> On 5 Jul 2017, at 10:27, Fof582 <fof582@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> Most tor clients send a DNS name, and flags that say whether they >> allow IPv4 and IPv6, and which one they prefer. They rely on the Exit >> to resolve the IP address and connect to the site. >> >> On the current network, an IPv6-only Exit won"t get the Exit flag, and >> therefore won"t get much client traffic. And it probably shouldn"t, >> until almost all internet sites are on IPv6. Otherwise clients will >> ask it to connect to IPv4-only sites, and it will fail them. > > But thats exactly the case in a "tor exit that can only be reached by ipv6, but reach itself ipv4 and ipv6". > Can such a exit be run at the moment? IPv6 can be used on such a exit for in+out-traffic, IPv4 can be used to reach out everything - its just behind a NAT. > IPv4-only sites can be reached from the exit. The only case is that the exit itself can only be reached over IPv6 because of IPv4-NAT. No, Exits need bidirectional connectivity over IPv4, because clients need to build circuits to them via IPv4-only middle relays. (Otherwise the Exit would have to connect our to the middle relay before the path would work, which breaks the clique requirement.) A similar requirement applies to all public relays, and will continue to apply, until some researchers show how to preserve client anonymity in a non-clique network. IPv6-only bridges are a special case, because they only connect out. And they look like clients to the rest of the network. We just need to fix the Tor code that makes them work: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4847 T -- Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n xmpp: teor at torproject dot org ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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