
+ (!conn->rend_data && TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_data) ||
+ (conn->rend_data && TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_data &&
+ rend_cmp_service_ids(conn->rend_data->onion_address,
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_data->onion_address))) {
/* this circ is not for this conn */
return 0;
}
@@ -300,7 +303,7 @@
/* c_rend_ready circs measure age since timestamp_dirty,
* because that's set when they switch purposes
*/
- if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->rend_query[0] ||
+ if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->rend_data ||
victim->timestamp_dirty > cutoff)
continue;
break;
@@ -1076,13 +1079,18 @@
if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) {
/* need to pick an intro point */
- extend_info = rend_client_get_random_intro(conn->rend_query);
+ tor_assert(conn->rend_data);
+ extend_info = rend_client_get_random_intro(conn->rend_data);
if (!extend_info) {
log_info(LD_REND,
"No intro points for '%s': refetching service descriptor.",
- safe_str(conn->rend_query));
- rend_client_refetch_renddesc(conn->rend_query);
- rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(conn->rend_query);
+ safe_str(conn->rend_data->onion_address));
+ /* Fetch both, v0 and v2 rend descriptors in parallel. Use whichever
+ * arrives first. Exception: When using client authorization, only
+ * fetch v2 descriptors.*/
+ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(conn->rend_data);
+ if (conn->rend_data->auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH)
+ rend_client_refetch_renddesc(conn->rend_data->onion_address);
conn->_base.state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
return 0;
}
@@ -1087,7 +1095,8 @@
return 0;
}
log_info(LD_REND,"Chose '%s' as intro point for '%s'.",
- extend_info->nickname, safe_str(conn->rend_query));
+ extend_info->nickname,
+ safe_str(conn->rend_data->onion_address));
}
/* If we have specified a particular exit node for our
@@ -1163,7 +1172,7 @@
rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), need_uptime, 1);
if (circ) {
/* write the service_id into circ */
- strlcpy(circ->rend_query, conn->rend_query, sizeof(circ->rend_query));
+ circ->rend_data = rend_data_dup(conn->rend_data);
if (circ->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND &&
circ->_base.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)
rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(circ);
Index: /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/connection.c
===================================================================
--- /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/connection.c (revision 16941)
+++ /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/connection.c (working copy)
@@ -385,6 +385,7 @@
memset(edge_conn->socks_request, 0xcc, sizeof(socks_request_t));
tor_free(edge_conn->socks_request);
}
+ tor_free(edge_conn->rend_data);
}
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL) {
control_connection_t *control_conn = TO_CONTROL_CONN(conn);
@@ -405,6 +406,7 @@
}
if (dir_conn->cached_dir)
cached_dir_decref(dir_conn->cached_dir);
+ tor_free(dir_conn->rend_data);
}
if (conn->s >= 0) {
@@ -523,7 +525,7 @@
* failed: forget about this router, and maybe try again. */
connection_dir_request_failed(dir_conn);
}
- if (conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC) {
+ if (conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC && dir_conn->rend_data) {
/* Give it a try. However, there is no re-fetching for v0 rend
* descriptors; if the response is empty or the descriptor is
* unusable, close pending connections (unless a v2 request is
@@ -528,7 +530,7 @@
* descriptors; if the response is empty or the descriptor is
* unusable, close pending connections (unless a v2 request is
* still in progress). */
- rend_client_desc_trynow(dir_conn->rend_query, 0);
+ rend_client_desc_trynow(dir_conn->rend_data->onion_address, 0);
}
/* If we were trying to fetch a v2 rend desc and did not succeed,
* retry as needed. (If a fetch is successful, the connection state
@@ -535,9 +537,10 @@
* is changed to DIR_PURPOSE_HAS_FETCHED_RENDDESC to mark that
* refetching is unnecessary.) */
if (conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC_V2 &&
- dir_conn->rend_query &&
- strlen(dir_conn->rend_query) == REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32)
- rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(dir_conn->rend_query);
+ dir_conn->rend_data && dir_conn->rend_data->onion_address &&
+ strlen(dir_conn->rend_data->onion_address) ==
+ REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32)
+ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(dir_conn->rend_data);
break;
case CONN_TYPE_OR:
or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn);
@@ -2565,6 +2568,7 @@
tor_assert(type == CONN_TYPE_DIR ||
type == CONN_TYPE_AP || type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT);
+ tor_assert(rendquery);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns, connection_t *, conn,
{
@@ -2572,12 +2576,16 @@
!conn->marked_for_close &&
(!state || state == conn->state)) {
if (type == CONN_TYPE_DIR &&
+ TO_DIR_CONN(conn)->rend_data &&
(rendversion < 0 ||
- rendversion == TO_DIR_CONN(conn)->rend_version) &&
- !rend_cmp_service_ids(rendquery, TO_DIR_CONN(conn)->rend_query))
+ rendversion == TO_DIR_CONN(conn)->rend_data->rend_desc_version) &&
+ !rend_cmp_service_ids(rendquery,
+ TO_DIR_CONN(conn)->rend_data->onion_address))
return conn;
else if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn) &&
- !rend_cmp_service_ids(rendquery, TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_query))
+ TO_DIR_CONN(conn)->rend_data &&
+ !rend_cmp_service_ids(rendquery,
+ TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data->onion_address))
return conn;
}
});
Index: /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/connection_edge.c
===================================================================
--- /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/connection_edge.c (revision 16941)
+++ /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/connection_edge.c (working copy)
@@ -1587,6 +1587,7 @@
/* it's a hidden-service request */
rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
int r;
+ rend_service_authorization_t *client_auth;
tor_assert(!automap);
if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(socks->command)) {
/* if it's a resolve request, fail it right now, rather than
@@ -1608,14 +1609,16 @@
return -1;
}
- strlcpy(conn->rend_query, socks->address, sizeof(conn->rend_query));
+ conn->rend_data = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_data_t));
+ strlcpy(conn->rend_data->onion_address, socks->address,
+ sizeof(conn->rend_data->onion_address));
log_info(LD_REND,"Got a hidden service request for ID '%s'",
- safe_str(conn->rend_query));
+ safe_str(conn->rend_data->onion_address));
/* see if we already have it cached */
- r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(conn->rend_query, -1, &entry);
+ r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(conn->rend_data->onion_address, -1, &entry);
if (r<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Invalid service name '%s'",
- safe_str(conn->rend_query));
+ safe_str(conn->rend_data->onion_address));
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return -1;
}
@@ -1624,14 +1627,26 @@
* a stable circuit yet, but we know we'll need *something*. */
rep_hist_note_used_internal(now, 0, 1);
+ /* Look up if we have client authorization for it. */
+ client_auth = rend_client_lookup_service_authorization(
+ conn->rend_data->onion_address);
+ if (client_auth) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Using previously configured client authorization "
+ "for hidden service request.");
+ memcpy(conn->rend_data->descriptor_cookie,
+ client_auth->descriptor_cookie, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
+ conn->rend_data->auth_type = client_auth->auth_type;
+ }
if (r==0) {
conn->_base.state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown descriptor %s. Fetching.",
- safe_str(conn->rend_query));
+ safe_str(conn->rend_data->onion_address));
/* Fetch both, v0 and v2 rend descriptors in parallel. Use whichever
- * arrives first. */
- rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(conn->rend_query);
- rend_client_refetch_renddesc(conn->rend_query);
+ * arrives first. Exception: When using client authorization, only
+ * fetch v2 descriptors.*/
+ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(conn->rend_data);
+ if (conn->rend_data->auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH)
+ rend_client_refetch_renddesc(conn->rend_data->onion_address);
} else { /* r > 0 */
/** How long after we receive a hidden service descriptor do we consider
* it valid? */
@@ -1647,11 +1662,13 @@
} else {
conn->_base.state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
log_info(LD_REND, "Stale descriptor %s. Refetching.",
- safe_str(conn->rend_query));
+ safe_str(conn->rend_data->onion_address));
/* Fetch both, v0 and v2 rend descriptors in parallel. Use whichever
- * arrives first. */
- rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(conn->rend_query);
- rend_client_refetch_renddesc(conn->rend_query);
+ * arrives first. Exception: When using client authorization, only
+ * fetch v2 descriptors.*/
+ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(conn->rend_data);
+ if (conn->rend_data->auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH)
+ rend_client_refetch_renddesc(conn->rend_data->onion_address);
}
}
return 0;
@@ -2531,8 +2548,7 @@
log_info(LD_REND,"begin is for rendezvous. configuring stream.");
n_stream->_base.address = tor_strdup("(rendezvous)");
n_stream->_base.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING;
- strlcpy(n_stream->rend_query, origin_circ->rend_query,
- sizeof(n_stream->rend_query));
+ n_stream->rend_data = rend_data_dup(origin_circ->rend_data);
tor_assert(connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(n_stream));
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
if (rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(n_stream, origin_circ) < 0) {
@@ -2815,7 +2831,7 @@
connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_connection_t *conn)
{
tor_assert(conn);
- if (*conn->rend_query) /* XXX */ /* XXXX Why is this XXX? -NM */
+ if (conn->rend_data) /* XXX */ /* XXXX Why is this XXX? -NM */
return 1;
return 0;
}
Index: /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/directory.c
===================================================================
--- /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/directory.c (revision 16941)
+++ /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/directory.c (working copy)
@@ -60,6 +60,22 @@
static void note_client_request(int purpose, int compressed, size_t bytes);
static int client_likes_consensus(networkstatus_t *v, const char *want_url);
+static void directory_initiate_command_rend(const char *address,
+ const tor_addr_t *addr,
+ uint16_t or_port,
+ uint16_t dir_port,
+ int supports_conditional_consensus,
+ int supports_begindir,
+ const char *digest,
+ uint8_t dir_purpose,
+ uint8_t router_purpose,
+ int anonymized_connection,
+ const char *resource,
+ const char *payload,
+ size_t payload_len,
+ time_t if_modified_since,
+ rend_data_t *rend_query);
+
/********* START VARIABLES **********/
/** How far in the future do we allow a directory server to tell us it is
@@ -434,29 +450,18 @@
});
}
-/** Launch a new connection to the directory server <b>status</b> to
- * upload or download a server or rendezvous
- * descriptor. <b>dir_purpose</b> determines what
- * kind of directory connection we're launching, and must be one of
- * DIR_PURPOSE_{FETCH|UPLOAD}_{DIR|RENDDESC|RENDDESC_V2}. <b>router_purpose</b>
- * specifies the descriptor purposes we have in mind (currently only
- * used for FETCH_DIR).
- *
- * When uploading, <b>payload</b> and <b>payload_len</b> determine the content
- * of the HTTP post. Otherwise, <b>payload</b> should be NULL.
- *
- * When fetching a rendezvous descriptor, <b>resource</b> is the service ID we
- * want to fetch.
- */
+/** Same as directory_initiate_command_routerstatus(), but accepts
+ * rendezvous data to fetch a hidden service descriptor. */
void
-directory_initiate_command_routerstatus(routerstatus_t *status,
- uint8_t dir_purpose,
- uint8_t router_purpose,
- int anonymized_connection,
- const char *resource,
- const char *payload,
- size_t payload_len,
- time_t if_modified_since)
+directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(routerstatus_t *status,
+ uint8_t dir_purpose,
+ uint8_t router_purpose,
+ int anonymized_connection,
+ const char *resource,
+ const char *payload,
+ size_t payload_len,
+ time_t if_modified_since,
+ rend_data_t *rend_query)
{
routerinfo_t *router;
char address_buf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN+1];
@@ -476,7 +481,7 @@
address = address_buf;
}
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, status->addr);
- directory_initiate_command(address, &addr,
+ directory_initiate_command_rend(address, &addr,
status->or_port, status->dir_port,
status->version_supports_conditional_consensus,
status->version_supports_begindir,
@@ -483,7 +488,39 @@
status->identity_digest,
dir_purpose, router_purpose,
anonymized_connection, resource,
- payload, payload_len, if_modified_since);
+ payload, payload_len, if_modified_since,
+ rend_query);
+}
+
+/** Launch a new connection to the directory server <b>status</b> to
+ * upload or download a server or rendezvous
+ * descriptor. <b>dir_purpose</b> determines what
+ * kind of directory connection we're launching, and must be one of
+ * DIR_PURPOSE_{FETCH|UPLOAD}_{DIR|RENDDESC|RENDDESC_V2}. <b>router_purpose</b>
+ * specifies the descriptor purposes we have in mind (currently only
+ * used for FETCH_DIR).
+ *
+ * When uploading, <b>payload</b> and <b>payload_len</b> determine the content
+ * of the HTTP post. Otherwise, <b>payload</b> should be NULL.
+ *
+ * When fetching a rendezvous descriptor, <b>resource</b> is the service ID we
+ * want to fetch.
