Re: [tor-talk] de-anonymization by correlating circuit changes

[Phillip <equusaustralus@xxxxxxxxx>]

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>> You mentioned having traffic logs from all possible servers.
>> If by "servers" you mean 'honestly and properly run Tor relays',
>> then those logs do not exist, so what you are saying is not
>> possible.
>
> Well, yes, i meant exactly this scenario. Unfortunately, this is
> possible today. Some countries in europe have indroduced data
> renetion laws, like denmark. They log, for example, everz 100 or
> 500 IP Packet passing a providers network.
>
> So, of course, you wont have a log with all packets, but i think,
> one, which enough information, to correlate the time of incoming
> packets (to the exit relay) and outgoing packets (to a website
> e.g.).
Would this apply if you are running a Tor relay? i.e. impossible to
correlate the time of the incoming packet??

Perhaps the solution is to make it as easy as possible for anyone to
be a low bandwidth tor relay (with speeds of say 32-64 kb/s), which
would increase the size of the network and also the person's
anonymity? I'm thinking as close to possible as 2 clicks and voila...
as it is, it's still a relatively complicated endeavour!


- -- 

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