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Re: [tor-dev] More tor browser sandboxing fun.

To: tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [tor-dev] More tor browser sandboxing fun.
From: grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2016 22:40:38 -0400
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There is VM's, and
Multiple X server can isolate on up to all available vty's.
There is also program shipped by X11 called Xnest.
But the more concern than apps and keyboards above,
is probably the driver / kernel portion of security surface.
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References:
- [tor-dev] More tor browser sandboxing fun.
  - From: Yawning Angel
- Re: [tor-dev] More tor browser sandboxing fun.
  - From: grarpamp
- Re: [tor-dev] More tor browser sandboxing fun.
  - From: Stanisław Kosma
- Re: [tor-dev] More tor browser sandboxing fun.
  - From: Yawning Angel

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