+ */
+void
+directory_initiate_command_routerstatus(routerstatus_t *status,
+ uint8_t dir_purpose,
+ uint8_t router_purpose,
+ int anonymized_connection,
+ const char *resource,
+ const char *payload,
+ size_t payload_len,
+ time_t if_modified_since)
+{
+ directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(status, dir_purpose,
+ router_purpose,
+ anonymized_connection, resource,
+ payload, payload_len,
+ if_modified_since, NULL);
}
/** Return true iff <b>conn</b> is the client side of a directory connection
@@ -668,6 +705,28 @@
const char *payload, size_t payload_len,
time_t if_modified_since)
{
+ directory_initiate_command_rend(address, _addr, or_port, dir_port,
+ supports_conditional_consensus,
+ supports_begindir, digest, dir_purpose,
+ router_purpose, anonymized_connection,
+ resource, payload, payload_len,
+ if_modified_since, NULL);
+}
+
+/** Same as directory_initiate_command(), but accepts rendezvous data to
+ * fetch a hidden service descriptor. */
+static void
+directory_initiate_command_rend(const char *address, const tor_addr_t *_addr,
+ uint16_t or_port, uint16_t dir_port,
+ int supports_conditional_consensus,
+ int supports_begindir, const char *digest,
+ uint8_t dir_purpose, uint8_t router_purpose,
+ int anonymized_connection,
+ const char *resource,
+ const char *payload, size_t payload_len,
+ time_t if_modified_since,
+ rend_data_t *rend_query)
+{
dir_connection_t *conn;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
int socket_error = 0;
@@ -705,6 +764,10 @@
/* decide whether we can learn our IP address from this conn */
conn->dirconn_direct = !anonymized_connection;
+ /* copy rendezvous data, if any */
+ if (rend_query)
+ conn->rend_data = rend_data_dup(rend_query);
+
if (!anonymized_connection && !use_begindir) {
/* then we want to connect to dirport directly */
@@ -1005,8 +1068,10 @@
/* this must be true or we wouldn't be doing the lookup */
tor_assert(strlen(resource) <= REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32);
/* This breaks the function abstraction. */
- strlcpy(conn->rend_query, resource, sizeof(conn->rend_query));
- conn->rend_version = 0;
+ conn->rend_data = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_data_t));
+ strlcpy(conn->rend_data->onion_address, resource,
+ sizeof(conn->rend_data->onion_address));
+ conn->rend_data->rend_desc_version = 0;
httpcommand = "GET";
/* Request the most recent versioned descriptor. */
@@ -1019,10 +1084,8 @@
case DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC_V2:
tor_assert(resource);
tor_assert(strlen(resource) <= REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32);
- /* Remember the query to refer to it when a response arrives. */
- strlcpy(conn->rend_query, payload, sizeof(conn->rend_query));
- conn->rend_version = 2;
- payload = NULL;
+ tor_assert(!payload);
+ conn->rend_data->rend_desc_version = 2;
httpcommand = "GET";
len = strlen(resource) + 32;
url = tor_malloc(len);
@@ -1877,6 +1940,7 @@
}
if (conn->_base.purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC) {
+ tor_assert(conn->rend_data);
log_info(LD_REND,"Received rendezvous descriptor (size %d, status %d "
"(%s))",
(int)body_len, status_code, escaped(reason));
@@ -1892,7 +1956,7 @@
} else {
/* success. notify pending connections about this. */
conn->_base.purpose = DIR_PURPOSE_HAS_FETCHED_RENDDESC;
- rend_client_desc_trynow(conn->rend_query, -1);
+ rend_client_desc_trynow(conn->rend_data->onion_address, -1);
}
break;
case 404:
@@ -1914,6 +1978,7 @@
}
if (conn->_base.purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC_V2) {
+ tor_assert(conn->rend_data);
log_info(LD_REND,"Received rendezvous descriptor (size %d, status %d "
"(%s))",
(int)body_len, status_code, escaped(reason));
@@ -1919,7 +1984,7 @@
(int)body_len, status_code, escaped(reason));
switch (status_code) {
case 200:
- switch (rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(body, NULL)) {
+ switch (rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(body, conn->rend_data)) {
case -2:
log_warn(LD_REND,"Fetching v2 rendezvous descriptor failed. "
"Retrying at another directory.");
@@ -1938,7 +2003,7 @@
log_info(LD_REND, "Successfully fetched v2 rendezvous "
"descriptor.");
conn->_base.purpose = DIR_PURPOSE_HAS_FETCHED_RENDDESC;
- rend_client_desc_trynow(conn->rend_query, -1);
+ rend_client_desc_trynow(conn->rend_data->onion_address, -1);
break;
}
break;
Index: /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/or.h
===================================================================
--- /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/or.h (revision 16941)
+++ /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/or.h (working copy)
@@ -676,6 +676,55 @@
/** Maximum length of authorized client names for a hidden service. */
#define REND_CLIENTNAME_MAX_LEN 16
+/** Length of the rendezvous cookie that is used to connect circuits at the
+ * rendezvous point. */
+#define REND_COOKIE_LEN DIGEST_LEN
+
+/** Client authorization type that a hidden service performs. */
+typedef enum rend_auth_type_t {
+ REND_NO_AUTH = 0,
+ REND_BASIC_AUTH = 1,
+ REND_STEALTH_AUTH = 2,
+} rend_auth_type_t;
+
+/** Client-side configuration of authorization for a hidden service. */
+typedef struct rend_service_authorization_t {
+ char descriptor_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN];
+ char onion_address[REND_SERVICE_ADDRESS_LEN+1];
+ rend_auth_type_t auth_type;
+} rend_service_authorization_t;
+
+/** Client- and server-side data that is used for hidden service connection
+ * establishment. Not all fields contain data depending on where this struct
+ * is used. */
+typedef struct rend_data_t {
+ /** Onion address (without the .onion part) that a client requests. */
+ char onion_address[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
+
+ /** (Optional) descriptor cookie that is used by a client. */
+ char descriptor_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN];
+
+ /** Authorization type for accessing a service used by a client. */
+ rend_auth_type_t auth_type;
+
+ /** Hash of the hidden service's PK used by a service. */
+ char rend_pk_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+
+ /** Rendezvous cookie used by both, client and service. */
+ char rend_cookie[REND_COOKIE_LEN];
+
+ /** Rendezvous descriptor version that is used by a service. Used to
+ * distinguish introduction and rendezvous points belonging to the same
+ * rendezvous service ID, but different descriptor versions.
+ */
+ uint8_t rend_desc_version;
+} rend_data_t;
+
+/** Time interval for tracking possible replays of INTRODUCE2 cells.
+ * Incoming cells with timestamps half of this interval in the past or
+ * future are dropped immediately. */
+#define REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL (60 * 60)
+
#define CELL_DIRECTION_IN 1
#define CELL_DIRECTION_OUT 2
@@ -1025,7 +1074,7 @@
uint32_t n_written;
/** What rendezvous service are we querying for? (AP only) */
- char rend_query[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
+ rend_data_t *rend_data;
/** Number of times we've reassigned this application connection to
* a new circuit. We keep track because the timeout is longer if we've
@@ -1078,11 +1127,8 @@
/** The zlib object doing on-the-fly compression for spooled data. */
tor_zlib_state_t *zlib_state;
- /** What hidden service descriptor are we fetching, if any? */
- int rend_version;
-
/** What rendezvous service are we querying for? */
- char rend_query[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
+ rend_data_t *rend_data;
char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; /**< Hash of the public RSA key for
* the directory server's signing key. */
@@ -1747,7 +1793,6 @@
CIPHER_KEY_LEN+\
DH_KEY_LEN)
#define ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN (DH_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN)
-#define REND_COOKIE_LEN DIGEST_LEN
/** Information used to build a circuit. */
typedef struct {
@@ -1883,28 +1928,8 @@
*/
crypt_path_t *cpath;
- /** The rend_pk_digest field holds a hash of location-hidden service's
- * PK if purpose is S_ESTABLISH_INTRO or S_RENDEZVOUSING.
- */
- char rend_pk_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
-
- /** Holds rendezvous cookie if purpose is C_ESTABLISH_REND. Filled with
- * zeroes otherwise.
- */
- char rend_cookie[REND_COOKIE_LEN];
-
- /**
- * The rend_query field holds the y portion of y.onion (nul-terminated)
- * if purpose is C_INTRODUCING or C_ESTABLISH_REND, or is a C_GENERAL
- * for a hidden service, or is S_*.
