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[tor-relays] Re: HSDir attacks



Is this the wrong forum?  It strikes me that this is the biggest attack, and
the only one to have affected my servers ever in over decade running Tor 

Why so little noise about it?  What research is going on?  and any
mitigation likely soon?

My exit node, normally around No 2 and UK exit was crashed out by the
assumed HSDir-shaping attack

It last appeared as Running at 10:00 UTC
? From 10:05 to 12:14 UTC, Tor logged continuous:
?Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests!?
? At the peak, Tor suppressed roughly 390,000 similar warnings per minute
? Latest heartbeat recorded 44,690 open circuits
? Inbound ORPort population: 8,826 channels
? Sources: 6,831 unique peers across 2,849 IPv4 /24 networks
? Onionoo now reports Running=false, hence no current flags
? Both IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts remain externally reachable
? Tor is active, configuration is valid, RAM/FD/disk are healthy
The attack has now largely subsided because the relay was removed from the
consensus: Tor CPU is presently only ~17%, and the connection population is
stable.

Gerry


-----Original Message-----
From: gerard@xxxxxxxxxxxx <gerard@xxxxxxxxxxxx> 
Sent: 15 November 2026 12:25
To: 'support and questions about running Tor relays (exit, non-exit,
bridge)' <tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: RE: [tor-relays] HSDir attacks

Update

Updated relay contributionx to Tor 0.4.9.17 and restarted at 12:17 UTC.
HSDir remained. Within five minutes it had 5,700 established ORPort
connections from 4,654 unique IPv4 addresses, with Tor using approximately
70% CPU. Temperature was 64?67°C and RSS approximately 731 MB. The same
high-count source addresses seen before shutdown reappeared. No overload
warning had yet been emitted by the fresh process, but the distributed
connection attack clearly resumed immediately.

Gerry

-----Original Message-----
From: DocGerry via tor-relays <tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: 15 November 2026 12:14
To: 'support and questions about running Tor relays (exit, non-exit,
bridge)' <tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: gerard@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [tor-relays] HSDir attacks

I run a busy Tor exit which has not regained all its flags over the last two
weeks.  My webtunnels have been unaffected

My small relay on underpowered old laptop really suffers and was set cooking
to 95C from severe Tor circuit-creation load, consistent with the HSDir
attack reports. "contribution", fingerprint
97AF9CDBEEFDFDF0632845A14319BFE6B4454794, Tor 0.4.9.15, regained HSDir cools
but hours later day became severely overloaded. At 2026-11-15 11:52 UTC it
had 8,484 established ORPort connections from 5,904 unique IPv4 addresses
across 3,483 /24s, Tor at 71% CPU and 3.7 GB RSS, host temperature 95°C, and
load average 3.75. Tor reported 12,631 open circuits and continuous ?too
slow to handle this many circuit creation requests?
warnings, including 13,698 suppressed events in two minutes. General
overload reported 260,729 dropped Ntor requests (1.2948%, threshold 0.5%).
All is consistent with the distributed HSDir-targeted circuit attack.   I
turned it off to cool it down.

Gerry


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