On 13 Dec (16:26:02), David Goulet wrote: > On 13 Dec (21:11:17), Yawning Angel wrote: > > On Tue, 13 Dec 2016 10:37:31 -0800 > > David Fifield <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > This is a bit of a followup to my earlier post on obfs4 bridges with > > > formulaic nicknames: > > > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-project/2016-November/000809.html > > > > > > > > > Those bridges are still there, but today I noticed a new weirdness: > > > 756 bridges all having the nickname "ki". 756 is 21.8% of the total > > > number, 3464. At the moment, "ki" far outnumbers every other > > > nickname, apart from "Unnamed": > > [snip] > > > > Should both groups be dropped at the BridgeAuth or what? As far as I > > am aware, there is nothing that is doing Sybil detection at the Bridge > > level, and I don't really think that's an arms race that's winnable > > (even at the standard relay level, it feels like an uphill battle). > > > > If I were to hypothesize, it's probably someone's botnet/malware or > > something (in both cases), but that's just a guess and it could be > > something either more nefarious, or more benign. > > Yes, we should be safe here and reject those. > > What's the procedure with the BridgeAuth? The dirauth-conf git repository > isn't made for the bridge authority. I want to bump this here btw.... I don't feel very comfortable with those bridge still around so we should REALLY block them soon. If I remember correctly, Roger told me on IRC that we either have to go through the BridgeAuth directly with reject rules (unconfirmed) or we block them on BridgeDB. I need someone with knowledge here and Isis needs to be in the loop as she basically run both service :). Thanks! David > > Cheers! > David > > > > > Regards, > > > > -- > > Yawning Angel > > _______________________________________________ > > tor-project mailing list > > tor-project@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-project > > _______________________________________________ > tor-project mailing list > tor-project@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-project
Attachment:
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
_______________________________________________ tor-project mailing list tor-project@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-project