- */
- char rend_query[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
-
- /** Stores the rendezvous descriptor version if purpose is S_*. Used to
- * distinguish introduction and rendezvous points belonging to the same
- * rendezvous service ID, but different descriptor versions.
- */
- uint8_t rend_desc_version;
+ /** Holds all rendezvous data on either client or service side. */
+ rend_data_t *rend_data;
/** How many more relay_early cells can we send on this circuit, according
* to the specification? */
@@ -3179,6 +3204,15 @@
const char *payload,
size_t payload_len,
time_t if_modified_since);
+void directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(routerstatus_t *status,
+ uint8_t dir_purpose,
+ uint8_t router_purpose,
+ int anonymized_connection,
+ const char *resource,
+ const char *payload,
+ size_t payload_len,
+ time_t if_modified_since,
+ rend_data_t *rend_query);
int parse_http_response(const char *headers, int *code, time_t *date,
compress_method_t *compression, char **response);
@@ -3835,9 +3869,9 @@
int rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
size_t request_len);
void rend_client_refetch_renddesc(const char *query);
-void rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(const char *query);
+void rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_data_t *rend_query);
int rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_info_t *failed_intro,
- const char *query);
+ rend_data_t *rend_query);
int rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
size_t request_len);
int rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
@@ -3844,25 +3878,10 @@
size_t request_len);
void rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query, int rend_version);
-extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro(const char *query);
+extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro(rend_data_t *rend_query);
int rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
origin_circuit_t *rendcirc);
-
-/** Client authorization type that a hidden service performs. */
-typedef enum rend_auth_type_t {
- REND_NO_AUTH = 0,
- REND_BASIC_AUTH = 1,
- REND_STEALTH_AUTH = 2,
-} rend_auth_type_t;
-
-/** Client-side configuration of authorization for a hidden service. */
-typedef struct rend_service_authorization_t {
- char descriptor_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN];
- char onion_address[REND_SERVICE_ADDRESS_LEN+1];
- rend_auth_type_t auth_type;
-} rend_service_authorization_t;
-
int rend_parse_service_authorization(or_options_t *options,
int validate_only);
rend_service_authorization_t *rend_client_lookup_service_authorization(
@@ -3868,6 +3887,7 @@
rend_service_authorization_t *rend_client_lookup_service_authorization(
const char *onion_address);
void rend_service_authorization_free_all(void);
+rend_data_t *rend_data_dup(rend_data_t *request);
/********************************* rendcommon.c ***************************/
@@ -3947,7 +3967,7 @@
int rend_cache_lookup_v2_desc_as_dir(const char *query, const char **desc);
int rend_cache_store(const char *desc, size_t desc_len, int published);
int rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(const char *desc,
- const char *descriptor_cookie);
+ rend_data_t *rend_query);
int rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_dir(const char *desc);
int rend_cache_size(void);
int rend_encode_v2_descriptors(smartlist_t *descs_out,
Index: /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/rendclient.c
===================================================================
--- /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/rendclient.c (revision 16941)
+++ /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/rendclient.c (working copy)
@@ -31,9 +31,10 @@
rend_client_send_establish_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ)
{
tor_assert(circ->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND);
+ tor_assert(circ->rend_data);
log_info(LD_REND, "Sending an ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell");
- if (crypto_rand(circ->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN) < 0) {
+ if (crypto_rand(circ->rend_data->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: Couldn't produce random cookie.");
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
return -1;
@@ -40,7 +41,8 @@
}
if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS,
- circ->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN,
+ circ->rend_data->rend_cookie,
+ REND_COOKIE_LEN,
circ->cpath->prev)<0) {
/* circ is already marked for close */
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't send ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell");
@@ -58,7 +60,7 @@
origin_circuit_t *rendcirc)
{
size_t payload_len;
- int r;
+ int r, v3_shift = 0;
char payload[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
char tmp[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
@@ -68,13 +70,16 @@
tor_assert(introcirc->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
tor_assert(rendcirc->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
- tor_assert(!rend_cmp_service_ids(introcirc->rend_query,
- rendcirc->rend_query));
+ tor_assert(introcirc->rend_data);
+ tor_assert(rendcirc->rend_data);
+ tor_assert(!rend_cmp_service_ids(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address,
+ rendcirc->rend_data->onion_address));
- if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(introcirc->rend_query, -1, &entry) < 1) {
+ if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address, -1,
+ &entry) < 1) {
log_warn(LD_REND,
"query %s didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.",
- escaped_safe_str(introcirc->rend_query));
+ escaped_safe_str(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address));
goto err;
}
@@ -117,22 +122,40 @@
}
}
+ /* If version is 3, write (optional) auth data and timestamp. */
+ if (entry->parsed->protocols & (1<<3)) {
+ tmp[0] = 3; /* version 3 of the cell format */
+ tmp[1] = (uint8_t)introcirc->rend_data->auth_type; /* auth type, if any */
+ v3_shift = 1;
+ if (introcirc->rend_data->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) {
+ set_uint16(tmp+2, htons(REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN));
+ memcpy(tmp+4, introcirc->rend_data->descriptor_cookie,
+ REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
+ v3_shift += 2+REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN;
+ }
+ set_uint32(tmp+v3_shift+1, htonl(time(NULL)));
+ v3_shift += 4;
+ } /* if version 2 only write version number */
+ else if (entry->parsed->protocols & (1<<2)) {
+ tmp[0] = 2; /* version 2 of the cell format */
+ }
+
/* write the remaining items into tmp */
- if (entry->parsed->protocols & (1<<2)) {
+ if (entry->parsed->protocols & (1<<3) || entry->parsed->protocols & (1<<2)) {
/* version 2 format */
extend_info_t *extend_info = rendcirc->build_state->chosen_exit;
int klen;
- tmp[0] = 2; /* version 2 of the cell format */
/* nul pads */
- set_uint32(tmp+1, tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&extend_info->addr));
- set_uint16(tmp+5, htons(extend_info->port));
- memcpy(tmp+7, extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
- klen = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(extend_info->onion_key, tmp+7+DIGEST_LEN+2,
- sizeof(tmp)-(7+DIGEST_LEN+2));
- set_uint16(tmp+7+DIGEST_LEN, htons(klen));
- memcpy(tmp+7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen, rendcirc->rend_cookie,
+ set_uint32(tmp+v3_shift+1, tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&extend_info->addr));
+ set_uint16(tmp+v3_shift+5, htons(extend_info->port));
+ memcpy(tmp+v3_shift+7, extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ klen = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(extend_info->onion_key,
+ tmp+v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN+2,
+ sizeof(tmp)-(v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN+2));
+ set_uint16(tmp+v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN, htons(klen));
+ memcpy(tmp+v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen, rendcirc->rend_data->rend_cookie,
REND_COOKIE_LEN);
- dh_offset = 7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen+REND_COOKIE_LEN;
+ dh_offset = v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen+REND_COOKIE_LEN;
} else {
/* Version 0. */
strncpy(tmp, rendcirc->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname,
@@ -137,7 +160,7 @@
/* Version 0. */
strncpy(tmp, rendcirc->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname,
(MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1)); /* nul pads */
- memcpy(tmp+MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1, rendcirc->rend_cookie,
+ memcpy(tmp+MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1, rendcirc->rend_data->rend_cookie,
REND_COOKIE_LEN);
dh_offset = MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1+REND_COOKIE_LEN;
}
@@ -216,6 +239,7 @@
}
tor_assert(circ->build_state->chosen_exit);
+ tor_assert(circ->rend_data);
if (request_len == 0) {
/* It's an ACK; the introduction point relayed our introduction request. */
@@ -224,7 +248,7 @@
*/
log_info(LD_REND,"Received ack. Telling rend circ...");
rendcirc = circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose(
- circ->rend_query, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
+ circ->rend_data->onion_address, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
if (rendcirc) { /* remember the ack */
rendcirc->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED;
} else {
@@ -241,7 +265,7 @@
* If none remain, refetch the service descriptor.
