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Re: Is three hops enough? (was Re: Tor client over a SOCKS proxy, and Tor client running through another Tor Circuit)

On 4/28/06, glymr <glymr_darkmoon@xxxxxxx> wrote:
Hash: RIPEMD160

On Fri, Apr 28, 2006 at 11:47:07AM -0400, Anthony DiPierro wrote:
>> If there is an attack that can be made, for example, over a 9 hop
>>  chain where an attacker only has two nodes compromised, I'm not
>> sure what it is.  I suppose there could be some sort of timing
>> attack, one that can't be easily mitigated by cover traffic.
>> Maybe that's what I'm missing.
what you are missing is that more hops results in a hell of a lot of
cover traffic, but does nothing about compromised nodes. killing
responsiveness with so many hops defeats the point of tor tho, since
its main purpose is for low and medium latency applications.

Well, if it only takes 2 compromised nodes in a circuit to compromise
that circuit, then Tor isn't really useful for anything other than
keeping your IP address out of server logs. That's fine, as that's
all I use Tor for anyway, and it works well for that limited purpose. I just thought there was more potential.

Anyway, as I've said in my other post, I need to delve a lot deeper
into the design information.  I should probably build my own client
while I'm at it - to really understand what's going on.

Thanks for your help and information.