On 05/14/2017 11:56 AM, niftybunny wrote:The last time I checked .onion domains don’t need exits. Every Tor
node can be a chain of the path to the .onion domain. So it is
completely pointless to block all the exits and second: Exits are
the end of the chain to the “normal” internet, if you don’t want
outgoing Tor traffic from your internal network you fucking block
guards and entry/middle nodes not exits
Ummm, that's basically what I said. It was stupid for the writer to say"exits". But you know that blacklists include all Tor relays.
Okay, they will overkill/overblock all nodes but they are out of luck with bridges. So it is pointless but they will feel better? Wow, much secure, so block, such ASL, wow!
…. btw, good luck with blocking all guards ….
Guards are public, bro. But not all bridges, of course.
You are right, my bad. niftybunny
abuse@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Where ignorance is bliss, 'Tis folly to be wise.
Thomas Gray
PS: >In accordance with known best practices, any organization
who has SMB publically accessible via the internet (ports
139, 445) should immediately block inbound traffic.
WTF?!??!?!??!?!? WHY WOULD YOU EVEN ALLOW SMB TRAFFIC FROM
UNTRUSTED INTERNET SOURCES INTO YOUR NETWORK????? WHYYYY?????
Because you're a dumbass motherfucker ;)
Firewall default is to block all traffic. You have to allow this traffic. Without using an VPN this is a special case of stupid … On 15. May 2017, at 00:08, Mirimir <mirimir@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 05/14/2017 08:54 AM, niftybunny wrote:
Known TOR exit nodes are listed within the Security Intelligence
feed of ASA Firepower devices. Enabling this to be blacklisted
will prevent outbound communications to TOR networks.
Wait, what?
| WanaCrypt0r will then download a TOR client from
| https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/6.5.1/tor-win32-0.2.9.10.zip
| and extract it into the TaskData folder. This TOR client is used to
| communicate with the ransomware C2 servers at gx7ekbenv2riucmf.onion,
| 57g7spgrzlojinas.onion, xxlvbrloxvriy2c5.onion,
| 76jdd2ir2embyv47.onion, and cwwnhwhlz52maqm7.onion.
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/wana-decryptor-wanacrypt0r-technical-nose-dive/
Sad but true.
But what they want to block are guards and directory servers. But their
list will probably include all relays, so whatever.
Longer term, it's pointless, because malware authors can just hard code
bridges. Even custom unlisted bridges.
niftybunny
abuse@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Where ignorance is bliss, 'Tis folly to be wise.
Thomas Gray
On 14. May 2017, at 21:45, Jon Gardner <toradmin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
From the SNORT folks...
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/wannacry.html?m=1 <http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/wannacry.html?m=1>
".... Additionally, organizations should strongly consider blocking connections to TOR nodes and TOR traffic on network. Known TOR exit nodes are listed within the Security Intelligence feed of ASA Firepower devices. Enabling this to be blacklisted will prevent outbound communications to TOR networks."
<><
Jon L. Gardner
Mobile: +1 979-574-1189
Email/Skype/Jabber: jon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx <mailto:jon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
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