*/
if (rend_client_remove_intro_point(circ->build_state->chosen_exit,
- circ->rend_query) > 0) {
+ circ->rend_data) > 0) {
/* There are introduction points left. Re-extend the circuit to
* another intro point and try again. */
extend_info_t *extend_info;
@@ -246,10 +270,10 @@
* another intro point and try again. */
extend_info_t *extend_info;
int result;
- extend_info = rend_client_get_random_intro(circ->rend_query);
+ extend_info = rend_client_get_random_intro(circ->rend_data);
if (!extend_info) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "No introduction points left for %s. Closing.",
- escaped_safe_str(circ->rend_query));
+ escaped_safe_str(circ->rend_data->onion_address));
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
return -1;
}
@@ -256,7 +280,7 @@
log_info(LD_REND,
"Got nack for %s from %s. Re-extending circ %d, "
"this time to %s.",
- escaped_safe_str(circ->rend_query),
+ escaped_safe_str(circ->rend_data->onion_address),
circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname, circ->_base.n_circ_id,
extend_info->nickname);
result = circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, extend_info);
@@ -337,7 +361,7 @@
* descriptor, return 0, and in case of a failure -1. <b>query</b> is only
* passed for pretty log statements. */
static int
-directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id, const char *query)
+directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id, rend_data_t *rend_query)
{
smartlist_t *responsible_dirs = smartlist_create();
routerstatus_t *hs_dir;
@@ -343,9 +367,9 @@
routerstatus_t *hs_dir;
char desc_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1];
time_t now = time(NULL);
+ char descriptor_cookie_base64[3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64];
tor_assert(desc_id);
- tor_assert(query);
- tor_assert(strlen(query) == REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32);
+ tor_assert(rend_query);
/* Determine responsible dirs. Even if we can't get all we want,
* work with the ones we have. If it's empty, we'll notice below. */
(int) hid_serv_get_responsible_directories(responsible_dirs, desc_id);
@@ -377,17 +401,33 @@
* directory now. */
lookup_last_hid_serv_request(hs_dir, desc_id_base32, now, 1);
- /* Send fetch request. (Pass query as payload to write it to the directory
- * connection so that it can be referred to when the response arrives.) */
- directory_initiate_command_routerstatus(hs_dir,
+ /* Encode descriptor cookie for logging purposes. */
+ if (rend_query->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH &&
+ base64_encode(descriptor_cookie_base64, 3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64,
+ rend_query->descriptor_cookie, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not base64-encode descriptor cookie.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Remove == signs and newline. */
+ descriptor_cookie_base64[strlen(descriptor_cookie_base64)-3] = '\0';
+
+ /* Send fetch request. (Pass query and possibly descriptor cookie so that
+ * they can be written to the directory connection and be referred to when
+ * the response arrives. */
+ directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(hs_dir,
DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC_V2,
ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL,
- 1, desc_id_base32, query, 0, 0);
+ 1, desc_id_base32, NULL, 0, 0,
+ rend_query);
log_info(LD_REND, "Sending fetch request for v2 descriptor for "
- "service '%s' with descriptor ID '%s' to hidden "
- "service directory '%s' on port %d.",
- safe_str(query), safe_str(desc_id_base32), hs_dir->nickname,
- hs_dir->dir_port);
+ "service '%s' with descriptor ID '%s', auth type %d, "
+ "and descriptor cookie '%s' to hidden service "
+ "directory '%s' on port %d.",
+ rend_query->onion_address, desc_id_base32,
+ rend_query->auth_type,
+ (rend_query->auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH ? "NULL" :
+ escaped_safe_str(descriptor_cookie_base64)),
+ hs_dir->nickname, hs_dir->dir_port);
return 1;
}
@@ -417,7 +457,7 @@
* <b>query</b>.
*/
void
-rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(const char *query)
+rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_data_t *rend_query)
{
char descriptor_id[DIGEST_LEN];
int replicas_left_to_try[REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS];
@@ -423,8 +463,7 @@
int replicas_left_to_try[REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS];
int i, tries_left;
rend_cache_entry_t *e = NULL;
- tor_assert(query);
- tor_assert(strlen(query) == REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32);
+ tor_assert(rend_query);
/* Are we configured to fetch descriptors? */
if (!get_options()->FetchHidServDescriptors) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "We received an onion address for a v2 rendezvous "
@@ -432,7 +471,7 @@
return;
}
/* Before fetching, check if we already have the descriptor here. */
- if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(query, -1, &e) > 0) {
+ if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &e) > 0) {
log_info(LD_REND, "We would fetch a v2 rendezvous descriptor, but we "
"already have that descriptor here. Not fetching.");
return;
@@ -438,7 +477,7 @@
return;
}
log_debug(LD_REND, "Fetching v2 rendezvous descriptor for service %s",
- safe_str(query));
+ safe_str(rend_query->onion_address));
/* Randomly iterate over the replicas until a descriptor can be fetched
* from one of the consecutive nodes, or no options are left. */
tries_left = REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS;
@@ -449,8 +488,10 @@
int chosen_replica = replicas_left_to_try[rand];
replicas_left_to_try[rand] = replicas_left_to_try[--tries_left];
- if (rend_compute_v2_desc_id(descriptor_id, query, NULL, time(NULL),
- chosen_replica) < 0) {
+ if (rend_compute_v2_desc_id(descriptor_id, rend_query->onion_address,
+ rend_query->auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH ?
+ rend_query->descriptor_cookie : NULL,
+ time(NULL), chosen_replica) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Internal error: Computing v2 rendezvous "
"descriptor ID did not succeed.");
return;
@@ -455,7 +496,7 @@
"descriptor ID did not succeed.");
return;
}
- if (directory_get_from_hs_dir(descriptor_id, query) != 0)
+ if (directory_get_from_hs_dir(descriptor_id, rend_query) != 0)
return; /* either success or failure, but we're done */
}
/* If we come here, there are no hidden service directories left. */
@@ -463,7 +504,7 @@
"service directories to fetch descriptors, because "
"we already tried them all unsuccessfully.");
/* Close pending connections (unless a v0 request is still going on). */
- rend_client_desc_trynow(query, 2);
+ rend_client_desc_trynow(rend_query->onion_address, 2);
return;
}
@@ -474,7 +515,8 @@
* unrecognized, 1 if recognized and some intro points remain.
