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[tor-relays] Update on attack in progress post 0.4.17 upgrade



I lost two HSDIR's to attacks pre-0.4.17 and one was under attack as 0.4.17 was released and upgraded. These are my observations:

First of all, in the post BEGIN_DIR new wave of attacks first reported by Forest, there were apparently two types. I will call them: Type A: Disproportionate ingress - very high traffic reported with ~6:1 ingress to output ratio Type B: Disproportionate output - very high traffic reported with ~1:2 ingress to output ratio, very high instances of circuit creation "Your computer is too slow..." messages, often 400,000 or more per minute. Note that this attack poisons ipset-style tor firewall rules.

I will report now a new type:
Type C: Traffic shutdown - traffic falls to very low levels with 1-2 MiB/s ingress and sub 1MiB/s output, medium to low cpu usage, very high number of "relay unresponsive" messages, affects other parts of the OS (can see slowdown in ssh connections to the machine), but does not trigger connection-attempt firewall rules.


Observations:
- One relay was under a type B attack at the time of my upgrade to 0.4.17. This relay had no traffic limits before the upgrade, at time of upgrade 12MiB/s rate limits were added.
- Pre-upgrade attack traffic was 18MiB/s ingress, ~40MiB/s output
- Post-upgrade and with traffic limits in place, traffic was extremely variable, 8MiB/s ingress, 4-20 MiB/s output. The relay was clearly still under Type B attack, but the effectiveness was significantly reduced. - The attach SHIFTED approximately 10 minutes after upgrade to the newly seen type C - The Type C attack caused repeat "relay unresponsive" log messages, dropping all traffic precipitously. - Relay unresponsive / resolved messages increased in frequency until traffic dropped to zero, tor's cpu usage was not terribly high - spiking in little spurts, but often as low ar 30%. - After the shift to Type C, my ipset firewall rules were re-enabled to no effect - no rules were triggered - Relay unresponsiveness ultimately caused loss of HSDIR. Attack ceased immediately on loss of HSDIR.

Analysis:
- As I have never seen a type A attack, I cannot myself say A and B are not similar symptoms of the same vector. That said, there are two to three independent vectors, and the current mitigations in 0.4.17 are insufficient to protect HSDIR.
- The attacks are AGILE, switching mid-attack to different vectors.
- It is unknown how many more tor protocol weaknesses are currently queued by the attacker, but given the sophistication of the attacks, it should be considered as given there are more waiting in the wings. - While it cannot be discounted this is merely a DoS against hidden services, this attacker is sophisticated enough for this to be a deanonymizing and tracking attack on hidden service operators and users. Attacks against friendly HSDIR nodes should be considered to be likely only half the threat, in conjunction with the attacker's own compromised HSDIR nodes.

Recommendations:
1) Get data now on what nodes are retaining HSDIR and not being attacked. These should be considered highly suspect nodes. 2) WARN WARN WARN - the responsible action is for the Tor project to officially warn that Tor Onion Hidden Services are currently AT RISK FOR DEANONYMIZATION AND CONNECTION TRACKING. 3) The Tor Project should consider relaxing rules for giving out HSDIR to keep the population of friendly HSDIR nodes very high. This will attract more attacks, which will spread the attack surface out more and tax the attacker. Currently the attacker is rewarded for a two hour attack by days of HSDIR loss in the target. Once granted, consider making HSDIR sticky for one week or more. 4) Rate limits on every single tor network transaction must be implemented and this should be considered to be an emergent threat. 5) When any attack mitigation is released, the mitigation code MUST LOG THE IP ADDRESS OF NODES THAT TRIGGER THE MITIGATIONS. BEGIN_DIR rate limit hitting should have triggered informational log entries with the node fingerprint and IP address. If you do not start treating this as a sustained, ongoing, coordinated attack and start taking more global affirmative mitigation measures, you are going to be permanently operating in catch-up mode. LOG IT! THE LACK OF ATTACK LOGGING IS IRRESPONSIBLE!

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