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[tor-relays] Self hosting bridge at home - de-anonymization risk?
- To: tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: [tor-relays] Self hosting bridge at home - de-anonymization risk?
- From: bjewrn2a--- via tor-relays <tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2025 15:48:20 +0000
- Feedback-id: S:dc9a4f26-3793-469d-b443-6f9507f568d7:anonaddy
- List-id: "support and questions about running Tor relays (exit, non-exit, bridge)" <tor-relays.lists.torproject.org>
- Reply-to: bjewrn2a@xxxxxxxxxxxx
is there any documentation on self-hosting a bridge at home and using it for your own connections?
I am trying to understand why this isn't a recommended setup, would it lead to de-anonymization? Why/how much?
your traffic blends with other users directly via the same connection
other users use your bridge on a regular basis together with you and your hidden services
ISP monitoring of your exact connection times are made harder (not sure how much exactly)
I don't understand why hosting a bridge outside of your geographic location is necessary?
is it a problem that the first hop is from your own IP address if the other two hops are external?
were there any studies or similar questions asked before? I couldn't find anything
I can't find help anywhere, so would appreciate any advice
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