> On 6 May 2016, at 19:30, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor <teor2345@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > >> On 6 May 2016, at 14:53, Virgil Griffith <i@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> I've received conflicting accounts as to whether the ethics guidelines require onionsites are to be opt-in [no spec yet?] or the current opt-out [i.e., /robots.txt]. > ... > There's one important exception to this general principle: Single Onion Services. > To avoid creating one-hop proxies, tor2web should not allow access to a single onion service. > We'e yet to arrive at a mechanism to make this happen, but I think we will end up adding a line to the onion service descriptor. > We could make this a configuration parameter (AllowTor2Web?) that defaults to 1 for hidden services, and 0 for single onion services. > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17945 After re-reading the ticket, there is another way to implement this feature without providing a generic method for onion services to block tor2web: The rendezvous point (and possibly the introduction point) could terminate the connection if it has a single hop on both ends. However, this could result in false positives if the consensus gets out of sync. Or is there a reliable way for a relay to detect non-relays without using the consensus? Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n
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