On Fri, 29 Aug 2008, Isaac Levy wrote:
Hi All,
So this is a bit of a cross-post, I thought it was relevant/
interesting, since we've all been buzzing about our very own Alex,
and
the wild Defcon demo on scary BGP re-routing; and many folks here
have
an interest in the TOR network.
ike-summary:
- Essentially, the first poster asks if the BGP attack could be
used to
break TOR anonynimity.
- The second poster explains a quick no, and then a sort of 'yes but
it's not in the realm of sanity', in good detail.
The second poster is correct.
-alex
From: "John Brooks" <aspecialj@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: August 29, 2008 1:46:30 AM EDT
To: or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: (Theory) The BGP exploit: Effects on Tor routing and
overall anonymity?
Reply-To: or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
The short answer is no, not much. The long answer is a lot longer
than that, so get ready :P
This would serve the person intercepting the traffic in near exactly
the same way it does the operator of the node - entry nodes know the
client, middle nodes know the entry and exit nodes, exit nodes know
the destination (and the traffic to that destination). You would
still need to intercept a significant amount of nodes before being
able to break anonymity and tell which users are responsible for
what traffic - which is a problem because the entire reason this
attack works is that it targets more specific IP blocks. That many
announcements (for various nodes) would be pretty easy to see. If an
attacker were able to intercept traffic on the entry and exit nodes,
or the client and destination, they could use timing and bandwidth
correlations to tell (with high probability) that this client is
accessing this destination. But this is no different from an
attacker with control of the entry node or exit/destination.
The only way to make use of it that doesn't involve guessing at what
nodes are in use would be to start at one end and work backwards or
forwards in realtime. Essentially, you start by intercepting traffic
to a target destination, then intercept traffic to the exit node
contacting that destination, then intercept traffic to the middle
node contacting that exit, then the entry node contacting that
middle node, and finally to the client. The problem here is that
you'd need a consistant (and obvious) traffic pattern sustained
throughout that time (which would be long, due to the large amount
of traffic most nodes handle and that BGP is not instantaneous),
which is not generally true of HTTP requests. The complexity of such
an attack would be problematic, and it still involves quite a lot of
guesswork.
So no, this isn't a significant risk to tor anonymity, it's at best
a quicker way to intercept traffic and follow a node path to its
source, and I would be amazed if that were pulled off successfully.
Remember that this exploit only allows you to intercept traffic *to*
a specific destination, and in that situation you have no more
information than the real destination does (less, in fact, because
you don't see the traffic going the other direction unless you
intercept that too).
- John Brooks
On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 11:21 PM, F. Fox <kitsune.or@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
Once I read about the recent BGP exploit (
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/08/revealed-the-in.html ) -
which
has the potential to re-route the traffic of millions of users - I
had a
question, from a theoretical standpoint:
If such siphoning drew in traffic passing in between Tor nodes, would
this have an effect on reducing anonymity for the users having their
traffic relayed by these nodes? If so, how?
- --
F. Fox
Owner of Tor node "kitsune"
http://fenrisfox.livejournal.com
Note 2008/08/19: I lost my old GPG keypair, and have generated a new
one. Authenticity can be verified by checking the ContactInfo on
kitsune.
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