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Cover Traffic
- To: or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: Cover Traffic
- From: 2600denver <2600denver@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 15 Apr 2006 10:16:51 -0700
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I know that the tor wiki suggests that people use cover traffic in order to increase their anonymity. Since each link is encrypted, why don't servers create their own cover traffic using a 1:2 rule. For every one packet it recieves, it sends 2 blank packets. An adversary observing the connection wouldn't be able to distinguish between cover traffic and real traffic (perhaps cover traffic could even have a different private key)
Here's how I imagine it working:
you-->(one packet, two covers)tornode1-->(one packet, two new cover packets)tornode2-->(one packet, two new cover packets)tornode3-->internet
Once the cover packet is decoded by the next server, it will recognize it as a cover packet and simply drop it and generate two new cover packets. Does this seem like a plausable solution to stop timing and point-to-point attacks?
Ringo Kamens