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[tor-relays] Re: "upcoming" CIISS update
- To: tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: [tor-relays] Re: "upcoming" CIISS update
- From: nusenu via tor-relays <tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2026 01:01:29 +0100
- In-reply-to: <3b348083-30d1-4dcc-84d1-b818959ab2b1@riseup.net>
- List-id: "support and questions about running Tor relays (exit, non-exit, bridge)" <tor-relays.lists.torproject.org>
- References: <3b348083-30d1-4dcc-84d1-b818959ab2b1@riseup.net>
- Reply-to: nusenu <nusenu-lists@xxxxxxxxxx>
Short work in progress update:
* updated the proof value: https://github.com/nusenu/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification/tree/v3-dev?tab=readme-ov-file#proof
This should significantly reduce the effort required to maintain the proof after transitioning to the happy family design
because the proof does not need any updates when adding more relays.
* added a urlpolicy field: https://github.com/nusenu/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification/tree/v3-dev?tab=readme-ov-file#urlpolicy
This aims to solve the problem that there are known spoofer out there but operators had no policy option to tell the world
and tor directory autorities how they should handle relays that fail the url proof verification.
* added a signal username field
Version 3 of the CIISS spec will become relevant once it is released and this onionoo issue is fixed and deployed:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/metrics/onionoo/-/issues/40051
I guess this will be the case once tor directory authorities are mostly running 0.4.9.x and that will be the case after that got released as stable tor release.
kind regards,
nusenu
--
https://nusenu.github.io
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