*/
int
-rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_info_t *failed_intro, const char *query)
+rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_info_t *failed_intro,
+ rend_data_t *rend_query)
{
int i, r;
rend_cache_entry_t *ent;
@@ -480,9 +522,10 @@
rend_cache_entry_t *ent;
connection_t *conn;
- r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(query, -1, &ent);
+ r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &ent);
if (r<0) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Malformed service ID %s.", escaped_safe_str(query));
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Malformed service ID %s.",
+ escaped_safe_str(rend_query->onion_address));
return -1;
}
if (r==0) {
@@ -487,11 +530,13 @@
}
if (r==0) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown service %s. Re-fetching descriptor.",
- escaped_safe_str(query));
+ escaped_safe_str(rend_query->onion_address));
/* Fetch both, v0 and v2 rend descriptors in parallel. Use whichever
- * arrives first. */
- rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(query);
- rend_client_refetch_renddesc(query);
+ * arrives first. Exception: When using client authorization, only
+ * fetch v2 descriptors.*/
+ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_query);
+ if (rend_query->auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH)
+ rend_client_refetch_renddesc(rend_query->onion_address);
return 0;
}
@@ -508,15 +553,18 @@
if (smartlist_len(ent->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0) {
log_info(LD_REND,
"No more intro points remain for %s. Re-fetching descriptor.",
- escaped_safe_str(query));
+ escaped_safe_str(rend_query->onion_address));
/* Fetch both, v0 and v2 rend descriptors in parallel. Use whichever
- * arrives first. */
- rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(query);
- rend_client_refetch_renddesc(query);
+ * arrives first. Exception: When using client authorization, only
+ * fetch v2 descriptors.*/
+ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_query);
+ if (rend_query->auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH)
+ rend_client_refetch_renddesc(rend_query->onion_address);
/* move all pending streams back to renddesc_wait */
while ((conn = connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(CONN_TYPE_AP,
- AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT, query, -1))) {
+ AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT,
+ rend_query->onion_address, -1))) {
conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
}
@@ -523,7 +571,8 @@
return 0;
}
log_info(LD_REND,"%d options left for %s.",
- smartlist_len(ent->parsed->intro_nodes), escaped_safe_str(query));
+ smartlist_len(ent->parsed->intro_nodes),
+ escaped_safe_str(rend_query->onion_address));
return 1;
}
@@ -648,10 +697,13 @@
_conn->marked_for_close)
continue;
conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(_conn);
- if (rend_cmp_service_ids(query, conn->rend_query))
+ if (!conn->rend_data)
+ continue;
+ if (rend_cmp_service_ids(query, conn->rend_data->onion_address))
continue;
assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn), now);
- if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(conn->rend_query, -1, &entry) == 1 &&
+ if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(conn->rend_data->onion_address, -1,
+ &entry) == 1 &&
smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes) > 0) {
/* either this fetch worked, or it failed but there was a
* valid entry from before which we should reuse */
@@ -689,7 +741,7 @@
* have been tried and failed.
*/
extend_info_t *
-rend_client_get_random_intro(const char *query)
+rend_client_get_random_intro(rend_data_t *rend_query)
{
int i;
rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
@@ -696,10 +748,10 @@
rend_intro_point_t *intro;
routerinfo_t *router;
- if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(query, -1, &entry) < 1) {
+ if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &entry) < 1) {
log_warn(LD_REND,
"Query '%s' didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.",
- safe_str(query));
+ safe_str(rend_query->onion_address));
return NULL;
}
Index: /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/rendcommon.c
===================================================================
--- /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/rendcommon.c (revision 16941)
+++ /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/rendcommon.c (working copy)
@@ -1242,8 +1242,7 @@
* than one we've already got; return 1 if it's novel.
*/
int
-rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(const char *desc,
- const char *descriptor_cookie)
+rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(const char *desc, rend_data_t *rend_query)
{
/*XXXX this seems to have a bit of duplicate code with
* rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_dir(). Fix that. */
@@ -1272,7 +1271,6 @@
rend_cache_entry_t *e;
tor_assert(rend_cache);
tor_assert(desc);
- (void) descriptor_cookie; /* We don't use it, yet. */
/* Parse the descriptor. */
if (rend_parse_v2_service_descriptor(&parsed, desc_id, &intro_content,
&intro_size, &encoded_size,
@@ -1291,10 +1289,32 @@
}
/* Decode/decrypt introduction points. */
if (intro_content) {
+ if (rend_query->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH &&
+ rend_query->descriptor_cookie) {
+ char *ipos_decrypted;
+ size_t ipos_decrypted_size;
+ if (rend_decrypt_introduction_points(&ipos_decrypted,
+ &ipos_decrypted_size,
+ rend_query->descriptor_cookie,
+ intro_content,
+ intro_size) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Failed to decrypt introduction points. We are "
+ "probably unable to parse the encoded introduction points.");
+ } else {
+ /* Replace encrypted with decrypted introduction points. */
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Successfully decrypted introduction points.");
+ tor_free(intro_content);
+ intro_content = ipos_decrypted;
+ intro_size = ipos_decrypted_size;
+ }
+ }
if (rend_parse_introduction_points(parsed, intro_content,
- intro_size) < 0) {
- log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"Couldn't decode/decrypt introduction points.");
- rend_service_descriptor_free(parsed);
+ intro_size) <= 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Failed to parse introduction points. Either the "
+ "service has published a corrupt descriptor or you have "
+ "provided invalid authorization data.");
+ if (parsed)
+ rend_service_descriptor_free(parsed);
tor_free(intro_content);
return -2;
}
@@ -1299,6 +1319,7 @@
return -2;
}
} else {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor does not contain any introduction points.");
parsed->intro_nodes = smartlist_create();
}
/* We don't need the encoded/encrypted introduction points any longer. */
@@ -1426,3 +1447,15 @@
return strmap_size(rend_cache);
}
+/** Allocate and return a new rend_data_t with the same
+ * contents as <b>query</b>. */
+rend_data_t *
+rend_data_dup(rend_data_t *data)
+{
+ rend_data_t *newdata;
+ tor_assert(data);
+ newdata = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_data_t));
+ memcpy(newdata, data, sizeof(rend_data_t));
+ return newdata;
+}
+
Index: /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/rendservice.c
===================================================================
--- /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/rendservice.c (revision 16941)
+++ /home/karsten/tor/tor-trunk-121-patches/src/or/rendservice.c (working copy)
@@ -69,8 +69,16 @@
* up-to-date. */
time_t next_upload_time; /**< Scheduled next hidden service descriptor
* upload time. */
+ smartlist_t *accepted_intros; /**< List of client_access_event_t's for
+ * accepted and answered INTRODUCE2 cells. */
} rend_service_t;
+/** The event of a client accessing our hidden service. */
+typedef struct client_access_event_t {
+ time_t access_time;
+ char diffie_hellman_hash[DIGEST_LEN];
+} client_access_event_t;
+
/** A list of rend_service_t's for services run on this OP.
