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Re: [tor-talk] Users profiling through personÐl banners filtering settings
On Tue, 22 Mar 2011 18:26:34 +0000
unknown <unknown@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Too many users dislikes of annoying web elements -- banners, popups, scripts,
> strange frames. They use a tools to blocks that elements or change webpage rendering.
> Traditional programs for filtering is a local proxys -- privoxy or polipo are examples with
> close relation to Tor and used actively. This programs cannot filtering SSL-content and evil site
> can use mix of SSL-ed and non-SSL-ed banners, pop-ups, etc to determine a fact
> of using such proxy and trying to guess personal users filtering settings.
> The problem may be even worse, with or without using this proxy, even if users block
> contents within a browser itself (with Firefox plugins to block banners, and scripts). Not
> only sites, but "mans in the middles", adversarial clusters of evil exit nodes
> can does parsing traffic and modifying web contents by injecting banners, misconfigured
> cookies, incorrect frames.
> Injected traffic for various sites, in different times
> and seances can be the way of revealing users with personal blocking rules. Data
> about blocking profiles of that users may be statistical processed and correlated.
> Is it a real threat? Should Tor users stop blocking contents
> selectively? Or they can use predefined and shared rules in analogy of Torbutton?
Let me describe a two examples about users blocks banners in privoxy/polipo/adblock/etc:
1. Webhost can see that user block russian/german/chinese/etc big portal banners. Webservers owner can make a conjecture about specific language of the user.
2. One exit or colluding exit nodes can compare banners blocking profiles from time to time. Profiles can be linked from different seances.
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