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[tor-relays] Re: SSHD security for your relay/bridge



On Thursday, 29 October 2026 05:38:35 CET 3hn92a--- via tor-relays wrote:

> What about the -sk version of mldsa44-ed25519?

In the case of NitroKey 3, OnlyKey, and SoloKey, the hardware unfortunately 
does not support these cryptographic operations. The computation of ML-DSA 
signatures and the storage of massive post-quantum keys (exceeding 1.3 KB) 
overwhelm the memory and cryptographic architecture of current FIDO2 tokens.

I am waiting for the new NitroKeys and OnlyKeys. They will also have large 
hardware-based password storage. (similar to the old Signet HC)
For now, I am happy with ed25519-sk (non-resident = Default) and ed25519-sk_rk 
(resident) keys. Additionally: In nftables, SSH is permitted only for a few IP 
addresses.

GrapheneOS + PGPPony¹ can do post-quantum cryptography.
¹OpenKeychain successor
https://pgpony.app/guides/migrate-openkeychain.php

> On Wed, 28 Oct 2026, George via tor-relays wrote:
> > Since the topic has come up again recently, I put up a short guide on
> > some best practices for OpenSSH.
> > 
> > https://nycbug1.nycbug.org/openssh.html
> > 
> > Note that as of OpenSSH 10.3, the first quantum computing-resistant key
> > cipher is available, mldsa44-ed25519, and if both the client and server
> > versions are capable, you should replace your keys with the new cipher.
> > (https://www.openssh.org/releasenotes.html#10.3)
> > 
> > Comments offline appreciated, but the guide is meant to be short and
> > actionable.
> > 
> > George

-- 
╰_╯ Ciao Marco!

Debian GNU/Linux

It's free software and it gives you freedom!

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