*/
static smartlist_t *rend_service_list = NULL;
@@ -360,7 +368,7 @@
if (smartlist_len(type_names_split) < 2) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient contains "
"auth-type '%s', but no client names.",
- service->auth_type == 1 ? "basic" : "stealth");
+ service->auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH ? "basic" : "stealth");
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(type_names_split, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(type_names_split);
continue;
@@ -423,7 +431,7 @@
"authorization type '%s'.",
smartlist_len(service->clients),
service->auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH ? 512 : 16,
- service->auth_type == 1 ? "basic" : "stealth");
+ service->auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH ? "basic" : "stealth");
rend_service_free(service);
return -1;
}
@@ -720,8 +728,10 @@
tor_free(client_keys_str);
strmap_free(parsed_clients, rend_authorized_client_strmap_item_free);
if (r<0) {
- abort_writing_to_file(open_cfile);
- abort_writing_to_file(open_hfile);
+ if (open_cfile)
+ abort_writing_to_file(open_cfile);
+ if (open_hfile)
+ abort_writing_to_file(open_hfile);
return r;
} else {
finish_writing_to_file(open_cfile);
@@ -764,6 +774,45 @@
return 0;
}
+/** Check client authorization of a given <b>descriptor_cookie</b> for
+ * <b>service</b>. Return 1 for success and 0 for failure. */
+static int
+rend_check_authorization(rend_service_t *service,
+ const char *descriptor_cookie)
+{
+ rend_authorized_client_t *auth_client = NULL;
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(descriptor_cookie);
+ if (!service->clients) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Can't check authorization for a service that has no "
+ "authorized clients configured.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Look up client authorization by descriptor cookie. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->clients, rend_authorized_client_t *, client, {
+ if (!memcmp(client->descriptor_cookie, descriptor_cookie,
+ REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN)) {
+ auth_client = client;
+ break;
+ }
+ });
+ if (!auth_client) {
+ char descriptor_cookie_base64[3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64];
+ base64_encode(descriptor_cookie_base64, sizeof(descriptor_cookie_base64),
+ descriptor_cookie, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
+ log_info(LD_REND, "No authorization found for descriptor cookie '%s'! "
+ "Dropping cell!",
+ descriptor_cookie_base64);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Allow the request. */
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Client %s could be identified for service %s.",
+ auth_client->client_name, service->service_id);
+ return 1;
+}
+
/******
* Handle cells
******/
@@ -780,7 +829,7 @@
char buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
char keys[DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN]; /* Holds KH, Df, Db, Kf, Kb */
rend_service_t *service;
- int r, i;
+ int r, i, v3_shift = 0;
size_t len, keylen;
crypto_dh_env_t *dh = NULL;
origin_circuit_t *launched = NULL;
@@ -791,9 +840,17 @@
int reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
crypto_pk_env_t *intro_key;
char intro_key_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+ int auth_type;
+ size_t auth_len = 0;
+ char auth_data[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN];
+ crypto_digest_env_t *digest = NULL;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ char diffie_hellman_hash[DIGEST_LEN];
+ client_access_event_t *event = NULL;
+ tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
- circuit->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
log_info(LD_REND, "Received INTRODUCE2 cell for service %s on circ %d.",
escaped(serviceid), circuit->_base.n_circ_id);
@@ -814,7 +871,8 @@
/* look up service depending on circuit. */
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest_and_version(
- circuit->rend_pk_digest, circuit->rend_desc_version);
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest,
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_desc_version);
if (!service) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Got an INTRODUCE2 cell for an unrecognized service %s.",
escaped(serviceid));
@@ -822,7 +880,7 @@
}
/* if descriptor version is 2, use intro key instead of service key. */
- if (circuit->rend_desc_version == 0) {
+ if (circuit->rend_data->rend_desc_version == 0) {
intro_key = service->private_key;
} else {
intro_key = circuit->intro_key;
@@ -854,13 +912,49 @@
return -1;
}
len = r;
- if (*buf == 2) {
+ if (*buf == 3) {
+ /* Version 3 INTRODUCE2 cell. */
+ time_t ts = 0, now = time(NULL);
+ v3_shift = 1;
+ auth_type = buf[1];
+ switch (auth_type) {
+ case REND_BASIC_AUTH:
+ /* fall through */
+ case REND_STEALTH_AUTH:
+ auth_len = ntohs(get_uint16(buf+2));
+ if (auth_len != REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Wrong auth data size %d, should be %d.",
+ (int)auth_len, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(auth_data, buf+4, sizeof(auth_data));
+ v3_shift += 2+REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN;
+ break;
+ case REND_NO_AUTH:
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown authorization type '%d'", auth_type);
+ }
+
+ /* Check timestamp. */
+ memcpy((char*)&ts, buf+1+v3_shift, sizeof(uint32_t));
+ v3_shift += 4;
+ ts = ntohl(ts);
+ if ((now - ts) < -1 * REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL / 2 ||
+ (now - ts) > REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL / 2) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "INTRODUCE2 cell is too %s. Discarding.",
+ (now - ts) < 0 ? "old" : "new");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (*buf == 2 || *buf == 3) {
/* Version 2 INTRODUCE2 cell. */
int klen;
extend_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t));
- tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&extend_info->addr, get_uint32(buf+1));
- extend_info->port = ntohs(get_uint16(buf+5));
- memcpy(extend_info->identity_digest, buf+7, DIGEST_LEN);
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&extend_info->addr, get_uint32(buf+v3_shift+1));
+ extend_info->port = ntohs(get_uint16(buf+v3_shift+5));
+ memcpy(extend_info->identity_digest, buf+v3_shift+7,
+ DIGEST_LEN);
extend_info->nickname[0] = '$';
base16_encode(extend_info->nickname+1, sizeof(extend_info->nickname)-1,
extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
@@ -865,22 +959,23 @@
base16_encode(extend_info->nickname+1, sizeof(extend_info->nickname)-1,
extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
- klen = ntohs(get_uint16(buf+7+DIGEST_LEN));
- if ((int)len != 7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen+20+128) {
- log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Bad length %u for version 2 INTRODUCE2 cell.",
- (int)len);
+ klen = ntohs(get_uint16(buf+v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN));
+ if ((int)len != v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen+20+128) {
+ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Bad length %u for version %d INTRODUCE2 cell.",
+ (int)len, *buf);
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
goto err;
}
- extend_info->onion_key = crypto_pk_asn1_decode(buf+7+DIGEST_LEN+2, klen);
+ extend_info->onion_key =
+ crypto_pk_asn1_decode(buf+v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN+2, klen);
if (!extend_info->onion_key) {
- log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
- "Error decoding onion key in version 2 INTRODUCE2 cell.");
+ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Error decoding onion key in version %d "
+ "INTRODUCE2 cell.", *buf);
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
goto err;
}
- ptr = buf+7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen;
- len -= 7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen;
+ ptr = buf+v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen;
+ len -= v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen;
} else {
char *rp_nickname;
size_t nickname_field_len;
@@ -932,6 +1027,58 @@
r_cookie = ptr;
base16_encode(hexcookie,9,r_cookie,4);
+ /* Determine hash of Diffie-Hellman, part 1 to detect replays. */
+ digest = crypto_new_digest_env();
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, ptr+REND_COOKIE_LEN, DH_KEY_LEN);
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, diffie_hellman_hash, DIGEST_LEN);
+ crypto_free_digest_env(digest);
+
+ /* Iterate over past requests, remove those which are older than one hour,
+ * and check whether there is one with same Diffie-Hellman, part 1. */
+ if (!service->accepted_intros)
+ service->accepted_intros = smartlist_create();
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->accepted_intros, client_access_event_t *,
+ access, {
