Re: [tor-dev] Draft Proposal: Random Number Generation During Tor Voting

[Tom van der Woerdt <info@xxxxxxx>]

I'm not a big fan of automated systems that ban authorities as it may get false positives and it may be gamed and/or attacked. 

An alternative solution is to make the voting a two-step system: first you publish the sha256 hash of your vote, then a few minutes later you publish the actual vote. If they didn't match, disregard the vote. 

It may be a bit more work to implement, but should prove valuable in the long run as it mitigates most cases of authorities trying to manipulate the consensus. 

Tom




> On 07 Sep 2015, at 09:05, s7r <s7r@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA256
> 
> Hi,
> 
> Sending the comments from #tor-dev here as well.
> 
> This is related to the attack where exactly half of the directory
> authorities commit to some values, and the last directory authority
> can send different values to both camps, and have the ultimate
> decision about the SR value. This isn't the worst thing a compromised
> / malicious authority could do, but this would be simple to detect and
> take action against, so it doesn't hurt to have it. If we see this
> happening in the wild, it will also warn us to take a closer look at
> that authority.
> 
> I think we should implement a ban score system, in which we ignore the
> shared randomness votes from authorities for which we see different
> commitment values within a close time frame:
> 
> A_1 vote:
> A_1 -> 7
> A_2 -> 15
> A_3 -> 21
> 
> A2_vote:
> A_1 -> 7
> A_2 -> 15
> A_3 -> 21
> 
> A_3 vote:
> A_1 -> 11
> A_2 -> 15
> A_3 -> 21
> 
> In this case we give a ban score of 1 to A_1. We put a timestamp on
> the ban-score and remember that A_1 stepped wrong for a longer period
> of time, maybe 30 days. If the ban score of a directory authority
> reaches value 2, we ignore that authority and agree on a SR value
> without it. Maybe we don't even need value 2 here, this shouldn't be
> possible to happen accidentally (need to properly document what is the
> behavior when an authority goes offline, OS/hardware failure, power
> cutoff, gets disconnected from the internet, etc. [TODO]).
> 
> For such a system to work without opening the door to other attacks,
> each authority needs to include in its vote the commitment values
> received from other authorities including their cryptographic
> signature (related to the identity of the authority sending the
> commitment value), so all other authorities can verify that a certain
> authority sent / signed 2 different commitment values in a short time
> frame, and A_3 did not lie that it received commitment value 11 from
> A_1, while A_2 and A_1 claim the received commitment value from A_1 is
> 7. Without this, any authority can increase the ban score of other
> authority on purpose, while the targeted authority is in fact "not
> guilty".
> 
> We also need a tiebreaker besides the time stamp for when we have an
> even number of directory authorities and exactly half of them commit
> to something, the other half to something else. In this case we could
> implement the same simple system as we currently have for relay
> descriptors: shortest digest value wins.
> 
> 
>> On 8/3/2015 5:03 PM, George Kadianakis wrote:
>> Hello there,
>> 
>> we are glad to release a first draft of our proposal on distributed
>> random generation using the Tor voting process. It specifies how
>> Tor dirauths can generate a fresh random value every day using a
>> commit-and-reveal protocol. The protocol piggybacks on top of the
>> regular Tor voting procedure which happens every hour.
>> 
>> Our proposal spends lots of effort resolving the various edge cases
>> and engineering issues that come up when you are trying to fit such
>> a protocol into the Tor voting system. It also introduces a new
>> consensus flavor document which is used to host shared randomness
>> information, so that the regular consensus does not get affected if
>> this feature is flawed.
>> 
>> We are especially interested in feedback from people who are
>> familiar with the Tor voting protocol and can tell us whether we
>> have messed something up, or whether there are attacks that we did
>> not consider.
>> 
>> We hope the document (and the illustration) is helpful for
>> understanding the protocol. Let us know if you have any questions,
>> or suggestions for improving the proposal.
>> 
>> We believe this proposal is fundamental for the security of hidden
>> services and for developing proposal 224, hence we invite everyone
>> to provide feedback and improvements.
>> 
>> Thanks!
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32)
> 
> iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJV7Tc8AAoJEIN/pSyBJlsRsPcH/2eVMUWpMwQBsjhbY4Qru2Q/
> IWOFTQY/C3A26Su/viZASzyzV7IoLPTTokbajOOUMVe04zqD7Kl2wvXwPLZ8/LHx
> 06wkr4tURTM0DXwvOzhnYJPXURlxDuZwLpUjOXe7YSpHNoRkJBh+rOd+i4CBmo1E
> imFa1HDgkMG3zn/GErbzhEZiGUTyh9wsdGdMl4LGcqNjc+6B9Uxccq5wG6lMoSuC
> bj9bNFpBROzspPGrRyx/zTfpQW18AHU3G/A+A4zgOW8m53W/krZyl2MxOiLVXTWD
> eIvHyV9uo3FKx2Jd4eLVtbVw4/bpKq25/Au+fSlTB0smxDaKb4z77JFyoLYOiL4=
> =EsTQ
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> _______________________________________________
> tor-dev mailing list
> tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
_______________________________________________
tor-dev mailing list
tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev