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Re: [tor-relays] Long-term effect of Heartbleed on Tor

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Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Long-term effect of Heartbleed on Tor
From: Paul Pearce <pearce@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wed, 9 Apr 2014 11:51:45 -0700
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> * Should authorities scan for bad OpenSSL versions and force their weight
> down to 20?

I'd be interested in hearing people's thoughts on how to do such
scanning ethically (and perhaps legally). I was under the impression
the only way to do this right now is to actually trigger the bounds
bug and export some quantity (at least 1 byte) of memory from the
vulnerable machine.
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Follow-Ups:
- Re: [tor-relays] Long-term effect of Heartbleed on Tor
  - From: Alexander Dietrich
- Re: [tor-relays] Long-term effect of Heartbleed on Tor
  - From: grarpamp
- Re: [tor-relays] Long-term effect of Heartbleed on Tor
  - From: Nils Kunze

References:
- [tor-relays] Long-term effect of Heartbleed on Tor
  - From: Tom van der Woerdt

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