+ if (access->access_time + REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL < now) {
+ tor_free(access);
+ SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(service->accepted_intros, access);
+ } else if (!memcmp(access->diffie_hellman_hash, diffie_hellman_hash,
+ DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Possible replay detected! We received an "
+ "INTRODUCE2 cell with same first part of "
+ "Diffie-Hellman handshake %d seconds ago. Dropping "
+ "cell.",
+ (uint32_t) (now - access->access_time));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ });
+
+ /* Add request to access history, including time and hash of
+ * Diffie-Hellman, part 1. */
+ event = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(client_access_event_t));
+ event->access_time = now;
+ memcpy(event->diffie_hellman_hash, diffie_hellman_hash, DIGEST_LEN);
+ smartlist_add(service->accepted_intros, event);
+
+ /* If the service performs client authorization, check included auth data. */
+ if (service->clients) {
+ if (auth_len > 0) {
+ if (rend_check_authorization(service, auth_data)) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Authorization data in INTRODUCE2 cell are valid.");
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "The authorization data that are contained in "
+ "the INTRODUCE2 cell are invalid. Dropping cell.");
+ reason = END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "INTRODUCE2 cell does not contain authentication "
+ "data, but we require client authorization. Dropping cell.");
+ reason = END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Try DH handshake... */
dh = crypto_dh_new();
if (!dh || crypto_dh_generate_public(dh)<0) {
@@ -976,12 +1123,14 @@
escaped_safe_str(extend_info->nickname), hexcookie, serviceid);
tor_assert(launched->build_state);
/* Fill in the circuit's state. */
- memcpy(launched->rend_pk_digest, circuit->rend_pk_digest,
+ launched->rend_data = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_data_t));
+ memcpy(launched->rend_data->rend_pk_digest,
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
- memcpy(launched->rend_cookie, r_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
- strlcpy(launched->rend_query, service->service_id,
- sizeof(launched->rend_query));
- launched->rend_desc_version = service->descriptor_version;
+ memcpy(launched->rend_data->rend_cookie, r_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
+ strlcpy(launched->rend_data->onion_address, service->service_id,
+ sizeof(launched->rend_data->onion_address));
+ launched->rend_data->rend_desc_version = service->descriptor_version;
launched->build_state->pending_final_cpath = cpath =
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
@@ -1053,13 +1202,7 @@
newstate->pending_final_cpath = oldstate->pending_final_cpath;
oldstate->pending_final_cpath = NULL;
- memcpy(newcirc->rend_query, oldcirc->rend_query,
- REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1);
- memcpy(newcirc->rend_pk_digest, oldcirc->rend_pk_digest,
- DIGEST_LEN);
- memcpy(newcirc->rend_cookie, oldcirc->rend_cookie,
- REND_COOKIE_LEN);
- newcirc->rend_desc_version = oldcirc->rend_desc_version;
+ newcirc->rend_data = rend_data_dup(oldcirc->rend_data);
}
/** Launch a circuit to serve as an introduction point for the service
@@ -1105,10 +1248,11 @@
intro->extend_info = extend_info_dup(launched->build_state->chosen_exit);
}
- strlcpy(launched->rend_query, service->service_id,
- sizeof(launched->rend_query));
- memcpy(launched->rend_pk_digest, service->pk_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
- launched->rend_desc_version = service->descriptor_version;
+ launched->rend_data = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_data_t));
+ strlcpy(launched->rend_data->onion_address, service->service_id,
+ sizeof(launched->rend_data->onion_address));
+ memcpy(launched->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, service->pk_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ launched->rend_data->rend_desc_version = service->descriptor_version;
if (service->descriptor_version == 2)
launched->intro_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(intro->intro_key);
if (launched->_base.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)
@@ -1133,12 +1277,14 @@
tor_assert(circuit->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO);
tor_assert(circuit->cpath);
+ tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
- circuit->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest_and_version(
- circuit->rend_pk_digest, circuit->rend_desc_version);
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest,
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_desc_version);
if (!service) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unrecognized service ID %s on introduction circuit %d.",
serviceid, circuit->_base.n_circ_id);
@@ -1214,8 +1360,10 @@
"received INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on non-intro circuit.");
goto err;
}
+ tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest_and_version(
- circuit->rend_pk_digest, circuit->rend_desc_version);
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest,
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_desc_version);
if (!service) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown service on introduction circuit %d.",
circuit->_base.n_circ_id);
@@ -1225,7 +1373,7 @@
circuit->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO;
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32 + 1,
- circuit->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
log_info(LD_REND,
"Received INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on circuit %d for service %s",
circuit->_base.n_circ_id, serviceid);
@@ -1252,12 +1400,13 @@
tor_assert(circuit->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND);
tor_assert(circuit->cpath);
tor_assert(circuit->build_state);
+ tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
hop = circuit->build_state->pending_final_cpath;
tor_assert(hop);
- base16_encode(hexcookie,9,circuit->rend_cookie,4);
+ base16_encode(hexcookie,9,circuit->rend_data->rend_cookie,4);
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
- circuit->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
log_info(LD_REND,
"Done building circuit %d to rendezvous with "
@@ -1265,7 +1414,8 @@
circuit->_base.n_circ_id, hexcookie, serviceid);
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest_and_version(
- circuit->rend_pk_digest, circuit->rend_desc_version);
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest,
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_desc_version);
if (!service) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Internal error: unrecognized service ID on "
"introduction circuit.");
@@ -1274,7 +1424,7 @@
}
/* All we need to do is send a RELAY_RENDEZVOUS1 cell... */
- memcpy(buf, circuit->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
+ memcpy(buf, circuit->rend_data->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
if (crypto_dh_get_public(hop->dh_handshake_state,
buf+REND_COOKIE_LEN, DH_KEY_LEN)<0) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Couldn't get DH public key.");
@@ -1336,7 +1486,8 @@
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO))) {
if (!memcmp(circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest,
intro->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) &&
- circ->rend_desc_version == desc_version) {
+ circ->rend_data &&
+ circ->rend_data->rend_desc_version == desc_version) {
return circ;
}
}
@@ -1346,7 +1497,8 @@
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO))) {
if (!memcmp(circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest,
intro->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) &&
- circ->rend_desc_version == desc_version) {
+ circ->rend_data &&
+ circ->rend_data->rend_desc_version == desc_version) {
return circ;
}
}
@@ -1827,11 +1979,13 @@
rend_service_port_config_t *chosen_port;
tor_assert(circ->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED);
+ tor_assert(circ->rend_data);
log_debug(LD_REND,"beginning to hunt for addr/port");
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
- circ->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
- service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest_and_version(circ->rend_pk_digest,
- circ->rend_desc_version);
+ circ->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
+ service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest_and_version(
+ circ->rend_data->rend_pk_digest,
+ circ->rend_data->rend_desc_version);
if (!service) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Couldn't find any service associated with pk %s on "
"rendezvous circuit %d; closing.",
Attachment:
patch-121-4b.txt.sig
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